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"If asked, workers will convincingly confirm that 
most factories are dangerous and unpleasant places 
to work in. Workers have to put up with the 
incessant noise from machines, dust from grinders or 
drills, heat from furnaces or the exposure to 
chemicals and gas fumes that are involved in various 
production processes. Workers will also tell that /'\ 
in the majority of factories, protective clothing is J 
at a minimum and protective devices such as hand 
covers on machines, or air blankets to blanket 
I 
1 
fumes, or fans to blow away dust, are not often 
provided.- This lack of protection results in many '"'-----,,,. 
injuries, and in 1974 it was estimated that 100 000 
hands, 50 000 feet and 40 000 eyes were badly 
injured, 31 000 men and women would be permanently 
maimed, several hundred were injured severely enough 
not to be able to return to work, and 2 284 were 
killed." 1 / 
The above was written ten years ago and, for many workers, 
probably little has changed in the intervening years. 
Nevertheless, some changes have taken place. The figures 
have changed, conditions in many factories have changed and 
there has been a process of legislative reform incorporating 
new developments in the field of workplace health and 
safety. But perhaps the major change has been the coming of 
age of the democratic union movement in this country. 
In many countries, particularly in some of the advanced 
capitalist countries, trade unions have historically played 
/~-~~·~.~.:,::;\ a crucial role in bringing about improvements in the working 
v,J. environment. The role of organised labour in improving 
occupational health and safety in North America, Western 
Europe and the Scandinavian countries has been especially 
marked since the 1960s, both through collective bargaining 
at the industry and national level and through the political 
1. Adler T: The prevention o~ occupational diseases and 
industrial accidents in South A~rican industry. South 
A~rican Labour Bulletin, 1979, 4(9&10), p.55 
' f, .. ,... 
role of labour in these countries. The giEjor objective of 
particip~tion has been to assert "the principle of the 
active and P!"i()rjtx_ role of workers and their 
_representatives in occupational safety and health. These 
claims have been upheld as justified in a number of 
countries where these new elements of workers' rights not 
only to be protected, but also to be informed about, to 
participate in decision taking on. and to exercise control 
over this protection - are now incorporated in the 
legislation." 2 
-
The continued growth and maturing of South Africa's 
democratic unions has held out the prospect of unions here 
adopting a similar role (if different in form), particularly 
as the principle of participation in workers' health and 
safety would be consistent with other commonly held 
principles in the union movement principles such as 
democracy and workers' control. And, indeed, over the last 
decade, unions that are today affiliates of both the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) have established a 
record of dealing with workplace health and safety. even if 
I 
not always as a prominent feature of their activities. 
,A union which has accorded workplace health and safety 
exceptional attention is that organising in the country's 
most hazardous industry, mining, which "remains the industry 
in which safety and health issues are most vigorously 
contested." 3 The focus on health and safety in the mining 
industry dates back to the early part of this century, but 
it has been the militant National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
that, during the 1980s, has begun to confront employers on 
conditions of the underground environment. 4 It is, of 
2. Parmeggiani L: State of the art: Recent legislation on 
wod,:ers' health and safety. International Labour Review, 
1982, 121 ( 3) , pa 275 
3. Bachman M, Leger J, Macun I, Price M: The privatisation 
of industrial health and health services. Forthcoming 
in: South African Research Services (eds): South A~rican 
Review 5. Johannesburg: Ravan Press 
4. A considerable body of sociological literature dealing 
with safety in the mining industry has been developed, 
largely through the work of Jean Leger and the Sociology 
. ' \ 
t ... r r_. 
_..., 
. ) ' 
' , 
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course, precisely the hazardous underground conditions that 
explain why t_he NUM has had health and safety placed high on 
its agenda by its members. In response, the NUM has placed 
safety squarely within the industry's framework of 
collective bargaining, both at the level of the individual 
mine and at the industry level. The union has also engaged 
the government department responsible for the industry over 
issues concerning mining safety and proposed legislation. 
No union representing workers in the South African 
manufacturing sector has dealt as systematically and 
consistently with the health and safety concerns of its 
members as has the NUM. In contrast, unions in the 
manufacturing sector have generally tended to deal with 
s_a~ety matters on an ad hoc basis, mainly in individual 
. --- ------. -
plants, although occasionally at industry level. Some of 
the reasons for the difference are obvious, most notably 
that there are no extensively organised sectors that have 
accident and disease rates as high as those in mining. 
Hazards in many industries in the manufacturing sector also 
tend to be far less obvious and it is more often the case 
that some rudimentary forms of control are exercised to 
protect workers. A problem identified by Adler was that the 
statutorily established standards "are not seen as basic 
minima, but are the only standards and policing procedures 
-~· allowed. The essential role of collective bargaining is 
v 
· _excluded. "l5 In this regard, there has been some change 
since the late 1970s: present legislative regulation could . ----
be seen as establishing a minimum fr~mework only and 
at!empts at dealing with health an~_safety vi~_t~e 
_c~~~<:1:_i_ve_ bargaining proce~s have been made. But even 
where unions have achieved improvements, they have seldom 
been sustained, largely because of a failure to establish a 
continued role for organised labour in policing the 
workplace from the point of view of safety and health. 
Without such a role, very few ad hoc improvements achieved 
through collective bargaining, or through other means, are 
of Work Programme, Department of So~iology, Univ. of the 
Wi twatet-st· and 
5 .. Adler: op cit!, 1979, p .. 65 
likely to remain in force to protect the health and safety 
of future generations of workers. 
Given the above characterisation of union approaches to 
regulating workplace health and safety in manufacturing. 
this thesis will, therefore, be concerned with trying to 
develop an understanding of what the difficulties have been 
4 
in bringing about improvements to the working environment in 
manufacturing. The role of labour will be of central 
concern, but an attempt will also be made to analyse the 
role of the other participants in the regulatory process, 
-~ namely, the state and employers. The period with which the 
V\(CM \fa--<' ~·C<ll 
o.rk.s..,:'5 <.),/',... thesis is concerned is the 1980s. The area is clearly a 
:;cu-co-...h,,c,~J-very broad one and no claims will be made to providing a 
'.. lse ,,0orcv'i:!comprehens i ve study. Rather, i.t is hoped that the Qresent 
study will provide some new data and some original insights 
into the regulatory process which will provoke further 
discussion and research in the field of occupational health 
and safety in South Africa. 
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Introduc_t ion 
This thesis is partly based on a research project undertaken 
while the writer was a member of the Industrial Health 
Research Group. The aim of the research, which was carried 
.,..~, o1-- Rskout in the period 1986 to-early 1988, was to study the 
.! , ; l ·. c_)p. 
·. feel 
implementation of a particular piece of legislation.,the 
Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. The research data 
did not, however, reveal much more than was already known 
about certain aspects of workplace health arid safety and 
tended largely to confirm certain predictions that had been 
made by other writers about the nature of the Act and likely 
responses to it.~ More importantly, in analysing the way in 
which legislative interventi~n could shape practices around 
health and safety, it became clear that such practices could 
equally well be shaped in other· ways, principally via 
employer and trade union initiatives. Indeed, it would 
appear that the latter, when they occur, may be the more 
successful initiatives in terms of establishing effective 
mechanisms for dealing with problems of health and safety in 
the workplace. In this case, Kahn-Freund's observation 
applies very aptly, namely, that "everywhere.the 
effectiveness of the law depends on the unions far more than 
the unions depend on the effectiveness of the law." 2 
Any change to working conditions or the enforcement of 
existing legal regulation, however, invariably involves the 
interaction of the major parties to the lab9ur relation, as 
well as the state, and it is primarily through this process 
of interaction - often struggle - that regulatory policies 
and practices are shaped. This fundamentally social process 
1. _See inter alia: 
Myers J, Steinberg M: Health and sa~ety organisation: A 
perspective on the Machinery and Occupational Sa~ety 
Act. South A~rican Labour Bulletin, 1983, 8(8) & 9(9)~ 
Maller J, Steinberg M: Health and sa~ety: An issue in 
industrial relations. South A~rican Labour Bulletin, 
1984, 9 ( 7); 
Pennington S: The Machinery and Oc~upational Sa~ety Act: 
Whose prerogative is sa~ety management? Indicator SA, 
1985, 2 ( 4) 
2. Davies P, Ft-e.•1c"?dland M: Kahn-Freund's "Labour and the 
l~w". London: Stevens & S6ns, 1983, p.21 
) ' .,,, 
"'. [""· 
r 1 • r .,, . 
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is often ignored in the literature dealing with occupational c 
Jhealth and safety, which tends to be concerned largely with 
general critique, specific epidemiological investigations or 
critiques of state policy. What has also received only 
limited attention is the extent to which trade unions do or 
do not participate in the regulation of production, 
particularly as regards improving the physical well-being of 
workers. The above deficiencies in the literature are 
particularly marked with regard to material dealing with the 
contemporary South African situation, although recent 
writing has attempted to fill in some of the gaps. 3 
From its origins in a fairly specific project, then, the 
thesis grew into a more exploratory study, focussing on the 
regulatory process and the parties to the process and on the 
role of trade unions in controlling the working environment. 
An underlying issue is that of ~orkplace health and safe~y 
itself,_wh_ich_, __ a~ a factor.in any industrial relations 
- ~~-----·--~--·-
scenario, combines two distinct aspects. On the one hand, - - --~ _____::,_._-- ----~ - ~- -
there is a set of scientific concerns which have to do with 
most systems of production - concerns that relate to the raw 
materials used in production, the way they are used and the 
machinery that is used to produce goods. The evaluation of 
hazards in a system of production in turn depends on the 
medical sciences and techniques of industrial hygiene. 
On the other hand, he~l ~]1 c!mi. s-:~ety ~t wor~ _is integrally 
tied to industrial relations - the relations between the 
- ------~ . ----
different parties in the workplace which determine how work· --------
fs done, the rules and_~~o~~dure~ which govern.the system of 
production and the management of such a system. The two 
components may often be interrelated. but they are not 
identical. A common denominator. however, is that of costs. 
which enter into decisions affecting most aspects of 
----·· ----·---
3. See, intet" alia: 
Mallet" J: Health and sa-fety -for workers: A study o-f 
conditions o-f health and sa-fety in the metal industry in 
the Vaal Triangle. BA(Hons) thesis, Univ. o~ the 
Witwatet"st"and. Bt"aam~ontein:DSG/Critical Health, 
Disset"tation Series No.4, 1983; 
Myers J, Macun I: The sociologic context o~ occupational 
health in South A~t"ica. American Journal o-f Public 
Health, 1989, 79(2) 
8 
production and the extent of which - perhaps particularly in 
the case of health and safety - is often determined by 
industrial relations factors. 
Following on the above, a first hypothesis of the thesis is, 
- . ---~ ---
therefore, that workplace health and safety is a more 
complex issue, both organisationally and technically, than 
other industrial relations issues. It is, moreover, 
precisely this complexity and the failure by either of the 
parties to the regulation process to adequately take into 
account both the technical and industrial relations 
components that often results in a failure to control, or 
only partial control of hazards at work. 
The second hypothesis arose out of the writer's experience, 
as a member of the Industrial Health Research Group, of 
working with union organisers and union members on health 
and safety issues. What became apparent was that, although 
unions are adept at dealing with a wide range of issues, 
including health and safety, via the collective bargaining 
process, the way in which they do so is circumscribed by 
various factors, some of which are beyond the control of 
trade unions. Effective, preventive action on health and 
safety requires ongoing involvement by workers to monitor 
the working environment and to identify the areas of the 
_§ystem where they can intervene to prevent danger. In the 
South African situation, however, such factors as limited 
resources, state political intervention in industrial 
relations, the need to address basic rights of workers and 
inadequate wage rates limit the extent to which unions can 
adequately address preventive aspects of regulation. More 
often, unions and workers are obliged to maximise short term 
gains - the immediate removal of a hazard and/or -· 
compensation for damage. One could therefore hypothesize 
that institutional trade union pressure i~. commonly 
_., "\ orientated towards short-term goals, which may be of limited 
)' 








'and safety . 
. ' 
efficacy, rather than towards longer-term 
of production as regards its effects on health 
' ,-~ \.,1.) \. .' 'Q, \ ~\. "'-" ( ' / 
L 
\ ....... 'y- - \ ' ' ', . 
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A final hypothesis concerns the roles of the respective 
parties to the regulation process, namely, the state, 
employers and organised labour. It has been suggested 
above, that it is necessary to deal analytically with 
regulation, as a process, occurring through the actions of 
the three parties, each of which brings somewhat different 
interests to bear on regulatory activity. Precisely because 
of the different interests at play, the respective roles of 
the state. employers and labour should ideally be clearly 
and positively defined, particularly with regard to the 
issue of compliance with regulation. The various roles and, 
to some extent, the interests of employers and. labour, are 
most commonly governed by legislation which provides the 
ambit for _formal regulation involving the state. But formal 
regulation is not the only source of role definition. The 
collective bargaining process is another source for the 
rules and procedures which govern the different interests 
and roles in industry - a mechanism for informal regulation. 
For effective regulation, which inc 1 udes monitoring·· 
compliance with rules and procedures by both management and 
labour, there is, therefore, a need for a meshing of formal 
and informal regulation and a continued role for the state, 
not only at a consultative and legislative l~vel, but in the 
workplace as well. It is hypothesized, however, that there 
is commonly a disjuncture between formal and informal 
regulation, or a disjuncture between the roles assigned to 
the state, employers and labour in regulating the workplace 
and the actual practices of the parties. Such disjuncture 
contributes to the failure of regulatory activity. 
One of the main objectives of the thesis will be to examine 
the above hypotheses in the South African context. Apart 
from a brief historical overview of early forms of 
legislative regulation, the focus will be the period from 
the late 1970s to the present, with particular emphasis on 
the period covering the passage of the Machinery and 
Occupational Safety Act (MOSA). The main data against 
--~-~-~-~ 
the hypotheses will be examined will be a survey of the 
implementation of MOSA and two case studies of industry-
level regulation. 
The study is, however, also concerned with a broader set of 
objectives, the first being that of conceptualising the 
regulatory process: what does regulation mean, what are its 
determinants and what is its efficacy? A second important 
objective of the thesis arises from the context within which 
regulation takes place, namely the labour process, defined, 
following Burawoy, as" ... the coordinated set of activities 
and relations involved in the transformation of raw 
materials into useful products." 4 Through statutory 
regulation, the state intervenes directly into the labour 
process and it is the labour process which provides the 
terrain within which the other parties to the labour 
relation, namely employers and workers, interact and relate 
to the working environment. The thesis will, therefore, 
attempt to conceptualise health and safety in terms of the 
labour process. 
A third objective will be to examine the organisational 
aspect of workplace health and safety. Since the 1960s 
there has been a clear move .in a number of countries towards 
___.--the development of organisational models that provide for 
worker participation in the monitoring of production vis a 
vis health and safety. Such models also attempt to shape 
the nature of the relationships between employers and labour 
around issues of health and safety. South Africa has 
followed this trend, although in its own particular way, and 
a central concern of the thesis will be to analyse and 
evaluate the model introduced in this country through the 
Machinery & Occupational Safety Act (MOSA). The 
introduction of the latter legislation highlights an 
important point about state regulation of production, 
namely, that it is by no means static and assumes different 
forms at different times, depending on the kinds of forces 
operating on the state and within its institutions. In this 
regard, MOSA represents an important shift in statutory 
·regulation from its predecessor, the Factories Act. Under 
the. old Act, duties were spelt out in detail. were to be 
enforced by government agents and occupational health and 
4. Burawoy M: The politics o~ production. London: Verso, 
1985, p.87 
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safety was firmly separated from the broader sphere of 
organised industrial relations. MOSA has introduced a new 
philosophy of self-regulation and has also provided for an 
increased role for workers in health and safety matters at 
the workplace. An analysis of the shift will attempt to 
contextualise the-contemporary model for the regulation of 
production and to evaluate its potential effectivity in the 
South African situation. 
A final objective of the study has to do with questions 
concerning the role of South African unions in regulating 
occupational health and safety. In 1979, Adler outlined 
a number of conditions that he viewed as necessary 
prerequisites for unions to be in a position to make 
improvements to health and safety. These were: 
* the establishment of free collective bargaining rights for 
all workers; 
* recognition of the right of unions to include working 
conditions and their enforcement in the arena of 
collective bargaining and in industrial agreements; 
* right of access by workers and unions to standards and 
research of semi-government bodies; 
* withdrawal of secrecy provisions in the various Acts 
covering occupational health and safety; 
* withdrawal of the clause in the Workmen's Compensation Act 
preventing civil actions for damages by workers against 
negligent employers.~ 
Adler was writing in the pre-Wiehahn period and the 
amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act later in that 
year, as well as subsequent changes, have all enforced the 
principle of collective bargaining as a means of achieving 
5. Adler T: The prevention o~ occupational diseases and 
industrial accidents in South A~rican industry. South 
A~rican Labour Bulletin, 1979, 4(9&10), p.65 ' 
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industrial peace. While many employers may still view 
health and safety as an area that falls outside of the scope 
of bargaining. there have been a number of precedents where 
unions have achieved significant improvements to working 
conditions through the bargaining process. Unions also have 
access to specialised research through th& health and safety 
service organisations that have sprung up in nearly all the 
major centres during the 1980s. As regards the right of 
access to information concerning the production process. 
MOSA stipulates that it is a duty of employers to make 
employees conversant with the dangers attached to their 
work. 6 The final condition. which would allow workers to 
make "employers' negligence a very expensive matter" 7 , has 
not been met and is unlikely to be met under the present 
political dispensation. 
Clearly there have been significant changes in the 
conditions facing unions in South Africa. Yet the 
) democratic unions, despite their organisational strength. 
\ resilience and innovativeness, have still not systematically 
I 
incorporated health and safety into the range of issues with 
which they normally deal. Nor. despite some advances. is 
~-there a clear record of sustained improvements through the 
collective bargaining process. Why is this so? 
As previously stated, part of the background to the present 
thesis was the writer's involvement in consultancy and 
service ,work on occupational health and safety. The 
valuable contact with unions provided an opportunity to 
observe some of the real problems they face in dealing with 
an area such as health and safety. Common problems include 
resistance by employers to any attempted interventions by 
unions; limited personnel resources. making it difficult for 
unionists to allocate the time necessary to deal adequately 
with issues. which, by their nature. often require lengthy 
and complex investigation and negotiation; and coping with 
frequent interruptions to any sustained programne of 
6. General Administrative Regulations. GN R2206, GG 9453, 
5 October 1984, section 5(h) 
7. Adler: op cit, 1979, p.65 
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intervention arising out of the highly politicised 
industrial relations system and repressive political system 
in South Africa. In addition, unions in this country are 
also faced, by and large, with the problems that are thrown 
up by the inadequate educational system .experienced by the 
majority of their members, the result of which is a real 
shortage of technical skills in the area of occupational 
health and safety. 
The above factors could support the argument that the lack 
of systematic attention to health and safety reflects only·a 
deve 1 opmenta 1 phase and that, i.n time, when such prob 1 ems 
have been overcome, South African unions, like others 
elsewhere, will turn their _attention to health and safety 
and deal with it comprehensively. The latter argument 
should not, however, be accepted uncritically and the thesis 
will attempt to examine the capacity of unions to effect 
changes to working conditions and to identify the problems 
they face in doing so. 
Chapter One will deal with the theoretical concerns of the 
thesis. The point of departure will be the Marxist analysis 
of the labour process and its influence on djscussions of 
the labour process and workers' health. An attempt will be 
made to critically review the use of the concept of control 
in relation to struggles between employers and workers over 
working conditions. An alternative, in the form of 'control 
by rule', will be discussed and different sources of control 
over the labour process wili be identified and discussed. 
The second chapter will sunmarise the historical background 
to statutory regulation of health and safety in the 
manufacturing sector in South Africa. The chapter will 
primarily be concerned with the legislative changes and 
commissions of enquiry that preceded and resulted in the 
drafting of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. The 
passage-of MOSA will be outlined and the major features of 
the Act will be discussed. The main aim of the chapter will 
be to examine the changing function of legislative 
regulation and the state's role in the regulatory process. 
13 
The third chapter analyses the implementation of MOSA, based 
on a sample survey.of companies and trade unions in the 
Greater Cape Town area. The chapter will provide empirical 
information on responses to the state's model for 
regulation. as well as highlight certain aspects of the role 
of employers and unions in controlling workplace hazards. 
Chapters Four and Five will present case studies of attempts 
at controlling specific hazards in the textile and fibre-
cement industries. Chapter Four deals with a union-
initiated campaign, directed at ascertaining the extent of 
exposure to cotton dust in the textile industry and 
preventing byssinosis, the respiratory disease caused by the 
dust. The Brown Lung Campaign, as it was referred to,' was 
initiated by the National Union of Textile Workers during 
the early 1980s. Chapter Five provides an outline and 
assessment of the regulation of exposure to asbestos in the 
Everi te company. The source of regulation in this cas·e was 
. primarily that of self-regulation by the employer, with the 
unionised workforce playing a supplementary, but important, 
role in seekin~ improvements in company practices and 
monitoring various aspects of health and saf~ty in the 
workplace. Both case studies will attempt to demonstrate 
the various ways.in which regulation. is brought about; how 
the state. employers and labour- .may interact in changing the 
working environment; and what limitations exist on the role 
of the various parties. 
The final chapter will present tentative conclusions with 
regard to the regulatory process in contemporary South 
Africa. The current model contained in MOSA will be 
evaluated and the hypotheses underlying the thesis will be 
discussed. 
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Throughout the thesis. the terms "occupational" and 
"workplace" will be used interchangeably with regard to 
health and safety. Both specify work as a context for 
health and safety. Health and safety will. in most cases, 
be used together. Although health usually refers to the 
longer-term effects on humans of a particular set of 
conditions or substances, safety is generally used to refer 
to protection from short-term, traumatic events. Often, 
however, the distinction becomes blurred. 
15 
Chapter 1: Regulating the workplace - o theoretical 
giscussion 
Introduction 
The literature dealing with work and its eff.ects on the 
health and safety of workers is extensive and often very 
depressing. 1 Not only has it been amply demonstrated how 
hazardous work can be, but there is a large body of 
literature that deals with the alienating nature of work, as 
well as its stressful nature, in both medical and 
psychological terms. 
Similar perspectives have been mirrored in the sociological 
literature from the time of Karl Marx to the resurgence of 
writing on the labour process, led by Harry Braverman·' s 
"Labour and Monopoly Capital". 3 The focal point of the 
Marxist literature.has necessarily been the exploitative 
nature of work, reflected in analyses of the_ various forms 
of control exercised over workers, the de-skilling of 
workers and other aspects of contemporary social and 
technical relations of production. 
Resistance by workers to the conditions facing them has also 
been documented, highlighting the essentially conflictual 
nature of production under capitalism. What has, however, 
received less attention is the way in which facets of 
production have become the focus of negotiation between 
employers and workers and what the role of labour, in 
consequence, has been in changing the working environment. 
1. Examples are: 
Berman D: Death on the job: Occupational health and 
sa~ety struggles in the United States. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1978; • 
Kinnersley P: The hazards o~ work: How to ~ight them. 
London: Pluto Press, 1973; 
Stellman J, Dawn S: Work. is dangerous to your health. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1973 
2. Braverman H: Labour and monopoly capital: The 
degradation o~ work in the twentieth century. London: 




In the latter regard, occupational health and safety is an 
interesting field for study. Most productive activity 
carries some risk to workers' health, either through the 
materials used, or through the way in which work is carried 
out.' Health and safety is also closely tied to industrial 
relations, being of concern to both parties involved in the 
process of production and often embodying conflicting 
interests between employers and workers. Yet health and 
safety appears less often to be a cause of overt conflict 3 
and more often the focus for regulatory activity, 
particularly in the form of legislative regulation, whereby 
the state enters directly into the labour process. 
Turning to the South African situation during the 1970s and 
1980s, a mainly black, trade union movement has emerged and 
has grown rapidly, making gains that have taken unions in 
other countries much longer to achieve. In less than ten 
years, the industrial relations scene has changed from one 
in which black trade unions demanded to be heard and 
employers refused to listen, to a situation in which the two 
parties bargain collectively. Not only have the parties 
bargained, but, over the years, as Friedman puts it, they 
increasingly "fought complex battles over co~cepts outsiders 
struggled to understand. t,The issues had changed too: unions 
demanded not only more pay and job security, but a say in 
ever more areas of factory life."4 Health and safety has 
been one of the areas at issue, raising the question of how 
and to what extent a dynamic union movement is able to 
effect changes in a particularly complicated aspect of 
working conditions. 
But, to be able to evaluate the role of labour in regulating 
workplace conditions, it is necessary to have some 
3. Although it is difficult to obtain exact figures for the 
number of strikes triggered by health and safety issues, 
it is estimated that such strikes seldom amount to more 
than 5% of the total strike figure in South Africa - if 
that. By far the largest proportion of strike triggers, 
over the last 3 years, were wage-related. See Financial 
Mail, 5 May 1989, pp.26-27 
4. Friedman S: Building tomorrow today: A-fric-an workers in 
trade unions 1970-1984. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987, 
p.394 
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understanding of the nature of the relationship between the 
state, employers and labour. in particular, with regard to 
occupational health and safety. The primary context within 
which employers and workers relate to each other is the 
labour process and it is here, too. that the state 
intervenes to regulate working conditions. This chapter 
will. therefore. begi~ by exploring the relationship between 
the labour process and health. as well as some of the 
conceptions in the literature about the dominant issues in 
the relationship. An attempt will be made to characterise 
how health issues are dealt with organisationally in the 
labour process. through regulation. or 'control by rule'. 
and the different sources of regulatory action will be 
discussed. A continuing theme in the chapter will be the 
18 
, different interests and capacities of employers and labour A 
,j 
and the way that such factors shape action or inaction on 
\health issues in the labour process[ The final part of the1 . , ··-..c, 
chapter will look more explicitly at the question of 
workers' participation in health and safety. which wil.l be / 
' 
discussed with reference to the issues raised in the chapter\_ 
as a whole. Particular attention will be given to the issue/ 
of different interests and how various roles. orientated to' 
monitoring safety, may be fulfilled in the light of the ! 
different interests. 
The labour process and health 
The labour process may be said to comprise a number of 
elements that are independent of any particular social 
formation. These are: 
1. purposeful activity directed to work; 
2. natural or raw materials as the objects on which work is 
performed; 
3. the instruments of work. which take various technological 
forms." 
Taken together. the components- of the labour process form 
the general preconditions of all production. A further 
5. Thompson P: The nature of work. London: Macmillan, 1983, 
p.39 
crucial feature of the labour process is, in Marx's view, 
the interpenetration of the technical and human aspects, the 
material and the social. "Production, then, is both a 
material and a social process, an activity whereby people 
transform both their circumstances and themselves. Each of 
its facets, in Marx's view, conditions and constrains the 
other. "6 
~e first element of the labour process, namely, labour, or 
purposeful activity, becomes particularly important when 
dealing with the labour process under capitalism. In the 
latter context, Marx used the term, labour power, to 
indicate that the worker's mental and physical abilities 
exist in a relationship to employers or capital. It is in 
terms of that relationship that the ability-to work becomes. 
transformed into a process of producing value. 1 Following 
Thompson's exposition of Marx's approach: "The production 
of conmodities with a use value is not the so~e goal of the 
capitalist. He needs to exchange those conmodities for a 
.price greater in value than the costs incurred in 
production. The process of production must therefore 
combine the labour process with the creation of value. 
Hence the labour process becomes inextricably linked to the 
struggle for profitable production.""" 
For Marx, ~profitable production' occurred not just,through 
the production of value. but through the extension of 
production into creating surplus value. that is, value that 
is over and above that necessary for the payment of labour 
power and which can remain the legal property of the 
employer. The process o~ creating surplus value. the 
valorisation process, as Marx called it. is what combines 
with the labour process to give it its distinctively 
capitalist character. 
6. Corrigan P, Ramsay H, Sayer D: Socialist construction 
and Marxist theory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1978, p. 2 
7. Thompson: op cit, 1983, pp.40-41 
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The validity of Marx's labour theory of value is the subject 
of a debate which will not be dealt with here8 , but which, 
oddly enough, has largely been ignored in discussions on the 
labour process. Irrespective of whether the relationship 
between labour and capital is primarily determined by a 
struggle over the amount of surplus value to be produced, or 
whether it is more 'simply' driven by the struggle for 
profitable production, the central point remains that there 
are antagonistic relations at the heart of the labour 
process~~which, under particular conditions, embody 
conflicting interests. Such conflicting interests may be 
evident in any number of issues where the rate of profit 
accruing to employers is threatened by alternative ways of 
carrying out production, under conditions that may be more 
favourable to employees. Safer, or healthier conditions of 
work would be a case in point. 
The Marxist analysis of the labour process has come to 
inform the discussion of worker's health in a number of 
different ways. As regards the latter two elements of the 
labour process mentioned above. namely. the objects on which 
work is performed and the instruments of work. referred to 
by Marx as the means of production. both can.be investigated 
in terms of potential risks to health and safety~ The 
objects of labour, or the raw materials put to use in the 
production process can be studied taking into account their 
physical, chemical and biological properties, any one of 
which could constitute health risks. 9 Similarly, the 
instruments of labour, which serve as. the intermediaries 
between the labourer and the objects of labour. need to be 
studied for their health effects and for the potential 
safety risks which, under certain conditions. they embody. 
Examples would be pneumatic drills, whose use can result in 
deafness and repetitive strain injury, or circular saws. 
which may. in certain circumstances. cause severe hand 
injuries. 
8. On this debate see, inter alia: Steedman I et al: The 
value controversy. London: Verso, 1981 
9. Navarro V: The labour process and health: A historical 
materialist interpretation. International Journal o~ 
Health Services, 1982, 12(1), p.9 
v The interrelation between the technical and social aspects 
of production, emphasised by Marx, applies equally to the 
' 
instruments of labour, which can be analysed in terms of 
their technical sophistication, or as an expression of 
specific social relations. As Navarro puts it: 11 ••• areas 
to look at include the physical effort needed to execute 
work; the interaction between the workers, the objects of 
work, and the means of labour; and the degree of control 
that the workers have over the means of work and over the 
process of work. Each of these different components of the 
labour process is an expression of the social relations that 
created it. For example, the instruments of work created 
under machine capitalism characteristically impose on the 
worker a specific manner of working. L The instruments of 
work. such as machines. dictate the rhythm of work and limit 
the decision making of the workers. 1110 The socially· 
determined character of the labour.process. therefore. can 
also be seen to have detrimental effects on health. 
particularly in terms of psycho-social stress factors~ 11 
At a more general level, there is the conmonly repeated 
truism that employers place profits before health and that 
health and safety must be paid for out of profits. "It is 
an extra that employers may or may not decide to purchase, 
rather than an integral part of the way work is done." 13 
Such views may be informed by an accurate analysis of the 
constraints under which capitalist production takes place,· 
but cannot address the particular circumstances and 
conditions under which hazards occur in production. More 
importantly, they do not incorporate any proposition that 
would allow for an explanation of the factors that lead to 
change and improvements to working conditions. 
·10. ibid, p. 11 
11. Some of the most important work in the area was that of 
the late Bertil Gardell. For a use~ul overview, see 
~Johnson J, Johansson G, Hall E: Introduction t6 special 
section: Work organisation, democratisation and health 
(dedicated to Professor Gardell). International Journal 
o~ Health Services, 1988, 18<4> 
12. Kinnersly: op cit, 1973, p.9 
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Navarro has attempted a more careful analysis of the labour 
process and health. drawing on Marx's distinction between 
absolute and relative surplus value in looking at the 
consequences for workers' health. 13 He concludes: " ... we 
can speak of absolute expropriation of health when the loss 
of health is due to the appropriation of absolute surplus 
value, the predominant form of exploitation in -
underdeveloped capitalist countries; and of relative 
expropriation of health when the loss of health is due to 
the appropriation of relative surplus value. the predominant 
form of exploitation in developed capitalist countries. 
Needless to say. the two types of expropriation of health 
can be superimposed on the same labourer." 14 While it may 
be important to distinguish between differing degrees of 
exploitation. or differing intensities in the production of 
surplus. such distinctions lose their conceptual clarity 
when applied to other factors. such as health. When applied 
to something that is primarily an ~ct of productive 
activity, rather than a determining factor in the 
organisation or intensity of production. the comparison 
tends to serve a purely descriptive purpose. If one starts 
from the premise that most forms of productive activity 
carry some risk to health, there is surely no need to 
demonstrate degrees of risk with reference to value. What 
becomes important is to analyse the effects on workers of 
differing exposures to risk. 
Another area of application of labour process theory to the 
study of workers' health is that relating to the control of 
production.. It may perhaps be more accurate to characterise 
the area as a parallel concern. but it is one that has 
become central to recent thinking on the regulation of 
workplace health and safety. 
Control and conflict over health and safety 
In the literature on·the labour process, a major theme which 
has emerged is that of 'control'. Control has been 
13. Navarro: op cit, 1982, pp.12-13 
14. ibid, p.13 
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recognised as a crucial issue in the capitalist labour 
process and common ground has been established in 
recognising the need for employers to exercise systematic 
control over the labour process in order to turn labour 
power into labour for profitable production. 
The question of how control over the labour process was 
exercised at different points in time underlay Marx's 
discussion of the transition from manufacture to 
machinofacture. The gradual and uneven transition from a 
situation in which workers wielded the instruments of 
production and largely determined the rhythm of work. to a 
labour process in which machinery determined the pace of 
work and workers exercised a limited amount of independent 
activity, was captured by Marx in the shift from what he 
called the formal subordination. or subsumption. of labour 
to real subordination. or real subsumption of labour. 18 
More recently, and often in response to Braverman's 
important work. 16 writers have considerably refined the 
. concept of control in relation to the capitalist labour 
process and a large part of the debate has revolved around 
the question of how capitalist control of the labour process 
is obtained. 
The fact that accumulation requires control of the labour 
process does "not tell us what form of control will be 
applicable in different circumstances. Nor does it 
distinguish between management choices based on 
considerations of short- and long-term profitability. No 
one has convincigly demonstrated that a particular form of 
control is necessary or inevitable for capitalism to 
function successfully." 17 What the debate has revealed 
is that within the overall control of the labour process by 
capital. there are a variety of techniques available to 
management to ensure that authority can be exercised over 
the labour of employees. At the same time as control is. 
exercised, however, some measure of voluntary compliance is 
15. Thompson: op cit, 1983, p.123 
16. Braverman: op cit, 1974 
17. Thompson: op cit, 1983, p.151 
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required to facilitate the smooth running of productive 
activity. Management can therefore be seen as faced with 
the dilemma of ensuring both control and compliance in the 
labour process. so that "the task of labour process theory 
becomes that of understanding the combinations of control 
structures in the context of the specific economic location 
of the company or industry. 11 1e 
How do different strategies essentially aimed at ensuring 
continued production of surplus affect workplace health and 
safety? The beginnings of an answer lie in the presumption 
that health and safety may be one facet of productive 
activity where change and improvement is relative to the 
degree of control exercised by management over the labour 
process. This presumption has been applied to issues of 
workers' health in ways that are illustrated by the 
following quotations: 
"Achievements in the OSH (Occupational Safety and 
Health) realm occupy a special place in this 
struggle (the class struggle). for they link both 
conditions of work and health provisions. But most 
important of all, they bear directly upon control of 
the work process - a central threat to capitalist 
control of the means of production." 1 9 
"In order that the capitalist can maximise his 
profit he demands that he should have the right to 
'control' every aspect of the production process -
including his employees. Workers on the other hand 
may well wish to minimise the capitalist's right to 
control, and to exert the greatest possible degree 
of control over the production process. Given the 
initial premises of the capitalist system they can 
never be other than partially successsful in this 
objective, since if they really did succeed in 
wresting 'control' from the capitalist they could 
18. ibid, p. 152 
19. Elling R: The struggle ~or workers~ health. New York: 
Baywood, 1986, p.108 
24 
then determine the nature and size of 'profit'. and 
the nature of the economic system would have been 
fundamentally altered. It must be recognised of 
course that unions do not necessarily pursue this 
objective in practice, but rather that they tend to 
concentrate upon trying to increase their members' 
share of the product of their labour. Nevertheless 
the fact remains that it is this conflict of 
interest. and struggle for control which underpins 
our entire industrial relations structure. Any 
analysis of the 'problem' of health and safety at 
work which ignores or distorts that reality cannot 
carry conviction. 11 20 
Maller has provided a very thorough discussion of the 
relationship between control and health and safety, arguing 
that: 
"As the worker lost the ability to control his/)'ler 
work. so too did the worker lose the ability to 
prevent accidents and exposure to dangerous and 
unhealthy substances. Thus. health and safety must 
be seen as a site of struggle within the.context of 
the generalized contradiction between capital and 
labour. The former attempt to keep wages as low as 
possible and avoid expenditure on means of 
production that like health and safety are 
essentially non-productive - these would include 
ventilation and fume extraction. safety guards, 
design and buildings and machinery. ·plant layout 
etc. On the other hand workers attempt to maximise 
wages and improve working conditions." 21 
20. Creighton B, Gunningham N (eds): The industrial 
relations OT occupational health and saTety. Sydney: 
Croom Helm, 1985, p.4 
21. Maller J: Health and saTety Tor workers: A study OT 
conditions OT health aryd saTety in the metal industry in 
the Vaal Triangle. BA<Hons) thesis, Univ. o~ the 
Witwatersrand. Braam~ontein: DSG/Critical Health, 
Dissertation Series No.4, 1983, pp.12-13 
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The view of workplace health and safety contained in the 
above quotations implies a number of propositions. These 
are: 
1. that workers are conscious of dangers at work and have an 
interest in preventing these dangers; 
2. that workers have an interest in and attempt to exercise 
control over the production process. including the health 
and safety aspects of the process; 
3. that health and safety at work is an aspect of the 
production process that employers seek to control in 
order to maximise profit; 
4. that health and safety is necessarily a conflictual issue 
between the parties to the labour relation, as it 
embodies the struggle for control over production. 
Propositions (perhaps more accurately. assumptions) such as 
the above. are common in the literature dealing with 
workplace health and safety. but they are problematic in a 
number of respects. It is worth noting that,'control' is 
not always used consistently to apply to attempts to ensure 
profitable production. In the above quotes. for example. it 
is used not only in the latter sense. but also in the 
relation to the organisation and 'politics' of work more 
broadly. 
Moving on to look at the propositions in more detail. the 
first proposition cannot easily be supported empirically. 
It can be demonstrated that workers' knowledge of hazards is 
often limited. because so many of the adverse health effects 
of production are very obscure. An example is the chemical 
industry. where lack of information about materials used is 
in most countries a serious constraint on the ability of 
workers to be conscious of hazards. It is only in last few 
years that the question of the right to information has 
become a topical issue in some countries. for instance the 
USA. where a Right to Know statute was only enacted in early 
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1988. As regards workers' interest in preventing dangers, 
objectively speaking, it could be argued that workers have 
an interest in a safe and healthy workplace, but then Marx 
claimed the same for their interest in comnunism. Even 
where the level of awareness of hazards is high - working 
underground in the mining industry would be an example -
worker or union action to prevent hazards is not a given. 
In short, objective interests are not automatically 
translated into subjective forms of acting on those 
interests. 
As regards the second proposition, it is crucial not to 
confuse resistance by workers and trade unions to adverse 
working conditions with attempts to control the production 
process in the sense of influencing the production of 
surplus. Resistance by workers can take place on a broad 
range of issues, such as exploitation. the relationship 
between effort and reward, labour intensification and the. 
treatment of workers and.their organisations. But such 
resistance is not always about control, either in the sense 
of determining production and output, or in the broader 
sense of being a 'political' struggle for power in the 
workplace. Conflict over conditions of work.pertaining to 
health and safety, in particular, can broadly be said to be 
concerned with rights in the workplace, such as the right to 
information or right of access for evaluation purposes; 
improvements to the working environment; and may also take 
the form of protests ove~ specific events, either accidents 
or disasters. Such conflict very often involves questio~s 
of financial expenditure. usually potentially increasing the 
costs of production, but such issues do not necessarily 
affect the way in which surplus is to b~ produced, or the 
rate at which it is to be produced. Nor can gaining further 
rights in the workplace automatically be linked to real or 
desired control over the production process. 
As regards the third proposition, the argument that it 
cannot automatically be assumed that workers have an 
interest in the question of control. can be extended to 
employers as well. There certainly are cost factors 
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involved, which may lead to resistance by employers to 
demands for changes J Costs. or expenditure on the working 
environment, can be related to profit, but again, this is 
not necessarily directly relevant to the question of surplus 
value. Employers are, however. interested in the question 
of prerogative. Accordingly, the health of "their 
employees", or the safety of "their workplace", constitute 
areas over which employers generally seek to maintain power. 
Perhaps the most common assumption in the literature on 
occupational health and safety is that it constitutes an 
area of conflict between employer and employee. Most 
industries do carry physical risks that could result in 
legitimate worker grievances and, as indicated above, in 
broad terms, there clearly are potential areas of conflict 
around this particular facet of the production process. 
In this sense, health and safety is perhaps no different 
from other aspects of the labour process which give rise to 
worker resistance and which become the subject of colfective 
. b~rgaining. The commonality of interest between employer 
and worker and the ideological effects of this conmonality, 
tend, however. to be ignored. 
Burawoy has provided interesting arguments about the way in 
which commonalities and consent are 'constructed' 
ideologically in the labour process. It could be argued, 
however, that there are specific interests in health and 
safety which are objectively shared. In such cases 
commonalities do not necessarily need to be 'constructed', 
although they do need to be organised in particular ways to 
be realised. Thus. workers have an objective (and 
subjective) interest in staying safe while at work, despite 
potential conflict with maximising output or taking short 
cuts in certain circumstances. Em~loyers, on the other 
hand. can be said to have an interest in health insofar as 
accidents and illness caused by work can impede 
productivity. 
There is also a broader sense irr which interests of both 
employer and employee are bound together, namely an interest 
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in profit, which ensures the maintenance of the labour 
relation (most of the time). With regard to workers, 
Burawoy argues: "Proletarian existence rests not merely on 
today's wage but also on tomorrow's and the next day's. 
Unlike feudal serfs, who produce and consume their own 
surplus independently of the lord. capitalist labourers 
depend on the production of profit." 2 a The shared interest 
in the production of profit, together with the specific 
interests of both employer and worker in health and safety, 
provide an important basis for the containment of conflict. 
Insofar as there may be grounds for foregoing changes to the 
working environment in the interests of greater 
~improvements' in terms and conditions of employment, so 
health and safety may be considered a lesser priority for 
I 
both parties. 
Sunmarising the discussion thusfar, it is possible to 
identify theoretically the elements of the labour process. 
that pose risks to health and safety. These are. firstly. 
the means of production. which may embody direct. physical 
hazards. Secondly, there is the specifically captalist 
character of the labour process. namely, the imperative for 
the production of surplus and the need for control over the 
labour process by capital to ensure profitable production. 
The drive for profitability may have direct effects on 
health and safety. depending on the particular form. or 
combination of forms of control. exercised over the labour 
process. Increased intensity of work may result in workers 
suffering from stress and being at greater risk of 
accidents. New forms of technology. introduced to increase 
output, can also embody new risks to workers. But it is 
difficult to specify exactly how the general contradiction 
between capital and labour affects the health and safety of 
workers, which may depend on the particular forms of control 
exercised over labour and the degree of compliance which may 
or may not exist in the labour process. 
22. Burawoy: The politics OT production. London: Verso, 
1985, p.34 
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The use of the concept of control in the discussion of 
health and safety has thus been accompanied by a number of 
problematic assumptions about the relationship between 
employers and workers within the context of the labour 
process. A key problem area identified has to do with the 
looseness with which the concepts of conflict and control 
have been used. Seldom are any answers provided to 
questions such as: Why is control necessary? Why are there 
opposing interests and what are these? What is antagonistic 
about the relations between employers and labour, generally, 
and with reference to health and safety? 
30 
The lack of conceptual clarity present in the ·debate on the 
labour process, it has been argued above, has been 
transferred into the discussion of workplace health and 
safety.::a3 While the importance of conflict cannot be 
ignored, the elements of consensus and the common interests 
of employers and workers also require explanation. Such an 
explanation may, in fact, be particularly important with 
regard to occupational health and safety, a facet of 
Rroduction where there may be greater in~erdependence 
between management and labour in the process of establishing 
controls over both the working environment and over the 
humans within that environment. The nature of control 
itself requires reassessment in relation to health and 
safety at work. 
Regulation: Control by rule 
In discussing the labour process and health. a useful 
approach has been identified by Laurell in suggesting the 
need to "penetrate the content of the processes of struggle, 
going beyond the formal frameworks in which they 
occurred. " 2 "' Such an approach is important, not on~.y 
theoretically, but also with regard to understanding and 
23. For a discussion of these problems in relation to the 
labour process debate, see Cohen S: A labour process to 
nowhere? New Le-ft Review, 1987, No.165 
24. Laurell AC: The role of union democracy in the struggle 
for workers" health in Mexico. International Journal o-f 
Health Services, 1989, 19(2), p.283 
evaluating specific policies and practices which become 
established to deal with health and safety in the longer 
term. 
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Health and safety in the workplace may differ from other 
aspects of the labour process in the way that employers and 
employees conceive of it and especially in the way that it 
is dealt with politically at the enterprise level. The 
differences are determined by the various components that 
can generally be distinguished in any issue concerning 
health and/or safety, whether as the subject of conflict, or 
when approached co-operatively by employers and workers. On 
the one hand, there are technical aspects, such that 
medical, industrial hygiene and engineering skills are 
needed to determine the medical effects of. hazards, the 
extent of problems and the necessary preventive measures. 
On the other hand, there is the industrial relations 
context, which has to do with how the problems become 
apparent, the 'solutions' that are instituted to deal with 
the problems and the mechanisms that become established to 
deal with future problems. Both the technical and the 
industrial relation components are clearly interlinked in 
any health and safety issue and these require discrete 
identification, analysis and evaluation. At the more 
abstract level, these components would be analogous to the 
technical an~ social relations of production. 
The above components must also be viewed in relation to 
hazards in production, not as static phenomena. but as 
recurring issues. Although the degree of recurrence will 
vary from one enterprise to another, the combination of 
material and behavioural factors which underlie hazards. 
ensures that there are neArly always risks attached to 
productive activity. Finally, the st~te may also have a 
direct presence in issues concerning health and safety in 
the workplace, in both the technical and industrial 
relations components, depending on particular state policies 
regarding regulation and/or enforcement of health and safety 
at work. 
The technical and industrial relations components of health 
and safety. as well as the recurring nature of the issues. 
introduces three crucial variables into the analysis of 
workplace health and safety. The first concerns the way in 
which rules, which provide guidelines for the regulation of 
the workplace to employers in particular. but also to 
workers. are defined. The second concerns the extent of the 
rules. how far-reaching they are in preventing hazards; for 
instance, whether. to protect workers from dusts and fumes, 
only masks are provided. or whether extractor fans are 
installed. The third concerns the way .rules are enforced, 
in other words, what organisational" procedures are created 
for ongoing monitoring of the workplace. The above three 
variables form the basis for the kind of control that lies 
at the heart of workplace health and safety, a form of 
control which does not have as its outcome any direct effect 
on the production of surplus value, on accumulation or on 
exploitation. but which is primarily concerned with 
regulating the effects of productive activities on workers. 
In Hyman's terms, the study of workplace health and safety 
therefore entails study of one of many "processes of control 
over work relations ... 11 ,ae that is, the form,of control 
which is exercised over work relations and over the 
technical aspects of production with the aim of preventing 
adverse health effects and protecting the safety of workers. 
Used in this sense, control by rule, or regulation, does not 
necessarily become divorced from the question of power and 
the struggle for power between employers and workers. but it 
does imply allowing for different uses of power. Hyman 
distinguishes between two aspects of power: 'power for' and 
'power over'. both of which could usefully be applied to the 
process of regulation. 36 In the case of the former. power 
is primarily a resource, used in the service of collective 
interests. or increased power is used for the 'general 
benefit'. More typical. however, is the use of power by an 
individual or group 'over' others. As Hyman argues: "In 
25. Hyman R: Industrial relations - a Marxist introduction. 
London: Macmillan, 1975, p.12 
26. ibid, p.26 
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capitalist society, because of the manifold conflict of 
interests which exist, power relations are normally of this 
kind." 37 While the latter may be dominant in the area of 
health and safety as well, the presence of elements of co-
operation and comnon interest can result in the use of power 
to serve common goals or collective inter·ests. 
'Ibe regulation of health and safety is thus not divorced 
from conflict, power and processes of struggle between the 
parties to the labour relation. nor is it divorced from 
common interests and the possibility of co-operation. 'Ibe 
way in which control by rule comes to be exercised will 
depend very much on the specific situation and also on the 
source of regulation that is brought to bear on workplace 
hazards. 38 
Sources of regulation 
Under capitalism three sources of regulation may be 
identified: that imposed by the state via legislation, that 
which is brought about by employers through self-regulation 
and regulation initiated by organised labour. usually 
through the collective bargaining process. 'Ibe three 
sources of regulation obviously interact. but. from within 
each of the three. different rules and different forms of 
control emerge. affecting both the technical and the 
industrial relations components of health and safety. Some 
points with regard to each source will be highlighted. 
1. Legislative regulation 
In the area of occupational he·al th and safety. it could be 
argued that. historically. legislation has been the primary 
source cf regulation. serving ae a precursor to initiatives 
at the enterprise level and reflecting the interventionist 
27. ibid, p. 27 
28. For a discussion o~ Job regulation that contains many 
use~ul insights, see Flanders A: Industrial rel~tions: 
What is wrong with the system? In: Flanders A: 
Management and unions: The theory and reform o~ 
industrial relations. London: Faber & Faber, 1975, esp. 
pp.86-94 
role of the state. The state's role has, nevertheless, been 
shaped in particular circumstances. With reference to 
early factory legislation in the United Kingdom, Carson has 
argued that it should not be seen as a "laudable victory for 
humanitarianism over early, ruthless capitalism." 29 Rather, 
"the industrial capitalism of the first half of the 
nineteenth century carried within itself its own impetus 
towards regulation. The logic of the very system itself 
involved a thrust towards the development of statutory 
controls over conditions at the workplace. Thus, for 
example, that system's need of a healthy workforce, both for 
purposes of more efficient labour and for market expansion 
through military might, was clearly recognised at the time, 
as was the potential role of legislation and enforcement in 
supplying it. 1130 During this early period, it is argued, 
regulation also served the important function of reducing 
competition between different enterprises by providing for 
similar conditions of employment - an argument that has also 
been applied to the early factory legislation in South 
Africa (see Chapter 2). 
The above line of argument, essentially concerned with the 
function of law as an expression of the relationship between 
st"te and capital, is given theoretical support by writers 
such as Poulantzas, who argue for a conceptualisation of 
state intervention (via law as well as other mechanisms) as 
"the specifically capitalist form of the State's presence in 
the relations of production."31 Although such analysis has 
been applied to the contemporary capitalist state, it could 
equally be valid with respect to the regulatory functions of 
the state in the early phase of industrial capitalism. In 
other words, it is a general function of the capitalist 
state to intervene in such a way as to ensure the conditions 
for the reproduction and accumulation of capital, including 
29. Carson W G: Hostages to history: Some aspects o~ the 
occupationai health and sa~ety debate in historical 
perspective. In: Creighton & Gunningham <~ds): op cit, 
1985, p.63 
30. i bi d, p • 63 
31. Poulantzas N: State, power, socialism. London: Verso, 
1980, p. 16 7 
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the protection of la.bour. through inter al ia. regulating the 
conditions facing workers in the production process. 
~Regulatory legislation seldom. however. goes much beyond 
what is possible for most employers to achieve with regard 
to meeting certain standards or conditions. The influence 
of employers on the legislative process in many cases limits 
the standards that are set. Nevertheless. all labour law. 
including legislation relating to workplace health and 
safety. is concerned with social power - "the principal 
purpose of labour law is to regulate. to support and to 
restrain the power of management and the power of organised 
labour."32 Legislation dealing with occupati"onal health 
and safety is. however. usually quite specific in the way 
that it regulates and restrains power. in that it has 
generally been 'positive'. It has "since its inception. 
said. and it continues to say to the employer "thou shalt". 
for example. ensure that dangerous machinery is securely 
fenced or that ladders do not slip."33 
It is important to recognise that differing conditions. 
economically. socially and politically. affect the form of 
state intervention at particular points in time. as well as 
the form of legislative intervention. Thus. in the South 
African situation. the state's general function - that of 
ensuring the conditions for the reproduction and 
accumulation of capital - underlay both the Factories Act 
and MOSA. but the very different forms of the two 
legislative interventions were shaped by particular 
historical conditions. 
2. Employer self-regulation 
The foregoing discussion of the role of the state in 
regulating production provides a context within which to 
assess the scope for employer self-regulation. insofar as 
specific legal obligations could prompt a more general 
32. Davies P, Freedland M: Kahn-Freund"s "Labour and the 
law". London: Stevens & Sons, 1983, p.15 -
33 • i b i d, p • 4(> 
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awareness, or sense of duty amongst employers which could 
lead to pro-active, self-regulation. There are crucial 
limitations on such a possibility, however, the most 
important perhaps being that employers will. as a rule, 
adopt a cost-benefit approach to questions of health and 
safety. The context within which they operate, dictates 
that enterprises continue to exist, only so long as they 
continue to show a profit. Sass has stated this succinctly, 
) as follows: "Industrial safety is profitable only when 
direct and indirect costs associated with accidents exceed 
the cost of eliminating those accidents, and, by the same ( 
token, management has even less of an incentive to moderate 
the negative health effects flowing from a workplace as very 
few of the costs associated with industrial illness are 
absorbed by the industry that produces them." 34 
Despite the objective limitations imposed on employer self-r--, 
regulation by a cost-benefit framework, there are 
identifiable circumstances which give rise to seif-
regulation, usually in the form of direct or irldirect 
pressure on employers. ~The first set of circumstances 
relates to internal conditions, whic.h result in employers 
establishing forms of control to counter the.risks faced by 
their-workers. Such circumstances would include the case of 
disasters in industry, or where there are known hazards 
involved in the production process. Examples of the latter 
would be the production of gas or the case of oil 
refineries. In such situations, self-regulation is crucial 
from the point of view of continued production and avoidance 
of the high costs attached to the kinds of hazards involved 
in the production process. Self-regulation in such 
situations, while being ostensibly concerned with safety and 
health, is therefore simultaneously necessary due to the 
dictates of accumulation, the costs of accidents certainly 
exceeding the costs of reducing risks~ In such situations, 
moreover, self-regulation of workplace safety appears to 
influence the form of managerial control over the labour 
34. Sass R: Alternative policies in the administration OT 
occupational health and sa~ety programs. EconDfltic and 
Industrial Democracy, 1987, 8(2), p.244 
process as a whole. The organisation of safety at oil 
refineries, for instance, frequently assumes a strictly 
hierarchical form, starting with top management personnel 
and stretching down to the 'shop-floor'. Such effects on 
overall managerial control tend to support one of Thompson's 
conclusions, that "within the overall control of the labour 
process by capital there are a variety of techniques and 
structures available." 3 " 
37 
A second set of circumstances relates to external conditions 
and their influence on management strategy. 36 A good 
example of the influence of external conditions is the 
asbestos industry, where increasing knowledge of the medical 
effects of exposure, compensation claims by workers who have 
contracted one of the asbestos-related diseases and a 
growing environmental lobby have had the effect of prompting 
certain employers using asbestos in the mining and 
manufacturing industry to embark on in-company health and 
safety progranmes. 
The above circumstances may be said to be conducive to the 
establishment of regulatory practices within an enterprise. 
It should be noted, however, that self-regul&tion conmonly 
occurs as a result of particular pressures being exercised 
on employers. 
Before leaving the subject of self-regulation. reference 
should be made to an additional feature of the corporate 
environment which may prompt the adoption of effective self-
regulatory pr~ctices. namely, the growth of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). In general, it may be said that 
changes in the area of health and safety are likely to be 
effected more easily in larger corporations. where there 
tend to be better information systems. more de·,eloped 
structures within the company to allow for responses to 
developments and, most importantly. greater resources. both 
material, human and financial. to allow for the 
35. Thompson: op cit, 1983, p.151 
36. A more general discussion of the topic i~ given by 8yman 
R: Managerial strategies in industrial relations and the 
control oi= labour. Unpublished mimeo: n/d 
\ 
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implementation of new policies. In the case of corporations 
operating on a multinational basis. such factors are 
generally present and when changes. new policies or new 
strategies are introduced within one part of the operation, 
there is a good chance that_ they will spread to operations 
in other countries. As in the case of o'ther circumstances 
influencing self-regulation, however. the pace at which the 
spread of new policies takes place. tends to be dependent on 
factors such as labour pressure. public awareness and 
different cost-benefit payoffs. 
3. Trade union regulation 
A crucial source of regulation in many countries has 
historically been the organised labour movement, primarily 
through trade unions. The primary ways in which unions 
provide a source of regulation are. on the one hand. through 
the political process and, on the other hand. through the 
collective bargaining process. The two are not mutuai'ly 
. exclusive and are generally interrelated in ways that are 
shaped by national characteristics regarding the political 
role of unions and the type of industrial relations system. 
A risky, but nevertheless useful generalisation in the 
latter regard is to be found in Kahn-Freund's work: 
" ... regulatory legislation is apt to prevail over collective 
bargaining where and when the political pressure power of 
the workers exceeds their industrial pressure power and. 
with great caution, this proposition can be reversed. It is 
sometimes (but not always) the case that, as the unions get 
industrially stronger, the significance of collective 
bargaining grows and that of legislation diminishes whilst, 
as their political influence increases. so does the volume 
and significance of regulatory ?.egislation. "37 The 
relationship between trade unions and the state implied in 
the foregoing generalisation is perhaps too linear and too 
simple. especially as regards the ability of organised 
labour to express its interest politically through the state 
in ways that can be of benefit to workers. It should also 
37. Davies & Freedland: op cit, 1983, p.52 
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be remembered that regulatory legislation covers a wide 
range of issues and health and safety may not always follow 
. the same pattern as that of wages or hours of work, ·for 
instance. 
Trade union influence on regulation occurs at various levels 
- at plant level, at industry level and at the national 
level - and there may be a combination of regulatory forms 
brought to bear at the various levels. An example is that 
of collective agreements which may be negotiated for a 
single company, for an industry or at the national level. 
Such agreements may also become transformed into law. or 
they may exist as an alternative, or adjunct to the law. 
Thus, since 1942, Sweden's industrial relations system has 
been characterised by the use of collective agreements in 
the area of health and safety. Generally speaking. however, 
in the capitalist countries, the process of bargaining 
collective agreements "concentrates on wages, monetary 
benefits and other conditions of employment; issues of 
safety and health at work being of secondary importance 
only. 113e 
What has become increasingly important over the last ten to 
fifteen years with'regard to the role of unions in 
regulating the working environment, is the question of 
workers' participation in health and safety. In a number of 
countries there has been a gradual acceptance of the 
principle that workers and their representatives can play an 
effective role in regulating the workplace due. to their 
daily work experience and intimate knowledge of proce·sses 
and conditions of work.· This development has been an uneven 
one, "stronger in those countries with a history of 
industrial democracy. and in those where trade unions have 
become most safety conscious and forceful in asserting a 
" right to participate in decision-making.":se 
. 38. Szubert W: Safety and health at work. In: Inter-national 
Encyclopedia o-f Comparative Law. The Hague: MartinLts 
Nijhoff, 1983, Vol.15 (Labour law>, Chapter 7, p.21 
39. Gunningham N: Workplace safety and th~ law. In: 
Creighton B, Gunningham N (eds): op cit, 1985, p.43 
The form of worker participation varies widely from country 
to country, but it appears possible to identify two broad 
lines of approach. The first lies in promoting 
consultation, 'constructive discussion' and co-operative 
effort in dealing with health and safety. The second 
approach tends to introduce some sort of supervision and 
investigation, in association with definite forms of 
intervention, where there are, or are likely to be, 
infringements of rules or imminent danger. 40 Strong 
arguments can be made for both lines of approach, even 
though they differ in underlying theoretical principles and 
in the practical effects that they may have. 
40 
~The former approach is limited by the assumption of an 
identity of interests between employers and workers in 
safety matters, which, as has been indicated, is not 
absolute. In the face of any conflict of interest, workers' 
delegates, whether they be safety representatives or members 
of a safety committee, will have little chance, witn only 
consultative prerogatives.~to defend the cause of safety. 
It has therefore been argued that participation through a 
co-operative model should be complemented by collective 
bargaining on safety issues. 4 1 
The second ~pproach to safety organisation is generally 
characterised by the safety representatives having wider 
powers with regard to such matters as inspections, 
supervision, the right to stop work and making obligatory 
recommendations. Here, the emphasis lies more strongly on 
the confrontational aspects of the employer-worker relation 
and on effective control of managerial activities in the 
field of health and safety. Interestingly enough, the 
second approach underlies regulatory legislation in some 
Sc~ndinavian countries and in the socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe. 42 This approach to safety organisation has 
the advantage of allowing safety representatives to take 
more meaningful steps in the case of non-compliance. But it 
40. Szubert: op cit, 1983, p.45 
41. See Gunningham: op cit, 1985, p.47 
42. Szubert: op cit, 1983, p.46 
may also place representatives in a difficult position in 
relation to the management whose workplace they are to 
control. while at the same time being subordinate to them as 
employees. Due to the contradictory pressures. "worker's 
representatives may be induced to act cautiously and to 
moderate their requirements for the promotion of safety and 
health at work."43 To counteract such tendencies. it is 
important that safety representatives be supported by trade 
union organisation which can provide support for their role 
and functions. 
Both approaches to the organisation of health and safety at 
work could thus be said to leave a significant role for 
trade unions and collective bargaining. whether to 
counteract the limitations of a predominantly consultative 
and consensual model, or to provide support for safety 
representatives operating within the context of a more 
conflictual model of safety organisation. It should be 
borne in mind. however. that there is, within the two 
models, great variation in the form taken by worker 
participation and. furthermore. that trade unions are far 
from uniform in the way that they relate to the field of 
health and safety. The nature of the relationship between 
state and trade unions also has an important bearing on the 
legislative framework providing for worker participation. in 
turn influencing the variations between countries. 
The broad approaches outlined do, however, capture an 
essential feature of workplace health and safety, namely its 
conflictual and. simultaneously, its consensual nature. 
Thus·. at the level of industrial relations systems. there is 
scope for both consultation and negotiation. for both co-
operative ventures and for a reliance on collective 




The preceding discussion started with an attempt to 
conceptualise health and safety in terms of labour process 
theory. fThe different elements of the labour process were 
identified. together with their effects on the health and 
safety of workers. Given the stress in labour process 
theory on the exploitative nature of the relationship 
between labour and capital. the concept of control was 
identified as being of particular importance and it was 
argued that the concept has been transferred, uncritically. 
into the discussion of health and the labour process. After 
examining some important flaws in the use of the concept of 
control in the literature on the labour process and health, 
• 
an attempt was made to specify more exactly.the nature of 
42./ 
_/ 
control. as it applies to the effects of production on 
health and safety. It was suggested that it is primarily 
through the establishment of rules. procedures and policies,· 
that forms of control over the labour process are exercised. 
The ways in which such forms of control come to be exercised 
may be shaped both by conflict and/or by consensual 
relations in the labour process and are also likely to be 
influenced by the source of regulation - the,state. 
employers and trade unions being the major sources of 
regulation. 
The three sources of regulation identified above are all 
complex in the way that they are determined and may also be 
problematic in their effects when evaluated individually. 
Legislative regulation has traditionally been relatively 
weak in many countries. as regards the requirements of the> 
\ 
law. 'weak' enforcement and inadequate legal penalties for; 
non-compliance. Employer self-regulation and trade union 
regulation, as the major informal mechanisms for regulation, 
also, however. suffer from limitations. 
Employer self-regulation is constrained by the primary 
economic aims of management. which, when they do allow for 
changes in the area of health and safety, all too often 
dictate a form in keeping with managerial strategies of 
control. A more important limitation has to do with ongoing 
monitoring of health and safety progranmes within 
enterprises: objective monitoring cannot be undertaken by 
only one party to the labour ~elation; rather it requires 
shared responsibilities and a more equal distribution of 
power. 
Perhaps the most important way of achieving the latter would 
be via direct participation of workers in the regulation of 
production from the point of view of health and safety. 
Such participation could address the social and technical 
context within which occupational hazards are generated. 
namely the labour process. Recent developments in 
regulatory legislation in a number of countries have in tact 
attempted to provide such a basis for the organisation of . 
health and safety at the plant level. particularly through 
the participation of workers in regulatory activities. 
In the light of the foregoing. the following chapter will 
. examine the legislative framework established in South 
Africa. particularly the model introduced in the 1980s for 
the regulation of health and safety in the manufacturing 
sector. 
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~bAQ.ter 2: State regulation in South Africa - From._the 
.F~.ctories Act to the Machinery & Occupational Safety Act 
Introduction 
Legislative regulation of occupational health and safety in 
South Africa began in the early part of the 20th century in 
the mining industry. Recognition of the adverse effects of 
mining on health led to the first Commission of Inquiry. into 
Pthisis in 1902 (the Milner Commission), followed by further 
commissions in 1905 and 1911. In 1911 the Mines and Works Act 
was passed, which was, inter alia, aimed at protecting the 
health of mine workers. State intervention during this early' 
period should be seen in the context of the increasing 
militancy of mine workers and their political representation/ 
/ 
in the Labour Party, which served as strong influencing / 
factors on the state. ~.i There had, furthermore, been 
considerable consolidation and expansion of the industry, 
which could thus afford to pay compensation and introduce some 
preventive measures. 
The same conditions were not present outside of' the m1n1ng 
industry, however, and it was only after the First World War 
that legislation dealing with working conditions in 
manufacturing was promulgate4. The first Factories Act 
.. -- -
(No.28) of 1918 was amended in 1936 and then replaced by a 
more substantive piece of legislation, namely, the Factories, 
Machinery and Building Work Act (No.22) of 1941. Forty-two 
- , 
years later the latter was replaced by the Machinery and 
-- ~ 
Occupational Safety Act (No.6 of 1983) (MOSA), which 
transformed the nature of legislative regulation in 
significant ways. 
The aims of this chapter will be, firstly, to examine very 
brief}Y the ,nature of the Factories Act and explanations as to 
it~ origi-ns. Secondly, the transition from the Factories Act 
1. Burke G~ Richardson P: The migration o~ miners' phthisis 
between Cornwall and the Transvaal 1876-1918. In: Bozzoli 
B (ed): Labour, townships and protest. Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1979. p.237 
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to MOSA will be traced and, in particular, an attempt made to 
contextualise the latter piece of legislation. Finally, MOSA 
will be analysed with reference to the concept of regulation 
embodied in the Act and the implications for the parties 
involved in the regulatory process. 
Early regulation of manufacturing industry 
The first attempt at legislative regulation of manufacturing 
industry came from the Cape Town Trade and Labour Board which 
initiated the tabling of draft legislation in Parliament in 
1907. The legislation was aimed at ensuring control over 
factories, but "was, for various reasons, not proceeded with 
at the time." 2 The ind~strial development that took_place 
during_World War ~ provided _impetus for legislative 
regulation, while the influenza epidemic of 1918 focussed_ 
attention on health issues in both the occupational and p~blic 
......_ - ·- -~ --~ 
settings. Such factors contributed to the promulgation of the 
first Factories Act (No.28 of 1918), as well as the Public 
Health Act (No.36 of 1919) . 3 The administration of the 
Factories Act was the responsibility of the Department of 
Mines and Industries until 1924, when it was taken over by the 
newly formed Department of Labour. It is likely that, at the 
time, the Department of Labour was more concerned with the 
implementation·of the newly promulgated Industrial 
------' 
Conciliation Act and with the incorporation of organised 
labour into state structures, rather than with the enforcement 
of regulations concerning the working environment in a 
burgeoning manufacturing industry. 
The first Factories Act was a very ~sjc piec~ of_legislation - ~-- --------
and it was another 23 years before the more substantive and 
far-reaching __ J::a.ctor:_i_~s_, __ ~~chinery and Building Work Act 
(hereafter the Factories Act) was passed. The Factories Act 
of 1941 was a broad-ranging piece of legislation which had as 
one of its aims, the prevention of accidents at work. It was, 
however, also aimed at providing regulation-and control of 
2. Wiehahn Repo~t (The Complete Wiehahn Report, with notes by 
Pro~ N Wiehahn), Johannesburg: Lex Patria Publishers, 
1982, p.363 
3. ibid 
factories, regulation of hours and conditions of work in 
factories more generally and supervision of. the use of 
machinery~,~ Except for very minor amendments, the-Act remained 
unchanged for close on 19 years, during which time the number 
of registered factories increased from 6 335 in 1942 to 17 146 
in 1959. 4 Eventually, in 1960, a lengthy amendment was 
passed, dealing mainly with certain shortcomings of the Act 
and administrative procedures. 
Probably the most significant amendment to the Act, from the 
point of view of health and safety, came in 1967 when a 
separate chapter was added which dealt specifically with the 
protection of health and safety of employees. The main thrust 
I 
of the chapter was to give the Minister the power to prohibit 
the use of certain substances and processes and to require 
employers to provide medical examinations and medical 
supervision, should the nature of the production process 
warrant such measures. These features, essentially concerned 
with occupational health, were not continued in MOSA, for 
reasons which may be found in a debate over the allocation of 
responsibilities between government departments, referred to 
below. 
An important.aspect of the Factories Act was the Regulations 
published in terms of the Act. The Regulations were a set of 
more detailed technical requirements concerning various 
aspects of work and the working environment, health and 
welfare in factories and the use of machinery. From 1963, 
numerous amendments and corrections to the regulations were 
published, including, for instance, the substitution of metric 
weights and measures for the former imperial measurements. 5 
The revised regulations also included the first technical 
standard, published in October 1974, which specified a maximum 
noise level of 85 decibels (dbA). 
An interesting aspect of the legislative change which took 
place during the 1960s and early 1970s concerned the findings 
.4. De Keck's Industrial Laws o~ South A~rica. Cape Town: 
Juta, 1977, no.7, p.1 
5. ibid, p.2 
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of a departmental committee formed to investigate the 
incidence of occupational diseases. The committee reported in 
1963 and, as a result of its recommendations, arrangements 
were made for closer co-operation between the Departments of 
Labour and Health. According to Myers, "it was intended that 
a number of physicians in the Department of Health would be 
appointed inspectors in terms of the Factories Act to assist 
in the implementation of legislation and to draft regulations, 
but the latter never took place. 116 This early attempt at co-
operation between the Departments of Health and Labour is 
interesting, as it appears to signify a perceived dichotomy 
between occupational health, on the one hand, and occupational 
safety, on the other, and some attempts at overcoming the 
dichotomy. The debate over which government department should . 
take responsibility for the various aspects of occupational 
health and safety continues to this day and has been reflected 
in legislation that has fragmented functions in the area. 
This issue will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
Forces for regulation 
The most important attempt to analyse the reasons for the 
promulgation of .the Factories Act is that of Budlender. 7 
I 
Her' 
theoretical point of departure situates regulatory control in 
relation to the form of capitalist production, a form of 
production that "encourages the employer to extract the· 
maximum amount of labour out of his workers in any given 
period, in that he can in this way appropriate more surplus 
value in proportion to the wage, the paid labour." 8 
Individual employers therefore minimise all expenditure, 
inc 1 uding expendi t.ure on safety equipment and improvements 
the working environment, which does not contribute to a direct 
improvement in output. According .to Budlender, "from the 
individual viewpoint such improvements would seem pure 
6. Myet"s .J: The health e-f-fects o-f working in the brick 
industry: A respiratory epidemiologic study in the South 
A-frican occupational health context. MD thesis, UCT, 1987, 
pp.1-3 
7. Budlendet" D: Labour legislation in South A-frica 1924-1945. 
MA Thesis, UCT, 1979 





charity, and against the logic of production and profit-
making. "9 
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While the latter view may apply in the case of individual 
employers, it cannot be assumed to apply to.the capitalist rJ(> 
class as a whole. Budlender's argument is that for the 
capitalist class and its representation by the state (social 
capital), a primary concern becomes that of ensuring the f10)ev~ 
continued reproduction of the working class. The latter 
concern becomes particularly important in the face of a 
limited supply of labour. Thus, "steps have to be taken to 
curb the worst excesses of the system and to protect the 
workers' health and productive capabilities in order that not 
only the individual capitalist, but social capital as a whole, 
will. continue to be able to obtain the labour power necessary 
for its functioning." 1 Q The task of regulating conditions 
has traditionally been carried out by the state, in its role 
of representative of social capital. 
An important qualification by Budlender concerns self-
regulation by individual employers, generally larger 
companies, aware of the need for "controlled exploitation", 
due to their own larger labour needs. The reasons for 
employer or managerial self-regulation may be more complex 
. that those presented by Budlender, as will be illustrated with 
reference to the case study of Everite (see Chapter 5), and 
require analysis of a broader range of factors which may 
prompt expenditure on the working environment. But, in the 
context of forces shaping state legislative regulation, 
Budlender argues convincingly that self-regulation ih some 
cases leads on to forms of joint capital-state control over 
working conditions. Since such joint controls would not cover 
all areas of industry, however, and since some employers may 
not choose to exercise any self-regulation, "some sort of 
general regulation became important, to obviate unfair 
competition by the smaller competitors against the bigger 
capitals, by the smaller capitals not incurring extra 
expenditures and thus being able to offer their goods at lower 
9. ibid, p. 142 
10. ibid 
prices, and - in the interests of industrial peace - to avoid 
excessive exploitation of labour." 11 
Applying the above argument to the South African situation, 
Budlender finds evidence to show a change from a situation in 
which employers displayed little concern for the conditions of 
production, to one where some of the bigger and more organised 
employers began to adopt a "wider perspective". By 1918, the 
then Secretary for Mines and Industries, Mr H Warrington 
Smyth, "found consistent support for the (Factories) Act from 
all Manufacturers Associations in the country. He found that 
employers of the better class were aware that standard 
legislation of this kind constituted a base for competitors 
who had less high ideas as to how to treat their employees. 
An Act of this kind protected the better class of 
employers." 12 Budlender does not, unfortunately, analyse the 
conditions surrounding the passage of the Factories Act of 
1941. Given that the state had at that point assumed quite a 
different form from the state of the post-World War I period, 
the same set of explanatory factors cannot be assumed. 
Nevertheless, the broad function fulfilled by the state via 
such legislation, namely, to ensure the continued productive 
capability of labour, would remain the same. I'n the latter 
respect, the upgrading of the Act in 1941 could be said to 
reflect the expansion of secondary industry that had taken 
place, the increased use of machinery and the substantial 
increase in occupational accidents and fatalities. 13 
Budlender's main argument - that the regulation and control 
contained in the Act were imposed primarily in the interests 
of capital and that, even while restricting capital, the 
regulations did not fundamentally affect its functioning and 
profitability - could be said to be borne out by the nature o( 
pre-World War II factory legislation. While imposing 
particular forms of regulation and gradually broadening the 
11. ibid 
12. SA Commercial and Manu-facturers Record, 1918, p.361; 
quoted in Budlender, ibid, p.143 
13. Budlender gives ~igures showing a 278% increase in 
accidents and a 175% increase in ~atalities in the petiod 
1924-1940 
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scope of regulation, the changes ~ere largely in the interests 
of capital and the benefits to labour were limited. 
With regard to the role of organised labour in shaping the 
Factories Act, Budlender suggests that "organised presentation 
of demands within the workplace, in !Cs and at wage board 
sittings, as well as on the wider political front, 
strengthened the case of those advocating factory reform, and 
hastened up its implementation, as well as influencing its 
... form." 14 With regard to specific aspects of the Act, there is 
not much evidence to suggest any substantive influence by 
labour as far as the safety and welfare provisions of the Act 
are concerned.f Other aspects of the Factories A~t. however, 
especially those relating to hours of work and ~egregation of 
facilities, were influenced by the ~ational Party and their 
/ 
Afrikaner nationalist partners in the trade union movement. 1 ~ 
Budlender also argues that the "imposition of general 
~onditions on all workers favoured the employment of white / 
~orkers." 16 
Perhaps it was because organised labour did not substantially 
influence the legislation of the time, that the form taken by 
th~ Factories Act had the effect of diminishin~ the potential 
~ 
for workers to excercise control over their working . 
environment. Budlender argues that the potential for workers 
to use the law to their advantage was decreased by the nature 
of the regulations enacted in terms of the Factories Act of 
1918, regulations which failed to adopt "positive" and 
"certain" legal principles, but which were couched in broad 
and often vague terminology. The effect was to complicate 
enforcement and annual reports of the period "are a series of 
complaints with regard to the inadequacy of provision with 
regard to ventilation, lighting, structure and cloakrooms, and 
the difficulty of enforcement in view of the subjectivity of 
14. i bi d, p • 1 84 
15. Simons J, Simons R: Class and colour in South A~rica 1850-
1950. Lbndon: Intern~tional De~ence and Aid Fund,1983, 
pp.533-534; and Davies R: Capital, state and white labour 
in South A~rica 1900-1960. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1979, p.292 
16. Budlender·: op cit, p.182 
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\ the measure of adequacy in this regard."
17 The 1941 Act 
introduced the principle of regulation on a large scale and 
empowered the Minister to make provisions on a wide range of 
subjects. The Minister was also empowered. in terms of 
Section 54, to exempt employers from most c~auses of the Act. 
Budlender argues that the increased bureaucratic 
administration that characterised the Factories Act. as well 
as the difficulties for workers of finding their way through a 
51 
•, 
maze of regulations. did little to enhance the ability of ___ --
labour to control conditions at work./----Furthermore. 
'--~ , 
difficulties of gaining access to documentation on rules and 
regulations left workers in ignorance and meant "that workers 
could not insist themselves on employers' observing the law, 
but had. rather to rely on state officials."18 
While Budlender's analysis highlights a particular bias in the . 
legislation with regard to .. :ig_ht t_2~know' provisions, it at 
the same time begs the q~~~~i~n_ 9tJ:he _ role of .. uni_ol!._s_ in. 
regulating_the~o.rkingJ_nvironment during the period under 
review. In general terms, the ability of trade unions to 
intervene to effect changes at the workplace cannot be said to 
be dependent on supportive legislation only, but has also been 
shaped by other factors. such as organisational' coherence, or 
awareness of health and safety problems and their consequences 
for workers. Thus, while the Factories Act could be seen to 
embody an unfavourable bias with regard to labour, it does.not 
necessarily follow that such bias alone would prevent unions 
from ensuring compliance by employers with the health and 
safety standards established by the law. Budlender's overall 
conclusion nevertheless seems valid, namely that the Factories 
~·_was a case of a general, state-imposed set of conditions 
c~lculated to avoid excesses and so to avoid the 
organisational and economic disadvantages which such excesses 
---
could cause."19 ....._ __ --- - - _:....:.--
1 7 • i bi d , p • 1 50 
18. ibid, p.151 
1 9. i bi d, p • 152 
From Factories Act to MOSA 
As indicated previously, the Factories Act of 1941 did not 
remain unchanged as far as occupational health and safety was 
concerned. Important amendments were passed in 1960 and 1963. 
and provision for granting paid sick leave· to workers was 
introduced by amendment in 1967. In addition, the Regulations 
underwent a number of revisions during the 1960s and 1970s. 
It should also be borne in mind that the Factories Act was not 
exhaustive of the legislation regulating conditions in 
factories. Acts such as the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1965, the Environmental Planning Act of 1967 and the 
Health Act of 1977, while not the focus of the present study, 
contain provisions which seek to regulate certain industrial 
activities, also regulated by the Factories Act, and t~erefore 
f_orm part of state legislative regulation during the same 
period. 
In attempting to situate the legislative changes that resulted 
in the repeal of the Factories Act and its replacement with 
the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1983, a useful 
starting point would, however, be the Erasmus Commission 
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established in 1974. The terms of reference of' the Commission I 
were to investigate the nature, extent and effects of ~ 
occupational diseases, statutory protection of health at work/~ 
and various aspects of occupational health services. 20 ~ 
Since the Commission reported in 1976, it has become a major , -. 
reference point for discussions of occupational health in 
t' 
South Africa. Th.e Commission painted a d.ismal picture of the 
state of workers' health; it was critical of statutory 
protection of health at work, which was found to be . 
fragmented, incomplete and out of date; and it found that . ' 
occupational health services outside of the mining industry 
w:re very limited. Despite _the political impact of the 
Erasmus Commission, only a few minor recommendations were, 
however, accepted and implemented in subsequent. legislation 
20 .. Report o-f the Commission o-f Enquiry on Occupational 
Health. r;:P 55/1976; referred to as the ErasmLts Commission 
after its chairman, JL1dge RP B ErasmLls 
'( 
/ 
and it was only in 1988 that legislative proposals appeared 
which could arguably be seen as a more substantive response to 
some of Erasmus's recommendations.21 
The many recommendations put forward called for far-reaching 
changes to the occupational health system and, although not 
all are pertinent to the discussion at hand, it may be 
worthwhile highlighting some aspects of the recommendations. 
The report recommended, inter alia, that one Act dealing 
exclusively with occupational health be drafted. It is worth 
~oting that the Commi~~ion's definition o! occupat~~nal h~~~t? 
did not include accidents. In other words, while bein~ aware 
of the international trend towards dealing with occupational 
health and saf~ty as two sides of the same coin, the 
Commission opted for a narrow interpretation of its terms of 
reference. 
Along with a single Act, Erasmus also recommended that 
occupational health should fall under one independent·. 
department which would act as an 'umbrella' department. It 
was recommended that this should be the Department of Health, 
as it was then called. Interestingly enough, Erasmus has gone 
on record more recently, still arguing for this administrative 
structure, despite the fact that trends in legislation and 
government thinking point in a quite different direction. The 
reason advanced by Erasmus for occupational health being 
administered by the Department of National Health and 
Population Development is "that a department directly 
concerned with production cannot ultimately be a judge where 
occupational health in its own field is concerned, and because 
the Commission viewed with dismay the fragmented state of 
legislation dealing with the subject scattered through eleven 
departments of State." 22°' The Commission had found that, at 
the time of its investigation, 71,9% of the economically 
active population (5,78 million of 8 million) were not covered 
21. These are the proposed Occupational Medicine and 
Occupational Diseases Bill and the Compensation ~or 
Occupational Diseases Bill, published by the Dep~rtment o~ 
National Health and Populat~on Development in 1987 
22. Erasmus RP B: Occupational health and hygiene. South~ 
A~rican Medical Journal, 1987, 72(15), p.279 
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by legislation relating to occupational disease. It estimated 
that, if its recommendations concerning an improved 
administrative structure were adopted, approximately 6 million 
industrial workers would be protected by legislation. 23 
Another important recommendation by the Commission was that 
managements "should be obliged to consult workers or their 
representatives on industrial health problems and working 
conditions and to grant them a hearing when they have 
complaints." 24 This line of thinking could be seen as·a sign 
of the times, representing some awareness of the emerging 
black trade union movement and of legislation being passed in 
other countries at that time. In the USA, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 and in the UK, the Health and 
Safety at Work Act, promulgated in 1974, were also granting 
workers increased rights to participation in workplace health 
and safety. However, the discussion in the report preceding 
the recommendation reflected the rather narrow interpretation 
that the Commission was to give to workers' involvement. The 
Commission did not, for instance, envisage co-operation 
between workers and management resulting in "freely 
recognising pressure groups among the workers or acceding to 
I 
their demands." 2 ~ In a similar vein, the Commission rejected 
the possibility of trade unions appointing representatives who 
would have the right to inspect a workplace, a right conferred 
on British coal miners since 1872 and extended to all British 
miners by the 1954 Mines and Quarries Act. The reasons given 
for its stance were that South Africa's trade union history 
was not as old as that of Britain; that 'races' in South 
Africa had different norms and would not always agree on 
demands; and that many miners were foreigners, who might 
"become the biggest pressure groups with the most unreasonable 
demands and as aliens they may even seek to dictate labour 
policy in this country." 2 6 
What the Commission did envisage was the establishment of 
joint safety committees, consisting of representatives of both 
23. RP 55/1976: op cit, p.96 
·24. ibid, p.98 
25. ibid, p •. 41 
26. ibid 
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management and workers, which would meet regularly for 
discussions on safety matters. For the purposes of such 
committees, the Commission was of the opinion that workers in 
industry shoutd be able to elect their own representatives. 
although the constitution of the committees was to be left to 
the discretion of management. 37 The proposal was very similar 
to the liaison committees which were provided for by the 
Department of Labour's new law, the Black Labour Relations 
Regulation Act of 1973. In the period after the latter law 
was passed. employers rushed to form liaison comrnittees and, 
by 1974, 1200 committees had been formed and the figure 
~ontinued to grow. 38 (After the massive strikes in Durban in 
1973, independent unions also continued their growth which, 
although perhaps not as rapid ~s that of the employer-
initiated liaison committees. was to prove more lasting, as 
the unions were far more popular with black workers than were 
the liaison committees.) The joint safety committees proposed 
by Erasmus did not. however, receive official sanction and. 
even if they had been written into law in some way. it is 
unlikely that their growth would have been as spectacul~r as 
that of the liaison committees. The proposal constituted an 
important symbolic change. however. because. for the first 
time in the history of South African occupational health and 
safety legislation. there was some recognition that workers in 
the manufacturing sector should be entitled to involvement in 
health and safety matters at plant level. 
pespite the ~risis of occupational health highlighted by 
Erasmus. it took another eight years before legislation was ..._ 
i~trod~ced specifically to regulate health and safety in 
industry. The origins of what was to become MOSA need, 
however, to be traced more directly to another Comnission 
established in 1977. namely the Wiehahn Comrnission. Much has 
been written about the Wiehahn Commission. its background, its 
recomrnendations for restructuring the country's industrial 
. relations system and the process that led to the recognition 
27. ibid 
28. Friedman S: Building tomorrow today: ~~rican workers in 
trade unions 1970-1984. Johannesburg: Ra.van Press, 1987, 
pp.54-55 
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of African trade unionism under what became the Labour 
Relations-Act. This ground will not be explored again here. 29 
What is relevant is that the protection of workers' safety and 
health formed part of the Commission's investigation and was 
dealt with in Part 4 of the Commission's Rep.ort. 
Wiehahn was instructed to investigate thirteen Acts of 
Parliament with reference to: 
"(i) the adjustment of the existing system for the regulation 
of labour relations in South Africa with the object of 
making it provide more effectively for the needs of our 
changing times; 
(ii) the adjustment, if necessary, of the existing machinery 
for the prevention and settlement. of disputes .which 
changing needs may require; 
(iii) the elimination of bottle-necks and other problems which 
are at present being experienced within the entire 
sphere o.f 1 abour; and 
(iv) the methods and means by which a foundati'on for the 
creation and expansion of sound labour relations may be 
laid for the future of South Africa." 30 
In line with its terms of reference, the most important 
aspects of the Commission's work had to do with changes to 
what was then the l~dustrial Conciliation Act, particularly 
with regard to the incorporation of black workers into the 
ill-::,._,-
off icial system. In reviewing the Factories Act, which 
c-
contained the most important provisions concerning health and 
safety, Wiehahn made six recommendations, five of which were 
accepted by the government in its l'lhite Paper. The sixth, 
concerning women and shift work, was deferred until later 
parts of the Commission's report, dealing with the issue, were 
29. See, inter alia: Friedman: ibid, pp.149-203; South A-frican 
Labour Bulletin, 1979, 5(2) 
30. Cited in South A-frican Labour Bulletin, ibid, pp.1-2 
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/ 
published. 31 The.five recommendations which were accepted, 
were: 
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1. The Factories Act should be consolidated with the Shops and { 
~ . /,' 
Offices Act and should be renamed the Occupational Health f 
. I 
and Safety Act (OHS Act) . , 
2. To rationalise efforts regarding health and safety, a 
directorate of occupational health and safety should be 
established within the Department of Manpower Utilisation. 
The main task of the directorate would be to administer 
legislation relating to health and safety at work apd to 
establish the necessary administrative machinery to ensure 
the maintenance and promotion of workers' health and 
safety. It was also envisaged that the directorate would 
take over and control as much as possible of the existing 
state machinery engaged in the l.atter task and co-ordinate 
the efforts of other organisations, such as the National 
Occupational Safety Association (NOSA). 
3. The reporting of statistics relevant to occupational health 
should be rationalised between the Workmen's Compensation 
Act and the new OHS Act. 
4. The regulations of the Factories Act should be reviewed by 
the directorate of occupational health and safety, in 
consultation with organised industry, commerce and 
employees' organisations, with a view to adapting them to 
modern needs and techniques. 
5. The consolidation of the Factories Act and the Shops and 
Offices Act should be undertaken by the Department of 
Manpower Utilisation. 
The Wiehahn recommendations were nowhere near as far-reaching 
as those of the Erasmus Commission, but they were significant 
in that they laid the ground for change to the Factories Act 
and provided a crucial vehicle for the.Department of Manpower 
Utilisation, in the form of the directorate, to carry out the 
31. Wiehahn: op cit, p.376 
change. The spirit of reform introduced by Wiehahn also 
provided an important context and set of guidelines for 
further change. As the present head of what is now the 
Directorate of Occupational Safety put it: · "The Wiehahn 
Commission was a very convenient and very timeous vehicle to 
effect changes that, as most of these things go, had been on 
the cards for quite a while."3:a 
MOSA: What's in an Act? 
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The first sign of legislative change came on 31 July 1981, ~. 
with the publication of the Draft Machinery and Qccupational· 
and Safety Bill. The draft bill was fairly bland: the main I 
departure from the Factories Act was a substantially extende~ 
scope, both in terms of the industries and the employees to/be 
covered. In November of the same year another draft appear,ed, 
this time called the Draft Machinery, Occupational Safety· ahd 
Occupational Health Bill. Neither of the bills was passed,~ 
but the intention was to repeal the Factories _Act, to·replace( 
it with a modernized version for the protection of both the , 
health and the safety of workers and also to provide for the\ 
establishment of an Advisory Committee on Occupational Health,j, 
Clear definitions of occupational health and occupational 
hygiene had been incorporated in the November draft. Chapter 
3 of the November draft supported a dualistic approach by 
formulating clearly which occupational health matters were to 
be dealt with by the Department of Health and which would come 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Manpower, in 
consultation with the Department of Health. Provision was 
also made for regulations with regard to providing both 
preventive and curative health services for workers. 33 
Occupational hygiene matters were to be the concern of 
employers and officials of the Department of Manpower, in 
32. Interview: I Mulder, ChieT Director, & P Haupt, Director, 
Directorate OT Occupational Sa~ety, Dept. o~ Manpower: 
15 March 1989 
33. Benatar S, Mets J, Elmes P: Occupational health and saTety 
in Sou'lah ATrica. South A-frican Medical Journal, 1983, 63, 
p.952 
J 
consultation with the occupational health officer of the 
Department of Health. 
A number of factors contributed to the division of functions 
among government departments, beginning with the 
recommendation of the Erasmus Commission that occupational 
health should fall under on~ Act, to be administered by the 
Department of Health. The government was apparently "not 
comfortable" with the latter recommendation and there had also 
been a number of objections from industry, who saw 
occupational health as being part of the labour field. As a 
result the government did not publish a White Paper on 
Erasmus. 34 Instead an inter-departmental committee was 
established in 1977 to look into the matter. While the 
committee was still sitting, Wiehahn published his Report, 
recommending that a Directorate of Occupational Health and 
Safety be established in the Department of Manpower, a 
recommendation accepted in the subsequent White Paper. 
Opinion in the inter-departmental committee seems to have 
\ 
varied, from initially favouring the scenario suggested by 
Erasmus, to favouring that of Wiehahn. It was in the midst of 
the apparent confusion that the November bill was published. 
Shortly afterwards, however, the Commission on Administration, 
a statutory institution responsible for reviewing and 
allocating functions and responsibilities between government 
departments, carried out an investigation on the matter. It 
recommended to the government that occupational health be 
split into two branches: 
occupational n~ne_ - the technical preventive measures to be 
carried out in the workplace - which should be the 
responsibility of the Department of Manpower, and; 
occupational medicine - the medical monitoring of employees -
which was allocated to the qepartment of Health. 
The outcome was the publication, on 2 March 1983, of the new 
Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA), which excluded 
.the section of the November 1981 draft on occupational health. 
34. Interview: Mulder & Haupt . 
59 
The Explanatory Memorandum stated that "Occupational Medicine 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health and 
Welfare and is not provided for in this Bill", and 
occupational hygiene was now defined as the "technical. 
preventive measures to be taken at the workplace to protect 
the health of employees". 3 e A significant feature of MOSA was 
therefore the concept it embodied of what aspects of 
occupational health and safety were to be regulated by the 
Department of Manpower, namely safety and hygiene. (Later 
developments have, however, begun to cloud this issue, with 
the Asbestos and Draft Lead regulations dealing with 
occupational health matters as well as safety and hygiene.) 
The major shortcoming of the outcome contained in MOSA was the 
fact that legislation on occupational health was once again 
delayed and critics were quick to point out that the omission 
detracted from the overall value of the legislation. As 
60 
argued by Benatar et al: "In our opinion there should be no / 
clear distinction between health and safety in the workplace. 
The two are intimately interwoven. To attempt to provi_de a 
separate set of regulations and separate inspectorates under 
two different ministerial departments, one for safety and one 
·for health, would lead to unnecessary expense and chaos."36 
Perhaps more importantly, the distinction between safety and 
health, adopted in the South African legislation, has laid the 
basis for a dual regulating system, one which may be incapable 
of dealing holistically and efficiently with workplace 
hazards and their effects on employees. 
In terms of the allocation of responsibility between 
government departments for safety and health, the South 
African government is not alone _in having opted for a 
dualistic model. As Luigi Parmeggiani, President of the 
International Commission on Occupational Health and also the 
technical editor of the ILO's Encyclopaedia of Occupational 
Health and Safety writes: "The competent authority for 
occupational health is the Ministry of Labour in some· 
countries, the Ministry of Health in others; in most countries 
35. Cited in Benatar et al: op cit, 1983, p.952 
36. Benatar et al: op cit, 1983, p.953 
the central authority has sole responsibility, in others the 
central and local authorities act together. In general, the 
competence lies with the Ministry of Labour in those countries 
which have a long tradition of worker protection at the 
workplace; this has the advantage of bringi~g together, under 
one authority, both the technical and the medical aspects of 
occupational safety and health in a coherent unit, better 
integrated and better able to deal with problems arising in 
individual enterprises. If, however, the Ministry of Health 
is the competent authority, this ensures better dovetailing of 
occupational medicine into the field of public health as a 
whole and thus seems preferrable in the developing countries, 
where the meagre resources for health and medical care require 
the fixing of priorities at the national level and where 
workers' health is more often at risk from public health 
conditions than from occupational factors." 37 
A developing international trend in assigning responsibility 
among government departments and public authorities has, in 
fact, been moves towards single, unified regulating systems. 
It could be debated back and forth whether, in South Africa, a 
single, unified body governing industrial health and safety 
should be based in the Department of Manpower, or in the 
Department of Health. What is essential, however, is that 
there be a "well-organised, competent medical component in the 
structure as a whole, with its main objectives the maintenance 
and promotion of the health of worker populations."38 A 
component embodying such objectives would also go some way to 
meeting the ILO principle, contained in its Occupational 
Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155), that workers' 
health and safety are inseparable. 
In terms of addressing the dichotomy between occupational 
safety and health, ~OSA did not provide any real solutiono. 
The parallel issue of departmental responsibility for the 
various functions was also not resolved by the Act, although 
it indicated a clear direction contrary to that of the Erasmus 
37. Parmeggiani L: State o+ the art: Recent legislation on 
workers' health and sa+ety. International Labour Review, 
1982, 121 (3), p. 274 
38. Benatar et al: op cit, 1983, p.953 
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Cormnission, namely that the Department of Manpower would 
maintain responsibility for occupational safety and hygiene. 
A model. for workplace regulation 
The most important point of departure contained in the 
62 
Machinery and Occupational Safety Bi 11, which was presented to C ·'!_,' ' · 
Parliament in March 1983 and passed later in the year, I.ay in / 
the organisational structures for whic~ it provided, namely, 
the system of Safety Cormnittees ,and Safety Representatives. 
In certain quarters, the latter was also to become the most 
controversial feature of MOSA. 
Approximately 15 months passed between the publication of the 
Draft Machinery, Occupational Safety and Occupational Health 
Bill and the tabling of the Machinery and Occupational Safety 
Bill in Parliament. During that time, the Cormnission for 
Administration was looking into departmental responsibilities 
and senior officials of Department of Manpower's Directorate 
of Occupational Safety were touring the USA, Canada and the 
UK. During the tour they also studied European legislation on 
occupational health and safety. 
An important feature of the legislation of the three countries 
visited and of many European countries was the incorporation 
of some form of worker participation in exercising control 
over occupational health and safety. The most common form of 
participation was found to be that of safety committees, joint 
management-labour forums, with a consultative role and 
functions that varied from country to country, but which most 
often included an advisory role and plant-level hazard 
analysis. The international origin of such committees could 
be traced back "to a resolution submitted by the Uruguayan 
workers' delegation to the International Labour Conference in 
1928. "39 Apart from the committees, the nature and extent of 
worker participation varied a great deal from country to 
country but, by the late 1970s, it had become commonplace to 
find some form of statutory provision for workers' 
participation. 
39. Parmeggiani: op cit, 1982, p.276 
As demonstrated above, 'the concept of joint management-labour 
committees in the area of hea-lth and safety was not new in 
South Africa. Erasmus had proposed them and Wiehahn had 
proposed participation by organised labour. It was therefore 
not surprising that the Machinery and Occupational Safety Bill 
introduced a form of worker participation in health and safety 
issues, which was accepted with·one important amendment and 
enacted in MOSA. The model introduced by MOSA is as follows: 
At the national level there is an Advisory Council for 
Occupational Safety (ACOS), similar in form and 
function to its Canadian counterpart, the Advisory 
Council on Occupational Health and Occupational Safety 
(ACOHOS). ACOS is composed of representatives of the 
Departments of Manpower and Health (two each), a 
representative from the-Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner's office and two representatives each of 
emloyers and employees. The role of ACOS is to 
undertake investigations and to advise and make 
recommendations to the Minister of Manpower, who 
appoints all members of the Council. 40 
At plant level, MOSA provides for a system of safety 
representatives and safety committees. The Act 
requires employers to designate as safety 
representatives one or more full-time employees who 
are acquainted with conditions at the workplace. In 
any firm there must be a minimum of one safety 
representative per 50 employees, except where there 
are less than 20 employees, in which case the 
requirement falls away. The functions of safety 
representatives are to inspect the workplace at least 
once a month, to write reports of inspections for the 
employer or the safety committee, to report on 
accidents and to act as a general watchdog on health 
and safety. Safety representatives are also required 
to attend safety committee meetings. 
40. Explanatory Memorandum on the Machinery and Occupational 
Sa~ety Bill. WP 6/1983 
63 
) 
In plants where more than one safety representative 
has been designated, employers are required to 
establish safety committees. It is up to the employer 
to decide on the composition of the committee and the 
committee must meet at least once every three months. 
The safety committee is required to go over the 
inspection and accident reports of the safety 
representatives on a regular basis, to make 
recommendations to management about improving safety, 
to report serious accidents to a Factory Inspector and 
to use its rights to make the workplace safer. 
In essence, the above was the organisational system introduced 
by MOSA, one which gave management the dominant role in 
establishing a safety committee and in deciding its 
composition. With respect to the safety representatives, the 
·act remained ambiguous: employers were to designate in 
writing one or more safety representatives. 41 In the 1981 
Bills there was provision for the election of safety 
representatives, an option preferred by the Department of 
Manpower. But, in the words of one of the drafters of MOSA: 
"the government decided as a matter of policy that they did 
not want the election of safety representatives. They would 
rather have the prerogative with the employer to designate 
safety representatives, but, very carefully they refrained 
from specifying who the employer should designate, or how he 
should arrive at his decisjon .... It was very carefully and 
deliberately done, it was left open-ended."42 
In choosing such a solution, South Africa was adopting a 
somewhat unique position, as is perhaps true for much of the 
industrial relations field in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
comparative terms, three options can be identified 
internationally in the way in which safety representatives 
fill their positions: appointment by the employer, 
appointment by a union and election by the employees. 
Examples of the first option, where safety representatives are 
41. Machinery & Occupational Sa~ety Act. 6/1983, section 9 
42. Interview: Mulder & Haupt 
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appointed by employers, are countries such as Austria, West 
Germany and Spain. The second option is followed in the UK, 
Canada and Sweden, while the election of safety 
representatives by employees is found in Denmark and Po.land. 43 
Legal approaches adopted in various countries cannot easily be 
categorised, however, as they sometimes allow for alternative 
methods of appointment of safety representatives, according to 
the degree of unionisation, or in consultation with other 
forms of statutory workplace organisation, such as works 
councils. 
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The option in MOSA nevertheless appears unique in that it / 
' ' 
follows the first solution above, the appointment of safety\ 1', 
:r:_epresentatives by employers, Rut leaves open the possibility, 
?f either a union or employees nominating or electing their 
:r__epresentatives. In theory then, one could argue that MOSA 
leaves open the possibility of some form of democratic worker 
p~rticipation in occupational health and safety via the 
function of the safety representative. This was the most 
c- ' 
radical departure of the Act from previous legislation ~nd 
recommendations. 
In the adoption of the safety committee concept', MOSA was less 
unusual, both in comparison with other countries and in that 
the committees closely resembled the old liaison committees 
introduced by the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act of 
1973. It is interesting to note that it is only in the 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe that safety committees 
,are set up within the trade union structure; jn most other 
9ountries they are joint bodies, as is the case in MOSA. 




While the introduction of the safety representative system was 
a fairly radical departure from the traditional South African 
' 
occupational health and safety arena, it would have to be seen 
43. Szubert W: Sa-fet y and heal th at work. In: International 
Encyclopedia o~ Comparative Law. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijho-F-f, 1983, vol.15 (Labour law), chapter 7~ p.42 
alongside of other aspects of the new thinking which underlay 
MOSA, the most important of which was the concept of self-
regulation embo~ied in the Act. The new thinking was well 
captured in the following extract from the Report of the 
Director-General of the Department of Manpo~er, but drafted by 
the Chief Director of the Occupational Safety Division: 
"One of the Department's basic points of departure is 
that safe conditions at a workplace cannot be ensured 
by legislation alone, but that this is to a large 
extent a self-regulating activity that should be left 
to the employer in collaboration with his employees. 
In this regard the Act provides that employers must 
appoint safety representatives from among their 
employees and safety committees to act as a watchdog 
and to identify dangers at the workplace in good time 
and bring these to the attention of the employer •. who 
must in turn take the necessary corrective steps for. 
the safeguarding of his employees, where necessary."44 
The above approach has a number of implications for the 
parties concerned in the regulatory process, some of which 
will be dealt with in the following chapters. The first point 
to note is that a strategy of self-regulation enables the 
state to play a qualitatively different role in relation to 
employers in the enforcement of regulations. The factory 
inspectorate need no longer play a prescriptive, paternalistic 
role, strictly enforcing the detailed letter of the law, but, 
under MOSA, are able to play a different· role, that of 
~·auditors of safety management systems. "415 As the Chief 
Director explainfad: 
" ... whereas previously the inspector would go to a 
factory and go to the grinding wheel and measure the 
gap between the guard and the wheel and say: ~oK, by 
· law that should be 8mm. and yours is lOmn. Hence you 
have contravened the law, correct within 30 days or I 
44. Report o~ the Director-General, Dept a~ Manpower, ~r the 
year ended 31/12/87. RP 72/1988 
45. Interview: Mulder & Haupt 
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am institutin~ prosecution.' Under the MOS Act he 
would go to that factory and he wouldn't even look at 
the grinding wheel, or anything else for that matter, 
he would go and sit down with the manager and say: 
'OK, where's the chairman of your safety committee, 
where's your record of incidents, etc.' He would talk 
to the safety reps, look at the minutes of the SC 
meetings, evaluate safety performance in terms of WCC 
records. He would do a walkabout, yes, normally 
accompanied by the SR for that particular department. 
So the whole function has changed, he (the inspector) 
has gone from policeman to auditor."46 
The latter approach to health and safety was clearly argued in 
1972 by the influential Robens Committee, established in the 
UK to make recommendations concerning occupational health and 
safety organisation. 47 The fundamental declaration of the 
report was as follows: "The primary responsibility for doing 
something about the present levels of occupational accidents 
and diseases lies with those who create the risks and those 
who work with them."48 The report warned against the tendency 
to rely too much on government regulations and not enough on 
voluntary efforts and individual responsibility·. It went on 
to argue that legislation should concern itself not so much 
with circumstantial details, but should "rather aim to shape 
attitudes and create the infrastructure for a better 
organisation of occupational safety and health by industry's 
own efforts."49 The Robens report later became the basis for 
restructuring and modernising the organisation of occupational 
health and safety in the UK and its influence, whether direct 
or via the UK system. on MOSA is quite obvious. 
Accompanying the move to self-regulation is a much clearer \ 
9-elim1tat1on of respons1b1l1ty 1n MOSA as compared with th~ .. 
Factories Act. In the former. responsibility clearly rests 
with the employer, perhaps a necessary adjunct to the self-
46. ibid 
47. Report o~ the Committee on sa~ety and health at work 1970-
72. London: HMSO, 1972 <Robens Report) 
48. Parmeggiani: op cit, 1982, p.273 
49. ibid 
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regulatory model, insofar as it is no longer the role of the 
state to define what constitutes dangerous working conditions 
and to prescribe the necessary precautions. The principle is 
perhaps best illustrated by reference to the following 
examples from the Acts: 
The Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, chapter 5a, 
section 39a states: 
"Cl) If the Minister is of the opinion that any 
activity carried on in any factory or on any premises 
on which machinery is used or building work _or 
excavation work is performed, is such that the health 
or safety of persons employed in connection therewith 
will be end.angered by their continued employment in 
connection therewith, he may by notice in the Gazette, 
declare such activity to be a specified activiti. 
C2) No person shall engage any person to perform work 
in connection with any activity declared to be a 
specified activity in terms of subsection Cl), unless 
such person has been examined within the prescribed 
period by a registered medical practitioner' .... " 
What could be seen as replacing the above in MOSA may be found 
in the General Administrative Regulations, the first set of 
regulations promulgated in terms of MOSA and gazetted in 
October 1984, shortly after the Act itself came into effect: 
"5. Without derogating from any specific duty imposed 
on employers or users of machinery by the Act or these 
regulations, every employer or user of machinery, as 
the case may be, shall -
Cf) establish, as far as is reasonable, what dangers 
to the safety of persons are attached to any work that 
is performed, any article which is processed, used, 
handled, stored or transported and any machinery which 
is used in his business and, further, he shall 
establish what precautionary measures should be taken 
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with respect to such work, article or machinery in 
order to protect the safety of persons and he shall 
provide the necessary means for, and apply such 
precautionary measures; / 
(g) take such steps as may be necessary to remove any 
threat or potential threat to the safety of persons as 
far as is practicable;" 
~e transfer of responsibility from "the Minister" is clear. 
In theory, the onus of responsibility on the employer could 
also grant a certain amount of power to the other party t~ 
regulation at the enterprise level, namely the employees, 
insofar as the law defines broad parameters for their 
IE,_onitoring of the way in which an employe_r carries out his or 
Q_er statutory responsibility. 
An important qualification to any discussion of 
responsibilities has to do with the phrases, "as far as is 
practicable", or "as far as is reasonable". On the face of 
it, such phrases may be a loophole for employers to argue 
their way out of having to do anything more than the bare 
minimum in the workplace. The now defunct Trade Union Council 
of SA (TUCSA) raised the issue in their submissions on the 
General Administrative Regulations, where they argued: 
" ... the word "reasonable" is too open to conflicting 
interpretation. The Council would strongly urge that this 
term be substituted by 'every possible measure', which whilst 
still being unavoidably vague, leaves less room to employers. 
who may wish to find loopholes in order to circumvent the 
spirit and intention of this Section in the Regulations."eo 
I 
On the other hand, it could be argued that there are 
precedents in common law for defining what would constitute 
"reasonable" action. Moreover, the terms imply an obligation 
for employers to take positive steps, in certain instances 
measurable against defined standards and duties. 
50. Records o~ the Trade Union Council o~ South A~rica: Letter 




Nevertheless, the key test of MOSA and the regulatory model 
that it introduced lay in its implementation and in the 
responses of employers and workers to it. 
Summary 
This chapter has traced the change in state legislative 
regulation from the early Factories Act through to the 
Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1984. In the 
formative period of factory legislation, the major force 
shaping legislative regulation was seen, following Budlender, 
to be capital's need to curb the worst excesses of the 
production system and to protect workers' productive 
capabilites in the interests of capital as a whole. While the 
foregoing view could be demonstrated empirically in relation 
to early factory legislation, the social forces influencing 
subsequent changes to factory legislation, are more obscure. 
~uring the 1970s and 1980s, the Erasmus and Wiehahn 
~ommissions of Inquiry made significant recommendations 
~egarding change to occupational health and safet~ 
legislation. Conflicting recommendations of the two 
~ . 
commissions reproduced a fragmentation of funct'ions and \ rJ ,'(~_ 
~sponsibilities between different government department~. 
The_separation of responsibilities for occupational health, on 
the one hand, and occupational safety and hygiene, on the 
... 
other, between the Departments of Health and Manpower, 
-· respectively, has reinforced a dualism which, while certainly 
not unique in comparative terms, can only serve to weaken 
~tate regulation of workplace health and safety. The adoption 
of the dualism or split responsibility cannot easily be 
related to the interest of any particular social group or 
class. Rather, it would appear, superficially ~t least, to 
have more to do with internal dynamics between state 
departments, which have, over time, come to assume 
responsibility for particular functions and which may have 
developed vested interests in continuing such functions. The 
influence of the state itself on the form of legislative 
regulation does not necessarily contradict the argument that 
the state continues to legislate in such a way as to ensure 
the interests of 'social capital'. or of capital as a whole. 
t 
The latter could be seen to remain an underlyi.ng function of 
the state and of legislation. which may be achieved in 
different ways and through different forms of legislation at 
different points in time. 
The legislative changes in the area of occupational health and 
safety over the last two decades. both proposed and adopted. 
were undoubtedly influenced by the growth of the democratic 
union movement. The attraction of the Erasmus Commission to 
the concept of joint safety committees could quite possibly 
have been influenced by the state's response to the emergence 
of the democratic unions. a response encapsulated in the 
promotion of the liaison committee system. Similarly. while 
the Wiehahn Commission was perhaps not so specific about the 
form of regulation of workplace health and safety. -it 
recommended definite changes to the legislative framework. 
More important was the spirit of reform introduced by wiehahn 
as regards the recognition of black trade unions. a reform 
which found a resonance in the more far-reaching changes 
contained in MOSA. in particular, that of the safety 
representative system. 
But. while the union movement may have had an indirect 
influence on legislative change in the field of occupational 
health and safety, other factors also influenced the passage 
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of MOSA. ~nternational developments in safety legislation no r 1 
doubt also had an effect. as is clearly reflected in the ~'./ .. · 
,-..; ;,;1.. 
safety committee and safety representative system. an· 
organisational system for workplace health and safety that had -- - - . 
been introduced into the legislation of a number of countries 
~ . 
_ by the ear 1 y 1980s.: The Robens Conmi t tee report appears to 
have been particularly influential, as there are a number of 
parallels between its recommendations and the outcome in MOSA 
- the concept of self-regulation being one crucial example .. 
While the above factors may constitute influences on the form 
of legislation to be found in MOSA, they do not provide clear 
explanations as to the aim of the state in introducing MOSA at 
the time that it did. Comprehensive evidence, from which such 
aims may be deduced, is, in the case of MOSA, hard to come by. 
The first real critique of the Act to have appeared in the 
literature, suggested that: "What MOSA amounts to, then, is a 
' . 
move by state and management to pre-empt organisation around 
health and safety that is controlled by workers/unions; and to 
put in its place a system that is more easily dominated by 
management, and in which the workers have no real say by 
1 aw. "!5 1 
One of the concerns of the following chapter will be to_ 
discuss whether the latter critique was an accurate assessment 
of the aims behind MOSA. Some of the major criticisms of MOSA 
will also receive attention. The major focus of the following 
chapter will, however, be an empirical assessment of the 
implementation of MOSA in the Greater Cape Town area and the 
likely practical effects of the regulatory model contained in 
the Act. 
51. Myer-s J, Steinberg M: Health and sa-fety organisation:_ A 
perspective on t~e Machinery and Occupational Sa-fety Act. 
South A-frican Labour Bulletin, 1983, 8(8) ~~ 9(1), p.83 
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Chapter~ The implem~mation of_ t)lEL Machinery and 
O~g_upa ti ona 1 Sg.f.~. Act_.:.. 
Introduction 
The Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA) was 
promulgated in March 1983 and came into operation.on 5 October 
1984. The stated aim of the Act is to provide for the 
protection of the health and safety of employees at work and 
to provide safety measures in connection with machinery. It 
does so partly through substantive provisions in the Act, but 
mainly as an enabling measure. which, as in the case of the 
Factories Act, finds practical expression in the regulations 
made in terms of the Act. Unlike its predecessor, the 
Factories Act. MOSA applies not only to employees in factories 
and building work, but to all persons in employment. inctuding 
the public sector, agriculture. commerce. local government and 
domestic service. MOSA is therefore far broader in scope than 
its predecessor and. as was discussed in.the previous chapter, 
it also introduced a new approach to health and safety in the 
workplace. 
Shortly after the Act was passed, MOSA met with a considerable 
amount of criticism, mainly from independent trade unions, 
industrial relations consultants and occupational health 
professionals. One of the aims of this chapter will be to 
review the criticisms of the Act, in particular. those 
regarding the most important and also the most controversial 
provisions of MOSA, pertaining to the appointment of safety 
representatives and safety committees. 
Given that companies are legally required to do so, it can be 
assumed that there has been widespread compliance with the 
provisions of the Act concerning the establishment of safety 
committees and designation of safety representatives. Since 
the Act came into operation, there has, however. been 
virtually no investigation of how the Act is being 
implemented, or how management and labour have responded to 
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the organisation of health and safety in the workplace. 1 The 
main aim of this chapter will thus be to investigate the 
latter questions and to evaluate the likely implications of 
present trends. The material on which the chapter is based 
was collected in a questionnaire survey, carried out in 
industry in the Greater Cape Town area, between 1986 and 1987. 
The research methodo 1 ogy of the survey wi 11 ·be presented, 
followed by an analytic discussion of the main findings. 
Early criticisms of MOSA 
The crux of the organisational model in MOSA, which was also 
the basis for the introduction of self-regulation, lay in the 
provisions relating to the establishment of a system of safety 
representatives and safety committees. While recognising the 
significance of such provisions, commentators 2 were also at 
their most critical in this area, especially with regard to: 
* the possibility of safety representatives being appointed 
rather than elected; 
1. The only research-based paper available is that by Kruger 
V: A pilot study into the implementation of MOSA and 
management~s attitude to worker and union participation. 
Presented to the ASSA Conference, Univ. of Natal, June 
1986 
2. The earliest and perhaps still the most significaht 
critique of MOSA was that of Myers J, Steinberg M: Health 
and safety organisation: A perspective on the Machinery 
and Occupational Sa-fety Act. South African Labour 
Bulletin, 1983, 8(8) & 9(9). Other important critiques 
that have been drawn on here: 
Maller J, Steinberg M: Health and safety: An issue in 
industt·ial relations. South African Labour Bulletin, 
1 984, 9 ('7) ; 
Maller J: Health and safety for workers: A study o-f 
conditions of health and safety in the metal industry in 
the Vaal Triangle. BA(Hons) thesis, Univ. of the 
Witwatersrand. Braamfontein: DSG/Critical Health, 
Dissertation Series No.4, 1983; 
B-ndix S: The implementation of the Machinery and 
Occupational Safety Act. Industrial Relations Journal, 
1984, 4(4); 
Pennington S: The Machinery & Occ~pational Safety Act -
Whose prerogative is safety management? Indicator SA, 
1985; 2 (4) · 
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* the potential for safety conunittees to be structured as 
liaison committees, dominated by management and potentially 
divisive of organised workers. 
It was argued that such features would allow management to 
dominate the ·structures and operate them solely in pursuit of 
their own interests. Furthermore, the features in question · 
were seen as an attempt to pre-empt union involvement in the 
area of health and safety. The criticism was most clearly 
spelt out by Maller: "MOSA, -like the Erasmus Commission can 
be seen as an attempt by the State and capital to control 
trade union and democratic worker organisation around working 
conditions, and to pre-empt worker demands that could 
adversely affect productivity and profitability." 3 Other 
critics argued that MOSA was out of line with the spirit of 
the reforms introduced by Wiehahn c:1nd that the Act saw things 
"in terms of management and the state only, ... there is no 
provision whatsoever in this act for the participation of 
workers/unions." 4 
The latter criticism is not entirely accurate, as there is 
provision in MOSA for worker representation on the Advisory 
Council (ACOS) and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
manner in which the safety representative system is to be 
established, is ambiguous. The more important point raised by 
the early critics, albeit in an indirect way, had to do with 
the question of participation or non-participation by workers 
in the structures introduced by MOSA. On that point, the 
criticisms could be read as coming down very firmly on the 
side of non-participation. Although no great debate about 
MOSA developed amongst the democratic unions, it should be 
noted that the Act and the early criticisms of it came only a 
short while after the heated debate on the question of 
registration by trade unions in terms of the new labour 
dispensation. It seems quite possible that responses to MOSA 
were influenced by some of the issues in the latter debate.i:s 
3. Ma 11 er: op cit, 1983, pa 48 
4. Myers & Steinberg: op cit, 1983, p.80 
5. For a summary o~ the registration debate and a 
reproduction o~ some o~ the key contributions, see: 
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Some of the critics of MOSA certainly shared the view of those 
who argued that allowing African unions to register was purely 
an attempt at disorganisation. The latter view arises from a 
particular understanding of the form of law. one in which the 
extension of certain rights is seen RI:1marily in terms of 
potentially destructive effects on collective labour and 
originating in intentions on the part of the state and capital 
to disorganise labour. ~at is lost sight of is that the 
form of law is often contradictory. "since the extension of 
rights serves not only to disorganise labour but also as an 
inhibition on the power of the state. as a means of defence 
for labour against the power of capital and as a way of 
consolidating and generalising gains made through shop floor 
struggle." 6 Thus it could be argued that an analysis of MOSA . 
as a more contradictory piece of legislation could well reveal 
greater scope for unions to use the rights contained in the 
Act to advance the health and safety interests of their 
members. The latter argument will be discussed further below. 
There was also a'perception, commonly held by early 
commentators. that health and safety was an emerging issue in 
industrial relations and that MOSA created a potential area 
for confli~t over control of safety representation in the 
workplace. The perception was no doubt based on attempts by 
some unions to negotiate over health and safety matters and to 
challenge the way that MOSA's health and safety structures 
were established. While these and subsequent attempts by 
unions at tackling health and safety issues are significant. 
the perception may prove to have been based on a 
miscalculation of the extent to which the democratic unions 
have moved beyond the traditional areas of collective 
bargaining. At the time that MOSA was passed. it was 
certainly the case that unions were. by and large. deafing 
with health and safety matters on an infrequent and ad hoc 
basis. As stated in the 1983 annual report of the Federation. 
of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), "the experience was 
Maree J (ed): The independent trade unions 1974-1984. 
Johannesburg, Ravan Press. 
6. Fine B: Trade unions and the state once more: A reply to 
ow- critics. South A-Fri can Labour Bullet in, 1982, 8 ( 1) , 
p.51 
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that bargaining over health and safety was very difficult in 
an environment that· sti 11 required a struggle for basic 
recognition rights." 7 
In the light of the criticisms of MOSA and perceptions of the 
industrial relations of workplace health and safety, what were 
the trends in the implementation of the Act? Furthermore. how 
were the trade unions responding? These were some of the 
concerns that underlay the questionnaire survey carried out in 
1986 - 1987. 
The implementation of MOSA in Cape Town 
1. Research methodology 
Two questionnaires were devised, one to be used in the case of 
companies and the other for trade unions (appended as Appendix 
1 and 2 respectively). The two questionnaires had slightly 
different aims. In the case of the company questionnaire. the 
aims were to elicit company policy on health and safety, to 
gather basic data on the implementation of MOSA in the 
particular company and to serve as a control for the 
information gained from thP. trade unions. The 'aims of the 
trade union questionnaire were to gather general information 
on the union's experience of MOSA and of health and safety 
issues. as well as to gather specific information on union 
policy regarding MOSA and/or health and safety. 
Structured, in-depth interviews. based on the questionnaires, 
were used throughout the survey. In total. 50 interviews were 
carried out, 36 being with company managements and 14 with 
trade unions (listings of all companies and unions interviewed 
are provided in Appendix 3). 
Selection of companies for interview was based on the 
Workmen's Compensation Act Accident Fund list. grouped 
according to different ranges of numbers of employees and 
7. FOSATU Annual Report;cited in MacShane D, Plaut M, Ward D: 
Power! Black workers, their unions and the struggle -for 
~ree~om in South A~rica. Nottingham: ~pokesman, 1984, 
pp.81-82. 
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categorised by the non-standard industrial classification used 
by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner's office. Although 
the information contained in the listing is not up to date in 
all cases, all companies are, by law, required to register 
with the Accident Fund; the list is therefore probably the 
most comprehensive listing of companies available. The sample 
size was taken at five percent of all companies in the Greater 
Cape Town area, in the size range 50-1000 employees (since 
MOSA requires that one safety representative be designated per 
50 employees) and amounted to 36 companies. 
Ten companies, all taken from the P~inting, Paper and 
Packaging sub-sector of the manufacturing sector, were 
initially selected for a pilot study. As ther.e were no 
substantial changes to the questionnaire after the pilot, the 
ten companies were included in the total sample. A further 26 
companies were then randomly selected from the list, making up 
the required total of 36 companies. Three of the companies 
selected turned out to have less than 50 employees,(while five 
I 
companies refused to grant interviews; they were replaced by 
other companies, on a random basis. The 36 companies 
interviewed represented the following sub.,..sectors of the 
manufacturing sector, in order of numerical prevalence in the 
sample: 
printing, paper and packaging (10); 
metal, motor and engineering (8); 
textile (7); 
food (4); 
wood ( 2); 
building and construction (1); 
chemicals and plastics (1); 
petroleum products (1); 
leather (1); 
hosiery (1) . 
Two trade unions interviewed as part of the pilot were also 
included in the total union sample of fourteen unions, which 
represented 34% of the 41 trade unions operative in the 
Greater Cape Town area at the time. The unions sampled 
claimed, on the basis of signed-up ~embership figures and the 
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operation of the closed shop, to represent in the region of 
81 800 workers. Of the fourteen unions, eight were not then 
affiliated to any of the major trade union federations, 
although the eight included ex-TUCSA affiliates. Five of the 
unions interviewed are affiliated to COSATU and one is 
affiliated to NACTU. 
2. Management responses 
The results of the survey of companies broadly confirmed the 
early criticisms as regards the responses of management to the 
Act. 
* The majority of safety representatives in the companies 
investigated were appointed (see Figure 1) and most safety 
representatives fell into job categories of top management 
to skilled worker (23 companies). Twenty-nine companies had 
mainly supervisory staff in the positions of safety 
representatives and only ten companies included safety 
representatives from the categories of semi-skilled to 
unskilled worker. 
* In 18 companies, or 51% of the sample, management used 
explicit criteria in the appointment of safety 
representatives, ranging from seniority, authority and 
responsibility to literacy and degree of skill - all of 
which would tend to exclude semi-skilled operatives and 
labourers. 
* The safety committees were in nearly all cases management-
dominated bodies, whose structure and membership were 
determined by management. Only one company had a safety, 
committee representative of all employees. Moreover, in 
larger companies, it was found that the type of structure 
employed was one that had, as its principal decision making 
committee, a central safety committee consisting of top 
management, departmental heads and the Safety Officer. 
Below the central committee were a number of departmentally 
-based safety committees, consisting of departmental heads, 
the safety representatives and/or supervisory staff. 
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Reports were relayed from lower levels of the structure to 
the central safety coinmi ttee·, where decisions were made and 
then in turn relayed back down to the departmental safety 
conunittees. 
The survey thus tended to confirm that the predominant, 
~----- - --~ 
interpretation of MOSA and the most conunon approach to the 
organisati?n of health and safety was one r~sulting in_~ 
hierarchical approach, accompanied by a bureaucratic form of 
control over health and safety matters by.the higher grades of 
employee. Given what amounts to managerial dominance of the 
area, it is interesting to note that 30 of the companies 
interviewed were nevertheless of the opinion that health and 
safety constitutes an area of mutual interest between 
management and workers. Only four companies regarded the area 
of health and safety as one embodying conflicting interests, 
despite the fact that 26 companies in the sample were 
unionised. 
Despite the form of safety organisation found in the sample, 
there were, however, some interesting features in the way that 
the safety representative and safety conunittee system was 
functioning., ~~--~ost striking was the fact th'at only 15 
(42%) of the companies surveyed actually use the safety 
representative and safety conunittee system as the main 
m;chanism for addressing health and safety issues in the 
workplace (see Figure 2). In a number of cases~problems 
relating to health and safety were still dealt with on an 
individual basis, that is, between the individual concerned 
- - ·-~--
and the foreman, supervisor or company medical personnel. In 
other cases, pre-existing mechanisms were still being used to 
deal with issues. Such mechanisms ranged from responsibility 
remaining with foremen or departmental heads, to addressing 
problems through a safety committee only, usually a committde 
which pre-dated MOSA. 
Furthermore, regarding the actual functions of safety 
representatives, while all were reported to carry out the 
required inspections, in only 17 compai:iies (47%) were safety 
representatives reported to carry responsibility for accident 
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FIGURE 2 Mechanism for dealing with 
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or incident reporting as well (see Figure 3). While MOSA is 
not insistent on safety representatives having the latter 
responsibilities, it does allow for the possibility, but it 
would seem that· in practice a significant number of safety 
representatives are limited to one basic function only, namely 
the monthly inspection. When asked whether the safety 
representatives should have more extensive powers than those 
vested in them by MOSA, 29 companies (81%) felt that this 
would be unnecessary. 
Almost half (47%) of the companies investigated (17) expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Act on a wide range of issues, such 
as the inadequate training of safety representatives, concern 
at the lack of employee involvement and the extent to which 
MOSA is management-orientated. It is interesting to note. that 
unions would be in agreement ori a number of these points. 
Despite evidence of some dissatisfaction with aspects of the 
Act, however, the investigation tended to confirm the obvious 
assumption that management viewed health and safety as an area 
for which it was responsible and also considered it the duty 
of management to see that health and safety precautions are 
enforced and policed. Only eight companies viewed health and 
safety as an area where there should be joint responsibility 
by both management and employees and only five companies 
conceived of the policing of health and safety as being the 
responsibility of both management and the safety 
representatives. 
It could be argued that the assumption by the companies, that 
health and safety in effect constitutes a managerial 
prerogative, is bolstered by MOSA itself, in that the Act 
places full responsibility oh management for safety in the 
workplace and requires self-regulation for the monitoring and 
improvement of health and safety. Prerogatives tlo not, 
however, necessarily imply clear strategy as evidenced by the 
way in which MOSA is being implemented. 
The fact that organisational structures in the workplace are 
management-dominated does not necessarily give rise to any 
clear policy and strategy for dealing with workplace problems 
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and hazards. In this context, it is worth noting that only 
nine (25%) of the companies interviewed, had a specific policy 
on health and safety. 
The effect of MOSA on many companies has, however, been an 
increased awareness of health and safety and greater alertness 
to hazards at work. The increased awareness! while being a 
positive effect of legislative regulation, is, unfortunately, 
not necessarily thoroughgoing and, very often, the result 
appears to have been the provision of more protective 
equipment to the workers, rather than addressing the problem 
at source. In the larger companies, particularly where there 
are certain hazards associated with the production process, 
the effect of MOSA has been more limited, tending more to 
streamline existing practices and procedures. 
In effect, there is formal compliance with the law, beyond 
which a number of variables come into play to shape the way 
that health and safety is handled. The variables include: 
size of company, nature of company activity, past practices in 
health and safety, the role of unions in the company and the 
effects of the economic climate on the firm - and some of the 
variables interrelate. For instance, smaller ~ompanies which 
are under pressure to remain competitive, tend to be less 
concerned with health and safety. This does not mean that 
they do not comply with MOSA, but they generally do so in a 
way which reduces health and safety to a mere legal formality 
rather than an issue which may require time, money and sound 
industrial relations practices to ensure improvements to and 
regular monitoring of the working environment. 
3. Trade unions and the implementation of MOSA 
According to at least half of the .. mion officials interviewed, 
health and safety has not been an area over which members have 
expressed much concern, or where any industrial action has 
been taken. An additional reflection of the fact that health 
and safety appears to occupy a relatively low place on the 
agenda of many unions, is the finding that, of 14 unions 
surveyed, only one had any written policy on MOSA. The 
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latter was by way of an inclusion in recognition agreements to 
ensure that shop stewards would, for the purposes of the Act, 
be recognised as safety representatives. 
An exception to the above was found in the case of Transport & 
General Workers Union (T&GWU), where members in one or two 
companies have consistently advanced health and safety 
' J 
problems of an acute nature. One effect has clearly been to 
increase the awareness of organisers in the union of the issue 
of health and safety,· in turn ensuring a more systematic 
approach to the issue within the union as a whole. (Although 
not part of the present investigation, a similar situation 
could be expected to exist in the case of the National Union 
of Mineworkers.) 
More generally, three broad responses to MOSA were identified 
amongst unions across the spectrum, that is, from the more 
conservative, establishment unions to those affiliated to 
COSATU and NACTU. The responses are as follows: 
1. Uncr.iticql participation: This tends to characterise the 
response of the ex-TUCSA unions who have accepted MOSA as a 
step in the right direction. Such unions are usually well-
established and have Sick Benefit Funds, through which 
complaints about health and safety tend to be processed in 
a bureaucratic and individual way. There is often an 
absence of a more general awareness of health and safety as 
a matter to be dealt with systematically between workers 
and management on the shop floor. 
2. Boycott: This was.the initial response of some unions that 
are today affiliates of COSATU. The main reasons advanced 
for the response were that MOSA was undemocratic in nature 
and did not incluJe unions at all. For some unions, it was 
considered that health ,and safety should be dealt with 
using the normal channels through which grievances are 
raised with management, that is, through the shop steward 
committees. 
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3. Strategi_g participation: The third response, one that could 
be called strategic participation, was a relatively new 
response adopted by some unions, some of which are 




A minimum position, involving management acceptance of 
union participation through election of safety 
representatives, coupled with a recognition that safety 
representatives are accountable to the workers who elected 
them. 
A maximum position, embodied in a Health and Safety 
Agreement which codifies a set of principles, procedures 
and structures relating specifically to health and safety 
organisation in a particular company. 
To date, two such agreements have been signed and research 
carried out in 1987 found that a further 11 unions we~e 
proposing or were in the process of negotiating health and 
safety agreements. 8 The agreements which have been 
negotiated, one by the T&GWU at Turnall (Cape) and the other 
by the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) at Malcomess 
(East London), are loosely based on MOSA, but also attempted 
to address a number of deficiencies in the Act. 
Firstly, the agreements provide for the election of safety 
representatives, who by and large carry out the duties 
envisaged for them in the Act. Secondly, where safety 
committees are concerned, the agreements provide for a two-
tier system consisting, on the one hand, of a management 
health and safety committee and, on the other, of a safety 
committee, comprising safety representatives and, should the 
union s-o- choose, a nominated shop steward. In at least one of 
the agreements, the safety commi tte_e is not regar:ded as a 
negotiating committee and it is recognised that the latter 
function will continue to be vested in the union's shop 
8. Finnemore M, Pallit L: Recent developments in health and 
sa~ety agreements at the workplace in South A~rica. 
Industrial Relations Journal, 1987, 7(2), p.35 
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steward committee. The latter feature implicitly conceives of 
health and safety as an issue that is not one merely requiring 
consultation between parties, but one that requires 
negotiation in the most important industrial relations 
structure within the firm. There are other features of the 
agreements which vest more rights in the hands of workers than 
does MOSA, such as access to information. access to company 
premises for union officials, access for experts of the 
union's choice in disputes and access to medical records. 
How such agreements would work in practice remains to be seen. 
The agreement between T&GWU and Turnall (Cape) unfortunately 
fell away as a result of a takeover of the company, before the 
agreement could be properly implemented. But such agreements 
would potentially put "workers, through their safety 
representatives and advisors, in a strong position to monitor 
health and safety issues and control management prerogatives 
in this area."9 At the same time, agreements of any kind can 
take a long time to negotiate, which may mean that unions are 
unable to gain basic rights on health and safety until such 
time as an agreement is signed. In the latter respect, health 
and safety agreements are open to the same kind of 
manipulation as are recognition agreements. 10 'Such problems 
may force unions to adopt different strategies towards health 
and safety agreements, such as negotiating a very short 
agreement on basic rights, or including a section on health 
and safety in the recognition agreement, as appears to be the 
practice in the Food & Allied Workers Union (FAWU). 
Overall, however, it would appear that health and safety is 
not an area that has been considered in any systematic way by 
unions in the Greater Cape Town area and it seems likely that 
the same applies to unions in the rest of the country as well. 
This is not to imply tha~ unions are not concerned with the 
area, but havecfor various reasons not adopted a thorough-
going approach. Most often, it would appear that health and 
9. Finnemore M: Recent developments in health and sa-fety 
agreements. Unpublished paper, Industrial Relations Unit, 
Univ. o~ Port Elizabeth: n/d · 
10. See Matiko J: Recognition agreements - an evaluation. 
South A-frican Labour Bulletin, 1987, 12(4), pp.10-15 
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, safety is dealt with by unions on an ad hoc basis in response 
to a particular situation - for example, where someone has 
been killed or seriously injured. 
Discussion 
The above survey was carried out on a relatively small sample, 
in only one geographic area of South Africa. It was also 
conducted at an early stage of the implementation of MOSA. 
Given the new approach introduced by the Act, it is likely 
that management and labour would require a longer period of 
time in which to establish mutually satisfactory working 
relationships around health and safety which could lead to 
meaningful improvements to the working environment. 
The major trends to emerge from the survey point to 
the fact that companies are interpreting MOSA. in a restrictive 
sense and in a way which does not always have.very much 
content as regards effective preventive measures. Despite the 
ambiguous wording of the Act with regard to worker 
representation in the plant-level safety structures. most 
safety representative and safety committee systems are 
effectively controlled by management. The form of control 
exercised by management over safety organisation is perhaps 
best captured in the concept of "bureaucratic control". 
characterised by Edwards in the following terms: 
"Bureaucratic control ... differs from the simple 
forms of control in that it grows out of the formal 
structure of the firm, rather than simply emanating 
from the personal relationships between workers and 
bosses ... bureaucratic control is embedded in the 
social and organisational structure of the firm and is 
built-into job categories, work rules, promotion 
procedures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of 
responsibilities, and the like. Bureaucratic control 
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establishes the impersonal force of "company rules" or 
"company pol icy"· as the basis for control. "11 
In the case of safety organisation, it is the law itself, in 
the form of MOSA, which provides the basis for control and 
which also serves to institutionalise the exercise of 
hierarchical power around health and safety through the safety 
committee and safety representative system. While the 
~nvolvement of management in the area of health and safety is 
certainly necessary in terms of improving safety, it needs to 
be of such a nature as to provide support for the safety 
system as a whole and to elicit the participation of workers 
therein. The support of the workforce for any system of 
safety organisation, particularly for safety representatives, 
has be~n found to be particularly important, in that it is the 
workforce who provide information abo~t the day-to-4ay hazards 
of work and who are in a position to pass on such information 
to safety representatives.12 
The most common way in which MOSA is being implemented is, 
however, one that is unlikely to have strong participation by 
shop floor workers or even support by them. The limited form 
of worker participation in health and safety i- likely to 
circumscribe the effectiveness of MOSA as regulatory 
legislation and also to limit the attempt at self-regulation 
introduced by the Act. The foregoing should be seen in 
conjunction with the findings of the survey that, in many 
cases, management still uses old or parallel systems to deal 
with health and safety and that the responsibilities and 
functioning of safety representatives are limited, a situation 
considered desirable by the majority of companies. 
Despite the fact that MOSA does not guarantee a democratic 
form of worker participation, the Act does not explicitly 
exclude it. The exclusion of workers has occurred in the 
11. Edwards R: Contested terrain: The transformation of the 
workplace in the twentieth century. London: Heinemann, 
1979, p. 131 
. 12. Glendon A, Booth R: Worker participation in occupational 
health and sa-fety in Britain. International Labour Review, 
1982, 121(4), p.404 
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practical implementation of the Act. MOSA has, moreover, 
introduced a number of rights for employees in the area of 
hJalth and safety, as well as defining specific duties fbr 
employers. 13 Nevertheless, trade unions have, by and large, 
not responded positively to the Act. The unions which have 
accepted MOSA, tend to be those which are less active at the 
shop floor level and whose members are therefore less likely 
to become particularly involved in the area of health and 
safety through their trade unions. Most of the trade unions 
that are active at the shop floor level and in the collecitve 
bargaining process, namely those unions affiliated to COSATU 
and NACTU, appear to have chosen not to rely on MOSA for 
workplace regulation. Some of the latter unions have endorsed 
the role of safety representatives, provided that they gain 
their positions through elections by workers. In such cases, 
it is very likely that the representatives would carry on 
their health and safety function as an extension of their 
role of workplace representative, as was found to be the case 
in a survey of the operation of the safety representative 
system in the printing industry in the UK. 14 
A significant attempt by some unions to meet the challenge of 
bargaining over health and safety has been through the 
negotiation of health and safety agreements. Such agreements 
have presented an alternative to the organisation of health 
and safety activities to that contained in MOSA. The 
alternative contained in the agreements has been influenced by 
MOSA, but has also gone beyond many of the deficiencies 
contained in the Act. Nevertheless, further research would be 
required to reveal the effectiveness of such agreements in 
practice. 
One reason why certain trade unions have not endorsed MOSA may 
be found in the stance adopted towards the collective 
bargaining process by the democ~atic unions. Since their 
13. The duties and responsibilities o~ employers are contained 
in the General Administrative Regulations, published under 
GN R2206, 5 Octob~r 1984, section 5 
14. Walters D: Health and sa~ety and trade union workplace 
organisation - a case study in the printing industry. 
Industrial Relations Journal, 1987, 18(1), p.42 
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emergence in the early 1970s, such unions have, by and large, 
operated at plant level and have built their power bases on 
the representation of workers in every sphere of activity and 
in many work-related issues. For the democratic unions, 
worker representation at the plant level is equated with 
representation by elected shop stewards and perhaps the 
-neutral' form of representation proposed by MOSA, albeit for 
the health and safety arena. was doomed from th~ start, 
irrespective of the intentions behind the legislation. 
The above characterisation of current union approaches may be 
set against the view expressed by a number of the company 
representatives interviewed in the survey: the prospect of 
union involvement in health and safety structures evoked 
suspicion, on the assumption that unions.are politically 
motivated on the issue. An early cormnentary on the 
implementation of MOSA, expressed similar concerns. although 
in a more sophisticated form: "Ideally health and safety 
should constitute an area for co-operation between management 
and the workforce. However, to expect such co-operation 
within South Africa's particular circumstances and at a stage 
where unions establishing themselves at plant level are 
envious of every issue not within their sphere 'of jurisdiction 
and where other unions not yet established are using every 
issue to gain entry, is perhaps unrealistic." 1 ~ The 
assumptions underlying such arguments are, unfortunately, 
flawed and could be read as implying that trade union concern 
with health and safety is somehow illegitimate. The 
assumptions do not, in any event, correlate with the status of 
health and safety as an issue for unions, at least in the 
Greater Cape Town area. In the context of the above survey 
findings regarding health and safety as a union concern, it 
would clearly be incorrect to make the assumption that unions 
are -envious' of the issue and would like it to be brought 
within their jurisdiction. that uni.ens may -use the issue· to 
gain entry', or that they are politically motivated on the 
issue. 
15. Bendix S: op cit, p.63 
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For the moment, then, the i~plementation of MOSA appears to be 
characterised by compliance with the letter of the law, but 
not always with the real interests of workers in mind. In a 
situation where management seldom sees a need to negotiate un 
health and safety and where the issue does not have a regular 
presence on the bargaining table from the side of unions, it 
would a~pear that health and safety remains an "emerging 
industrial relations issue". More importantly, the 
legislative framework within which the issue may be raised, 
remains flawed. 
It may, however, be possible to draw a parallel with the 
industial relations situation as it existed in the mid- to 
late 1970's. At that time a number of powerful, emerging 
unions were granted de facto recognition by employers with 
whom they were having dealings, despite the lack of legal 
standing and access to the statutuory system of collective 
bargaining. The position obviously changed in the post-
Wiehahn period and with subsequent changes to the Labour 
Relations Act. But, as far as MOSA is concerned, it may be 
possible to envisage a similar scenario, whereby incremental 
changes in the law come about, reflecting improvements which 
are established in practice between employers ~nd trade unions 
in the area of health and safety. 
In general, however, it takes time and money to establish a 
saf~ working environment and, in South Africa, it will 
probably take even longer; given the high firiancial costs of 
improvements, due to past neglect, poor motivation, inadequate 
legislation and given that health and safety is a relatively 
new concern for both employers and trade unions. 
Sununary 
This chapter has briefly reviewed some of the major criticisms 
that were made of MOSA at the time that it was promulgated. A 
survey of the implementation of MOSA in the manufacturing 
sector in the Greater Cape Town area was then presented, 
focussing on the way in which companies were establishing the 
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safety representative and safety committee system provided for 
by the Act. 
The general pattern to have emerged was one in which companies 
had established safety systems dominated by the more skilled 
grades of employee and managerial staff. The safety systems 
were implementing the rules and procedures required by the law 
through .hierarchical safety representative and safety 
committee structures, effectively exercising a bureaucratic 
form of control over the area of health and safety. In many 
cases, however, companies were implementing only the minimum 
requirements of MOSA, to some extent coupled with 
dissatisfaction with certain requirements of the law, 
particularly as regards the responsibilities placed on , 
management. There was also a marked lack of instances of any 
company policy towards the area of health and safety. An 
important feature of the company interviews was the extent to 
which different variables ultimately shaped the way in which 
health and safety was dealt with by any particular company. 
Thus, although legislative regulation provided a minimuin 
framework for dealing with health and safety at the plant 
level, the content given to regulation tended to be determined 
more by factors such as size of the enterprise,' past practices 
around health and safety and, very importantly, the nature of 
production and its hazard profile. 
Through interviews with trade union officials, it was found 
that responses to MOSA were largely determined by the 
particular tradition of which any union was a part. Some 
unions would have their members appointed as safety 
representatives, who would then attend the safety committee 
meetings, but there was little evidence of such unions putting 
their own stamp on the way in which regulation of the 
workplace was to be carried out. Other unions have tended to 
bypass MOSA entirely,· preferring to deal with the health and 
safety concerns of their members through established channels 
at plant level, namely the shop steward system. A minority of 
unions have attempted to engage with the self-regulatory model 
contained in MOSA, by insisting on participation on their own 
terms, that is, by electing safety representatives. and 
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maintaining the right to negotiate over health and safety 
issues. One of the unions surveyed had negotiated a health 
and safety agreement as .an alternative model for regulation, 
but one that was influenced by MOSA. 
The general finding with regard to the trade unions was that 
health and safety issues had not featured prominently amongst 
their activities. While critical of MOSA, a number of unions 
had also not developed any alternative form of regulation 
which could take into account the legal obligation on 
companies to implement the Act, while at the same time 
addressing some of the deficiencies of MOSA. Instead, there 
was a general tendency amongst these unions to rely on their 
own shop floor tradition, one of bargaining at plant level 
through elected worker representatives. 
The following chapter will attempt to examine in greater 
detail the dynamics of a particular trade union initiative in 
the area of workplace health and safety, one carried out 
independently of the legislative framework for regulation. 
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Chapter 4; ~rown lung in the SA textile industry - A union 
campaign for control 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have attempted to provide an 
analysis of the regulatory model introduced by MOSA, its 
background, some of the problems in its implementation and 
information on responses to it by management and trade 
unions. An organisational approach to workplace safety an~ 
health is, however, a recent legislative phenomen·on in South 
Africa and it would be unrealistic to expect major changes 
in attitudes and practices at an early stage. Nevertheless, 
the trends which have emerged two to four years after the 
Act was promulgated, suggest that-the n~w system of 
regulation may not work as effectively, or as smoothly, as 
was intended by the legislators. 
Regulation of workplace health and safety does not. however, 
only come about through legislative interventi-on. As 
outlined in chapter 1, regulation should be considered from 
the point of view of employer initiatives, as well as, and 
perhaps more importantly, the role of the collective 
bargaining process and the initiatives of trade unions. 
The aim of this chapter and that following will be to 
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develop two case studies, which al low for an exploration of ---
the other forms of regulation. 
The use of case studies has the obvious disadvantage of 
dealing with specific situations, from which it may be 
difficult to generalise to other situations. In the studies 
discussed in the following chapters, the occupational 
hazards which are the subject of regulation, arise from the 
use of specific substances in the production process. The 
substances in question, cotton and asbestos dusts. give rise 
to specific diseases, which do not occur in many other 
industries. The occurrence of particular occupational 
diseases also unavoidably introduces the issue of workmen's 
compensation, which has featured prominently in both case 
studies. Compensation, albeit of crucial importance to 
workers and in the field of occupational health, will not, 
however. be dealt with in any depth. as it detours into 
areas that are not the focus of this thesis. 
Despite the specifics of the studies used here and the 
problem of generalisability. the use of case studies does 
allow for an in-depth look at the responses of employers and 
organised workers to the dangers associated with work. how 
improvements are achieved and the kinds of monitoring 
systems that are set in place. It was· suggested in the 
previous chapter that the participation of wo~kers in the· 
regulatory process in manufacturing industry may generally 
be relatively weak. In contrast. in the case studies dealt 
with here. organised workers have played a role in improving 
the working environment. There is thus a bias in favour of 
organised workers in the following studies, but it is one 
purposefully chosen to allow for an examination of the role 
which organised workers may play in the area of health and 
safety. 
In the literature on South African trade unionism. there are 
very few case studies on the role of trade unions in dealing 
with health and safety problems facing their members. The 
lack is particularly marked in the case of the manufacturing 
industry, whereas in the case of the mining industry and the 
recent attempts of the National Union of Mineworkers to 
intervene on health and safety matters. Leger has undertaken 
important studies in the last few years. 1 The following 
cases are therefore in some senses atypical. in that they 
are among the few sustained initiatives on health and safety 
by indep~ndent. democratic unions in the manufacturing 
sector. 
1. Leger J: Safety and the organisation of work in South. 
African gold mines: A crisis of control. International 
Labour Review, 1986, 125(5>; 
Leger J: From ~atalism to mass action - the South 
A~rican National Union of Nineworkers~ struggle far 
safety and health. Unpublished paper, Sociology of Work 
Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988 
This chapter concerns a union-initiated campaign to combat 
the effects of exposure to cotton dust amongst its members. 
The campaign was launched in 1982 and continued over the 
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· next two years; it encompassed many facets of occupational 
health and safety and represented what was probably the 
first major trade union initiative in the area. The form of 
the campaign conducted by the union. the National Union of 
Textile Workers (NU1W), will be described and an attempt 
will be made to assess the impact of the campaign and to 
discuss its advantages and shortcomings: 
The SA textile industry - Background to unionisation 
The South African textile industry presently employs 104 000 
persons. had a total turnover of R3.9 biilion in 1987 and 
consumes 270 000 tons of fibre a· year.a In international 
terms. it is a fairly small industry and its fibre 
consumption is only 0,7% of total worldwide demand. The 
roots of the industry in South Africa go back to the late 
1920s, when a local cotton blanket industry was established 
- although some blanket factories had been in existence 
before that time. none was of much significance. 3 It was 
only after the second World War, however. that the industry 
expanded very rapidly. due in part to strong encouragement 
from the state. particularly the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC). 4 
In the early phase of the industry's growth. factories had 
been fairly evenly spread throughout the major centres. 
From the late 1950s. however. the geographic focus changed 
and. increasingly. the Durban-Pinetown-Maritzburg (D-P-M) 
complex became the most important textile area. with the 
Eastern Cape as the second largest concentration of textile 
production. A number of reasons have been advanced for the 
regionalised growth of textile manufacturing. for instance: 
the favourable location of Durban in relation to both raw 
2. Te:-:tiles - A Sur-vey. Supplement to Financial Mail, 4 
November- 1988, p.7 
3. Hirsch A: Ah intr-oduction to textile worker or-ganisation 
in Natal. South A-frican Labour Bulletin, 1979, 4(8), p.3 
4. ibid, p.4 
materials and markets; the proximity of a large population 
of potential consumers of blankets, rugs and related 
products, the manufacture of which formed the original basis 
of the textile industry; and the high humidity in the D-P-M 
area which is suitable for knitting and weaving, in that 
there is less development of static electricity than in a 
dry climate. 
Hirsch, however, focusses on another factor as the major 
reason, namely, "the readily available supply of cheap non-
European labour of great advantage in an industry where 
'wage costs comprise a large proportion of operating costs."" 
The production process in the manufacture of textiles is one 
that relies mainly on semi- ~nd unskilled workers, with only 
about 20% of the total workf.orce being skilled. A large 
·proportion of text i 1 e workers are women, so that "the 
reserve army for the industry is even larger than for other 
industries." 6 The industry's major labour requirements are 
thus that it be cheap, plentiful and disciplined, 
requirements that have historically been adequately met in 
Natal and also the Eastern Cape. 
The implications of the above characteristics for employee~ 
in the industry are that they have very few skills with 
which to bargain. Wages in the industry have thus 
historically been very low and labour turnover has been high 
until quite recently. In addition, employees are often 
faced with employers who "will seldom hesitate before firing 
a worker, and will even replace half his plant's workforce 
if they are not as co-operative as he might wish.""' A 
clear illustration of the latter characterisation occurred 
in 1984, during the Brown Lung Campaign, when, at one of the 
textile mills, 850 out of 1000 workers were dismissed after 
a work stoppage.a 
5. ibid, p. 6 
6. ibid, p.10 
7. ibid 
8. White N: An investigation OT byssinosis among South 
ATrican textile workers. MD thesis, UCT, 1985, chapter 
3, p.25 
Despite the above characteristics of the industry, or 
perhaps because of them, trade unions have been actively 
supported by textile workers. The first union to establish 
a presence was the Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU), 
registered in 1932 by JC (JilJIDy) Bolton.• At the time the 
TWIU was organising mainly white workers. In 1950, the 
African Textile Workers Industrial Union (ATWIU) was 
founded; formally affiliated to the TWIU, it worked very 
closely with the latter. Both unions became important 
affiliates of the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SAC1U) and it was only in 1964 that the TWIU disaffiliated 
from SAC1U, after a more conservative grouping had taken 
over the running of the union. By the late 1960s TWIU had 
affiliated to the more conservative union federation. 1UCSA; 
there was "no longer any mention of ATWIU, and it appears 
that it died with the defeat of the nationalist 
movements. 11 10 
Active trade unionism in the textile industry only really 
· emerged again in the early 1970s and especially after the 
massive Durban strikes of 1973. Paradoxically, the 
resurgence initially occurred through the TWIU, but, after 
the formation of the parallel, unregistered National Union 
of Textile Workers (NUTW) in September 1973, it was the 
latter that rapidly grew to become the major force in the 
industry. The NUTW went on to become a founder member of 
the Trade Union Advisory Co-ordinating Council (nJACC). 
which was later absorbed into the Federation of South 
African Trade Unions (FOSATU). When COSAnJ was formed in 
December 1985, NUTW affiliated to it. Since the formation 
of COSAnJ, the NUTW has merged with the TWIU and the 
National Union of Garment Workers (NUGW) to form the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Unions of South 
Africa (ACTWUSA). At the time of writing ACTWUSA is at an 
advanced stage of negotiation with the Garment and Allied. 
Workers Union (GAWU) and a merger seems set for September 
1989. The result would be a unified union representing the 
majority of workers in both the garment and textile 
9. Hirsch: op cit, 1979, pp.16-17 
1 (> • i b i d, p • 32 
industries and, with approximately 200 000 members, the 
second largest affiliate of COSA'IU. 
It was the NUTW, however, that launched the Brown Lung 
Campaign in 1982, prior to the mergers, at a time when it 
had in the region of 23-25 000 members in the textile, 
knitting, clothing and leather sectors. 
Brown lung and textile production 
~ . 
,.1- "', The textile industry, like most other industries. has its 
fair share of safety and health hazards. Hazards that have 
been identified. include: 
\*~ise: Many textile processes are characterised by noise 
levels which are often in excess of the legal limit of 85 
decibels (dBa). The machinery used in the industry does 
not generally fall within the category of precision 
machinery: "gear wheels are rough cast and not precision 
cut and consequently they make more noise. 1111 To obtain a 
substantial reduction in noise levels would require that 
machinery be redesigned. 
~ghting: Exceptionally high standards of lighting are 
required in certain textile processes. such as drawing-in 
(where the worker has to thread by means of a reed-hook 
thousands of threads per day through the "healds and 
reed" 13 ), the weaving of coloured cloths and close 
examination. In many textile factories natural daylight 
is not used to best effect, because windows are not kept 
clean and the inside walls and tops of rooms are not 




11. ILO: Encyclopaedia on Occupational Health and Sa~ety. 
Geneva: International Labour O~~ice, 1983, p.2168 
12. ibid 
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* Ioxic substances: Such substances are mainly used in the 
manufacture of synthetic and artificial fibres. Toxic 
dangers also exist in the dyeing section of the textile 
industry. In dyeing. certain dyestuff intermediates can 
produce bladder cancer.13 
* Hours of work: The textile industry the world over has 
been characterised by extremely long working hours. with 
some mills in some countries employing workers for 13 
hours a day. 7 days a week. with only 3 days' annual 
holiday. 14 More recently, there has been a widespread 
movement towards the introduction of shift systems, ·which 
appears to have reduced the physical and mental strain on 
workers to some extent. with a corresponding decrease in 
the accident and sickness rates. Shift work, however. 
carries its own set of problems with regard to workers' 
health. 18 
* D.'wll.: The most dangerous dust found in the industry is 
asbestos dust. which may be present in the working 
atmosphere of all asbestos spinning. yarn preparation and 
weaving workrooms. The most widespread du~t. however. is 
that giving rise to byssinosis. This respiratory disease 
occurs in workers exposed to dust in cotton, flax and hemp 
mills. but has not been found in the spinning of man-made 
fibres. Until recently. "it was considered that 
byssinosis occurred only in workers in the fibre opening 
and cleaning processes up to the carding machine but some 
medical authorities have found cases in the later 
processes of yarn winding, especially in high-speed 
winding." 18 The most dusty process is that of carding. 
(See diagrammatic representation of the production process 
on the following page.) 
13. ibib, p.2169 
14. ibid 
15. See Adler T: Sleep Tor sale: ShiTt work in South ATrica. 
South ATrican Labour Bulletin, 1986, 11(6) 
16. ILO: op cit, 1983, p.2168 
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Cotton bales ar'e opened, blended 
and cleaned by beating. 
BLOW ROOM 
Giant fans blow cotton into the 
air and separate the fibres. 
CARDING 
The cotton is fed into carding 
machines where wire teeth are 
used to separate and ·straighten 
the fibres. A gauze-like web of 
cleaned cotton is rolled into a 
strand called "slivers" and rolled 
into tall, round containers. 
DRAWING 
Several slivers are combined into a 
rope-like strand. 
ROVING, 
Rope-like strands go to roving 
frames. made parallel, twisted and 
rolled on a bobbin. 
SPINNING 
The spinning frame draws strands 
into a single smaller strand and 
twists it into yarn. 
WEAVING· 
Yarn goes to weaving machines 
and is made into fabric. 
Basic steps in the manufacture of cotton fabric. 
Byssinosis, popularly known as brown lung, is a chronic 
respiratory disease, characterised by chest tightness and 
breathlessness at work. usually after a weekend break or 
other absences. In the late stages of byssinosis, workers 
who suffer from it, may become severely disabled with 
chronic bronchitis and emphysema. 
While there is considerable lack of clarity regarding the 
aetiology of the disease, the mechanism of broncho-
constriction is known to involve an agent contained in the 
leaves of the cotton plant, but not in the fibres or seeds. 
There is also evidence that certain endotoxins in bacteria 
found in cotton plants may be aetiologically important. 17 
The prevalence and severity of byssinosis is determined 
primarily by the amount of dust in the workplace an~ the 
length of exposure. but other factors such as air pollution 
outside the factory. cigarette smoking and respiratory 
infection are also important contributory factors. Two 
additional points about byssinosis are worth noting: 
firstly, surveys of the disease have found no association 
between symptoms of byssinosis, on the one hand, and sex or 
ethnic origin, on the other hand; and, secondly, despite a 
strong association between length of service 'and presen.ce of 
symptoms, recent studies have shown that the prevalence of 
symptoms amongst cotton workers who have worked less than 
one year in carding or spinning rooms, may be the same as 
that amongst workers with longer exposures in the same 
mi11.1e In other words, the same prevalence of symptoms can 
be expected amongst South African textile workers. even 
those with short periods of service, as has been found 
amongst workers in other countries, or workers with longer 
service. 
In South Africa, ~official awareness' of byssinosis :ed to 
the extension of compensation under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act to byssinosis in 1973. There was, however. 
no real knowledge of the extent of the problem and, by 1982.· 
17. ibid, p.351 
18. Bouhuys et •1: Respiratory survey o~ a mill with rapid 
labour turnover. Annals o-F International Medicine, 1969, 
71<2>; cited in White: op cit, 1985, chapter 2, p.10 
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only one case of byssinosis had officially been recorded and 
compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
(WCC). As regards the textile industry employers at the 
time. the comments of the Erasmus Commission with regard to 
industry in general were entirely applicable: " ... it has 
regrettably to be stated categorically that ... industrial 
health not only occupies a secondary position in industry in 
this country. but that industrialists have put very little 
time, money and organisation into the prevention of 
occupational diseases." 19 Real changes in the industry were 
only initiated after the NlTIW began its Brown Lung Campaig~ 
in 1982. As White puts it: "The realisation by the NlTIW in 
1982 that textile employers were ignoring oc~upational 
health in turn led to a realisation by employers that they 
could no longer comfortably continue to do so. 1130 
The Brown Lung Campaign 
The large-scale investigation of exposure to cotton dust by 
the NU1W began with a simple question: John Copelyn, then 
General Secretary of NlTIW, asking Dr Neil White what he knew 
about byssinosis. That was in early 1981 and, at the time, 
White knew little about the disease: "I recalled that 
byssinosis had occupied a paragraph or two of my notes at 
medical school". 21 After some visits to factories, some 
investigation of the literature and after examining some 
workers, White began to build up a picture of a serious 
disease, which had been virtually ignored, despite its 
implications for the approximately 50 000 workers in the 
industry, the majority of whom were members of either the 
NU1W or TWIU. At that stage only one person, a white 
foreman from the Industex plant in Port Elizabeth, had ever 
received compensation for byssinosis. Soon after White 
started his investigations, he submitted a claim for 
compensation on behalf of a machine operator in the spinning 
department of the Natal Thread factory in Hamnarsdale, a 
19. Report o~ the Commission o~ Enquiry on Occupational 
Health. RP 55/1976, p.9 
20. White: op cit, 1985, chapter 3, p.27 
21. ibid, chapter 1, p.1 
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certain John Hlela. who became the second person to be 
compensated for the disease.22 
Neil White was formally introduced to the National Executive 
Committee of the NUTW in July 1981 and. at this meeting. 
discussions took place about the form of a campaign. 
Factories were selected where it was hoped to conduct 
medical screenings and a booklet was planned which would 
serve as an educative tool on brown lung. At the time. 
White was employed by the Cape Town-based Health Care Trust. 
an organisation servicing community organisations and trade 
unions in the field of primary health. It was only two 
years later. in July 1983. that NUTW created the post of 
Medical Officer. which White filled from September 1983. 
Prior to that time. however. White was already clearly 
integrated into the national operation of the union and 
regularly attended National and Branch Executive meetings. 
where he reported on the campaign and where progress was 
discussed. 23 
The campaign conducted by the union consisted of medical 
screenings at 12 textile mills and covered approximately 
5000 unionised textile workers. 24 At each mill. 
respiratory symptom questionnaires were administered, 
workers' heights and weights were measured and lung funtion 
tests were carried out. At three of the mills surveyed. 
dust measurements were also carried out. using a vertical 
elutriator static sampler. The basic procedure for the 
surveys was for the shop stewards committee to obtain the 
co-operation of th~ management. whereafter a general meeting 
was held with all employees at which the campaign was 
explained and discussed. Union shop stewards played an 
important part in the campaign. they were "active in 
22. White N: Cotton dust kills. Johannesburg: Centre -For 
Applied Legal Studies, Health and Sa-Fety at Work Series, 
No. 2, 1981 
23. Minutes o-F NUTW National Executive Committee, July 1981-
August 1985 
24. White N: Brown lung in South A-Fric:a - A union directed 
occupational sa-Fety campaign. In: Zwi A, Duncan Saunders 
L <eds): Towards health care ~r all. Proceedings or 
NAMDA Con-Ference, 1985, p.135 
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directing the campaigns - addressing workers meetings, 
interviewing members and explaining how the lung function 
test works." 2 " Once a survey had been completed, a report 
of the findings would be presented to the shop stewards 
committee and the management. The reports, while 
highlighting the level of exposure to cotton dust in the 
plants, also put forward recommendations on how the 
situation could be improved and thus provided a basis for 
the negotiation of improvements. 
During the course of the campaign, discussion took place at 
both the individual factory level and at union Executive 
Committee meetings about the demands to be raised in 
connection with the campaign. The following were the 
principal demands made of the various managements: 
* a safe and healthy workplace 
* clean air and proper ventilation systems 
* effective respirators where needed 
* reasonable access to a union-appointed doctor 
* workers affected by byssinosis to be transferred to dust-
free areas of work at the same rate of pay,and to have 
opportunities to be retrained in a new occupation 
* company co-operation with claims for Workmen's 
Compensation 
* company recognition of the World Health Organisation's 
recommended standard of 0.2 mg/cu.m. as the Permissable 
Exposure Limit for cotton dust 
The demands, while far-reaching in their ramifications. were 
in most cases in themselves relatively modest and some of 
them were achieved as a direct result of the campaign; for 
instance, the transfer of workers affected by byssinosis to 
dust-free areas has generally become a standard practice in 
the industry. Company responses to the campaign were not 
always co-operative. however, and there was a certain amount 
of resistance from managements that did not want their 
factories investigated. In such cases, the surveys were 
25. NUTW: Brown lung campaign. South A-frican Labour 
Bulletin, 1984, 9<7>, p.85 
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conducted away from the factories. in halls in nearby 
residential areas. At one mill in the Cape Town area. the 
management agreed to co-operate with the campaign. but 
during the course of the survey. opposition developed from a 
rival union. which had a small proportion of members in the 
plant. The union in question was the Textile Workers 
Industrial Union. which intervened by alleging "unethical" 
behaviour by the NU1W doct_or. on th~ grounds that he was not 
examining memlrers of the TWIU. Although the TWIU even went 
so far as to threaten to take the company to court. if it 
continued co-operating with the campaign. the threats were 
not pursued and the survey at the plant was completed. 26 
Responsibility for an organised. public response by 
employers fell to the national employers association for the 
industry. the Textile Federation (TF). The TF was 
established in 1975 as an amalgamation of three existing 
employer organisations and serves the industry'primarily as 
a trade organisation and lobbying body with government. 27 
Although the TF had not. prior to the early 1980s. played 
any significant role in occupational health and safety 
matters. it had begun to collect information'on the subject 
of byssinosis in 1982. In.mid-1984. an announcement was 
made that a special committee had been established "to 
investigate the whole question of byssinosis which conmittee 
has been gathering and channelling all available information 
to Textile Federation members and there is still much 
fundamental research. both environmental and medical with 
special reference to South African conditions. to be carried 
out." 28 Whether the special comnittee had. in fact. existed 
prior to 1984 is not clear. 
26. ibid 
27. Interview: Brian Brink, Deputy-Director, Textile 
Federation: 15 March 1989 
28. Press release by the Frame Group: Byssinosis in 
perspective - Textile manu~acturers have been active. 
11 June 1984 
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In July 1984 the TF hosted a seminar for the industry and 
thereafter released a press statement which is worth quoting 
at some length: 
"The industry pledged its full resources and support 
to undertaking a comprehensive and scientifically 
based research proganme. This will investigate dust 
levels in all sectors of the industry and will also 
initiate and proceed with a medical screening survey 
in order to evaluate the prevalence of and 
sensitivity to byssinosis and its relationship to 
the quantities of cotton dust in the spinning mills. 
It is intended that these comprehensive and properly 
conducted tests will lead to recomnendations to be 
made to government regarding drafting of dust leve-i 
_/ 
regulations and the prevention of byssinosis 
becoming a health hazard in this industry. 
This survey and the eventual prevention programme 
will involve the industry in an investment of many 
millions of rands to ensure a health hazard-free 
environment for all its workers. 
This inititative by the Textile Federation and its 
cotton processing members is unique to the extent 
that the industry did not wait for regulations to be 
framed, but will in fact assist in their drafting 
and will consult fully with government on this 
aspect." 29 
Although it had taken a long time for the industry to embark 
on self-regulation, there is no doubt that the programne 
outlined was an ambitious. but potentially effective on~. 
There are. however. a number of points worth noting about 
it. 
29. Press release to the Industrial Editor of the Nat~l 
Mercury from S Shlagman, Executive-Director, Textile 
Federation, 6 July .1984 
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Firstly, with regard to the second press statement quoted 
above, the impression conveyed was that the industry was 
embarking on action to prevent byssinosis "becoming a health 
hazard". The statement ignored the fact that the survey 
reports tabled by the NU1W in individual companies had 
already provided clear evidence of unacceptably high dust 
levels in a number of work-stations, as well as of symptoms 
of byssinosis amongst workers. It was also revealing that 
the TF expressed a commitment to consulting with government, 
but failed to mention plans to consult with the NU1W, the 
major union within the industry. The lack of any reference 
to the NU1W was all the more surprising in the context of 
fairly extensive media coverage of the Brown Lung Campaign 
on the basis of information obtained from White and the 
NU1W. The media coverage preceded the TF's seminar and both 
press releases and no doubt constituted an important form of 
pressure on the industry to make a response. 
Secondly. with regard to the relationship of the TF to the 
industry, it would appear that it fulfilled an important co-
ordinating role between the various companies, irrespective 
of differences which may have existed between companies on 
certain issues. By 1984, the NU1W had conducted surveys at 
Braaitex in the Transvaal, David Whitehead in Tongaat, 
Industex in Port Elizabeth, Table Bay Spinners in Cape Town 
and Mooi River Textiles. Thus, the TF statement of July 
1984 could be considered a response representative of most 
companies within the industry to union initiatives, such as 
the Brown Lung Campaign, within individual companies at the 
plant level. 
A third point has to do with the timing of the TF's public 
response to the union's campaign. The press releases quoted 
above, from the Frame Group and the TF, were both made in 
mid-1984, at a time when factories within the Frame Group 
had been targetted by NU1W for surveys. Although it would 
seem that the industry's research into byssinosis had 
started at least 18 months previously, there does not appear 
to have been any result which warranted a public statement 
certainly none was quoted. It is more likely that the 
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effects of the campaign began to be felt much more sharply 
within the industry, once the largest group in the industry 
became the focus for the campaign. thus prompting the press 
releases. At the time,. NU1W was still not recognised by the 
Frame Group and relations between the two parties were at a 
delicate stage. It would certainly have been convenient 
for Frame to be able to deflect any pressure from the union 
by referring to its co-operation with the initiatives of the 
TF, rather that having to respond directly to any questions 
about health hazards in its plants. The latter 
interpretation is clearly borne out by press reports of the 
time. Billy Paddock and Mike Robertson of the Daily News; 
for instance, quoted Selwyn Lurie, the Joint Managing 
Director of Consolidated Textile Mills (the largest company 
within the Frame Group) as saying that "their company was 
co-operating with an investigation set up by the Textile 
Federation and would comply with any of its recommendations. 
He said that they were taking steps to keep a check on the 
problem by having their medical checks stepped up and also 
by the use of waste filtration to cut down the levels of 
dust. "30 
' A final point and perhaps the most important to note about 
the 1984 press releases, is that the research initiative 
announced at that time has still not borne any fruit five· 
years later. The TF has established a data base into which 
is entered information· from its member mills on dust levels 
measured in the mills. The information is contained in 
quarterly returns submitted to the TF. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that the TF has used the data to make 
recomnendations to the government regarding the drafting of 
a cotton dust regulation. as initially.stated. 
The Directorate of Occupational Safety was certainly also 
aware of the developments in the industry and is partly to 
blame for not seeing to the enactment of a cotton dust 
regulation under MOSA - and they have pleaded guilty to 
30. Daily News, 25 May 1984 
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delays in this regard. 31 According to the Chief Director. 
however. there is an "exposure limit which is enforceable, 
in terms of the special powers of the inspectors. Every 
inspector has in his posssession a copy of the American 
Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 
Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) in which an exposure limit for 
cotton dust is specified (at 0,2 mg/cum.) and in terms of 
the special powers that the inspectors have. he can enforce 
this if he deems it necessary." 32 Drafting a cotton dust 
regulation has been further complicated. for the Directorate 
of Occupational Safety, by the relatively undeveloped state 
of research into the aetiology of byssinosis. 
The performance o_f the TF in aiding the regulatory process 
in the industry has thus been rather mediocre. The TF did 
co-ordinate the bulk purchase of lung function machines for 
its various member companies. to be used in the medical 
screening programmes which were introduced in the wake of 
the union's campaign. But it was the Brown Lung Campaign 
which constituted the primary reason for the considerable 
change brought about at the level of individual companies. 
A clear illustration of the process of change is provided by 
, 
David Whitehead & Sons. a subsidiary of the Tongaat-Hulett 
Group. 
The campaign at David Whitehead 
Prior to the early 1980s, there had been few real attempts 
at regulating the cotton dust hazard in the David Whitehead 
plant. In the early 1980s there was an occupational health 
service at the plant and a Cotton Dust Awareness Committee 
had been established. There was no worker education 
programme, however, and little real knowledge or awareness, 
on the side of either management or workers. of 
31. Interview: I Mulder, Chie~ Director, and P Haupt, 
Director, Directorate o~ Occupational Sa~ety, Dept. o~ 
Manpower: 15 Ma~ch 1989 
32. ibid 
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byssinosis. 33 As explained by a worker who was a shop 
steward in the factory at the time: 
"The only education that one would get from the 
company was that the factory was the safest place 
that one could be in. Nobody ever hinted that there 
could be dangers. The only dangers that would be 
identified would be if one was not wearing one's 
boots, then one might have metal falling on one's 
toes and if you were in· the workshop, you had to 
have a helmet, all those sorts of things. But as 
far as dust is concerned and noise .~. it was as if 
the factory was safe until this campaign was 
started."34 
The management of David Whitehead was open to co-operation 
with the union's campaign and after it was completed, 
negotiations for_ improvements appear to have been 
productive. The management was not entirely happy with the 
dust measurement results obtained by White and his team. but 
the result was that they introduced their own measuring 
programme which is still being carried out. 
The use of compressed air for cleaning machinery, a practice 
which contributes significantly to overall dust levels, has 
been stopped in the plant and there has been an improvement 
in existing ventilation systems and the installation of some 
additional ventilation. Such changes may have contributed 
to the drop in dust levels that have been reported for the 
plant from 1983 to the present. 
Of equal importance is the claim that the incidence of 
byssinosis has dropped. Medical screening was introduced 
after the campaign and the occupational health clinic's 
medical programme now includes audiometry testing and pre-, 
33. The.information on David Whitehead has been gained 
primarily from two interviews: one with David Stacey, 
the Personnel Manager at the company (10 March 1989); 
and the other with Elias Banda, presently an organiser 
with ACTWUSA, but a shop steward at David Whitehead at 
the time of the campaign (26 January 1989) 
34. Interview: Elias Banda 
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in- and post-employment screenings which focus on lung 
function and respiratory problems. The decreased incidence 
of byssinosis is partly attributed to improved detection of 
individuals thought to be susceptible. such as those with 
decreased lung function or heavy smokers. New employees 
with any respiratory problems or decreased lung function are 
placed in departments other than spinning, which is where 
the highest dust levels are found. and job transfers with 
rate retention are effected for those whose lung function 
decreases while in employment. 
An interesting feature of the campaign at David Whitehead 
was the attempt at negotiating a health and safety agreement 
outlining a set of rights and practices regarding health and 
safety and the working environment. Although negotiation of 
the agreement was not pursued for more than a few meetings. 
it was certainly the first time that such an agreement had 
been tabled by a South African trade union. Since then. a 
few health and safety agreements have been tabled by other 
· trade unions. 3e 
The activism around health and safety which was initiated by 
I 
the union campaign at David Whitehead, was not sustained for 
very long. at least in terms of the involvement of workers 
in such matters at plant level. The implementation of MOSA. 
for instance, has proceeded with little influence from the 
union members at the factory, who have not been keen to 
participate in the structures provided for by the Act. 1be 
lack of participation is in accordance with informal policy 
in the union as a whole and will be discussed below. The 
implication has been that the safety representative and 
safety comnittee structures have been a managerial 
initiative, comprising mainly supervisory staff. Thus, the 
only structured form of ongoing monitoring of health and 
safety matters and, particularly, of the cotton dust haza~d. 
is confined almost entirely to the supervisory and 
managerial staff in the company. 
35. See Finnemore M, Pallit L: Recent developments in health 
and sa~ety agreements at the workplace in South A~rica. 
Industrial Relations Journal, 1987, 7<2> 
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The prevalence of byssinosis and the struggle for 
compensation 
Having dealt briefly with the course of the Brown Lung 
Campaign, the responses to it by the industry and the form 
it took at the David Whitehead plant, it may be appropriate 
at this point to examine the incidence of brown lung 
discovered by the union and the attempts to gain 
compensation for byssinotics. There is a problem in doing 
so, however, as it is necessary to draw on different sources 
which quote different study populations. On the one hand, 
there is reference to the "full scope of the investigation" 
by the NU1W, which took in 5000 union members in 12 textile 
mills in different parts of the country - mainly in Natal.36 
Of the 5000 workers screened for byssinosis, 700 were non-
exposed controls. On the other hand, there is available a 
very thorough discussion of an epidemiological investigation 
of 2421 subjects in 6 mills, written up for academic 
purposes. 37 The latter forms a subset of the former. With 
regard to the full investigation, it would appear that "as 
many as 16 of every 100 spinners have been found to have 
symptoms of brown lung." 38 Turning to the findings of the 
, 
in depth epidemiological investigation, the prevalence of 
' "byssinosis symptoms (all grades) amongst cotton workers was 
11.1% in spinning. 6.1% in winding and 6.4% in weaving 
departments."39 
When compared with studies of English, American, Tanzanian 
and Indian workers, a lower prevalence of byssinosis 
symptoms was found among South African cotton textile 
workers. An important factor which was thought to have 
influenced the results, was the high labour turnover rate in 
the textile mills which were investigated. As the incidence 
of byssinosis is related to exposure to cotton dust, length 
of service was in this instance thought to be an important 
variable. Only 6.9% of the workers investigated had more 
36. White: In Zwi & Duncan Saunders (eds): op cit, 1985 
37. White: op cit, 1985 
38. NUTW: op cit, 1984, p.86 
39. White: op cit, 1985 
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than 20 years service in the industry. 40 The reasons for 
the comparatively short lengths of service was "thought to 
be related to the relatively recent establishment of the SA 
textile industry (all of the mills studied having been 
established 25 - 30 years ago) and a number of factors 
characterising labour relations in the industry - such as 
low wages, the extensive use of migrant labour and the 
generally low level of skill required to operate textile 
machinery and the consequent ease with which workers can be 
replaced." 41 Accordingly, comparisons between countries 
would only be meaningful if rates, adjusted for length of 
service and other counfounding variables, could be compared 
between South Africa and other countries. 
Along with the medical examinationi;,, the dust measurements 
carried out also indicated the existence of a cotton dust 
hazard in the plants surveyed. Altogether 22 dust level 
measurements were carried out in three mills. As noted by 
White: "Twenty two samples clearly do not constitute a full 
investigation of the large floor area contained in three 
textile mills."43 The results did, however, indicate that 
in two of the mills, there were work areas where samples 
I 
were in excess of the WHO recommended Permissable Exposure 
Limit of 0.2 mg/cu.m. 
One of the major responses by the NUTW to the findings of 
the campaign was to submit claims for compensation on behalf 
of the workers diagnosed as suffering from byssinosis. In 
total, 66 claims were submitted from among the 4300 exposed 
workers screened for byssinosis, giving a referral rate of 
15.0 per 1000. Based on the referral rate, "it can be 
estimated that there would be approximately 640 persons 
disabled by byssinosis among the workforce of 40 000 
employed in the cotton industry in the period 1982/3."43 
By the end of 1984, only eight claimants had, however, been 
compensated, while a number of others, whose claims had been 
turned down, had their claims on appeal in terms of section 
40. ibid 
41. ibid, chapter 4, p.67 
42. ibid, chapter 4, p.65 
43. ibid, chapter 6, p. 18 
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25 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The extent of the 
time lag is hardly surprising, as the processing of claims 
for occupational diseases, in particular, by the office of 
the Workmen's Compensation Comnissioner "can take up to. two 
years to be processed."44 
A significant development in the NUTW's pursuit of 
compensation was an attempt by White, as the union's.medical 
officer, to introduce changes to the preliminary guidelines 
used by the wee to assess claims for byssinosis. The 
preliminary guidelines were used for judging cases of 
suspected byssinosis and had been drafted by Dr F J Wiles, 
the then Director of the Medical Bureau for Occupational 
Diseases (MBOD), which serves as a research and medical 
reference body primarily for the mining industry, but also 
for all other industries with regard to occupational 
·diseases. The preliminary guidelines formed part of. the 
basis for the decision not to compensate a number of the 
claims submitted by the NUTW. One of the latter claimants 
was, however, subsequently compensated after his case was 
taken on appeal. The success of the appeal posed an 
implicit challenge to the assessment procedure of the MBOD 
' and presented an opportunity for further debate over 
appropriate guidelines. 
Proposed modifications to the guidelines were accordingly 
forwarded to the Directors of the MBOD and the National 
Centre for Occupational Health (NCOH) by White. As a 
result, a special meeting of the NCOH/MBOD joint panel was 
held to discuss the question of compensation guidelines for 
byssinosis. 49 Apart from members of both the NCOH and the 
MBOD, White for the NUTW and Dr Grobbelaar for the Textile 
Federation were also present. The debate over appropriate 
guidelines is a complex one that will not be entered here. 
Suffice it to say that while there appears to have been 
44. Myers J, Garisch D, Cornell J: Compensation ~or 
·occLtpational· diseases in the RSA. South A-frican Medical 
Journal, 1987, 71, p.305 
45. The Joint Panel, which served as a re~erence body for 
cases sLtbmitted ~or compensation of occupational 
disease, was abolished in 1986 
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agreement on the issue of criteria, there was no consensus 
on the question of reference values for pulmonary 
function. 46 The end result of the debate was that the NCOH 
decided to draft a set of guidelines for use by its own 
medical panel; the guidelines were recommended to the wee, 
but do not appear to have been formally adopted by the 
latter. The significance of the above developments is 
summed up by White: "It is the first time that such a body 
of expert medical opinion has met to consider criteria for 
compensating byssinosis. In doing so the assessment of 
cotton textile workers for medico-legal purposes has been 
made much more precise. As an exercise it would be worth 
repeating for other occupational diseases as well."47 
Despite the rather innovative intervention by a union staff 
member, the compensation of cases submitted by the union 
continued to drag on over a lengthy period. In the period 
1982 to 1986, of the 66 original submissions, 38 claims were 
accepted, while a number were still on appeal. 48 The· 
emphasis that was placed on compensation as part of the 
Brown Lung Campaign may also have detracted somewhat from 
other aspects of the campaign, particularly the continued 
monitoring of improvements at the plant level. 
Assessment of the NUTW's Brown Lung Campaign 
The first point to note about the union initiated campaign 
and, arguably, its most significant achievement is the 
extent to which it was able to alert union members to the 
hazards of cotton dust and to the health and safety aspects 
of their work. As White put it, once the union had 
determined that brown lung was an important problem in the 
factories where surveys were conducted, "this message 
permeated deeply into -the ranks of the Union 
membership ... "49 The awareness-raising aspect should not be 
46. White: op cit, 1985, chapter 6, p.19 
47. ibid, chapter 6, pp.20-21 
48. White N: Byssinosis in South Africa - A survey of 2411 
te>:tile workers. South Mrican Medical Journal, 1989, 
75, p.441; and personal communication from N White 
49. White: In Zwi ~ Dunc~n Saunders <eds): op cit, 1985, 
p.136 
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seen as being only an exercise in informing textile workers 
of the hazard of cotton dust. but encompassed other aspects 
as well, such as medical screening measures. preventive 
measures. compensation and comparisons with the way in which 
cotton dust exposure has been regulated in other countries. 
The significant level of participation of union members. 
particularly of shop stewards. in the running of the 
campaign in individual factories and in the negotiation of 
improvements no doubt deepened their awareness of the issues 
and contributed to what was a fairly thorough educative 
process. 
The Brown Lung Campaign also had the important effect of 
boosting the image of the union and mobilising its existing 
members. as well as potential members in the industry. This 
was particularly true for the David Whitehead plant where a 
strike just prior to the campaign had significantly reduced 
union membership through dismissals and resignations.~0 The 
campaign provided an ideal recruiting mechanism. as the 
· medical screenings were provided for all workers in the 
plant and not just union members. so that the union was seen 
as providing a service to workers. During the course of the 
I 
campaign, about 300-400 workers in the plant decided to join 
the union. thereby boosting its majority amongst the 
workforce. The campaign also received a fair amount of 
coverage in the commercial press and particularly in union 
newspapers. Almost every edition of FOSATU Worker News in 
the period 1982-4 carried an article on the campaign. 
Another important organisational result of the Brown Lung 
Campaign was that it provided the basis for NUTW's contact 
with the American Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
(ACTWU). which has subsequently grown into "very syst~matic 
contact."e1 At the time of the campaign. the Health and 
Safety Officer of ACTWU. Eric Frumin. visited_South Africa 
and spent a two week period with White. assisting with 
health and safety. In fact, the model for dealing with 
50. Interview: Elias Banda 
51. Interview: John Copelyn, General Secretary o~ ACTWUSA 
(former General Secretary of NUTW>: 7 February 1989 
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health and safety adopted by the NU1W, namely, that of 
establishing a special health and safety portfolio within 
the union, appears to have been borrowed directly from 
ACTWU. 
The NU1W's creation of the portfolio of medical officer was 
a new approach within the independent union movement and it 
was also the first time that a doctor had filled such a 
position within a union. Subsequently the National Union of 
Mineworkers has established.an entire Health and Safety 
Department. but the independent unions have generally tended 
to rely on the skills of health and safety service 
organisations for assistance on such issues. A few unions 
in other countries have their own health and safety 
portfolios, not necessarily staffed by medical personnel, or 
such services are provided through a national union 
federation - the Swedish LO (Landsorganisationen), for 
example, employs a medical doctor who heads a health and 
safety division. 
There appear to be some major advantages to having 
specialist medical skills available from within a trade 
' union, or through a union federation. One advantage lies in 
the maximal access that it affords the union membership to 
services in the health and safety area. A second advantage 
is the access that the medical or health and safety 
personnel have to the various decision making structures of 
the union. Moreover, health and safety portfolios located 
within unions provide a centre from which activities around 
health and safety can be initiated, monitored and sustained. 
The success, albeit short-lived, of the portfolio of medical 
officer in the NU1W appears to have been grounded on such 
factors as the above. 
Nevertheless, it is debatable which would be the most 
effective option for unions to follow: whether to have a 
health and safety function provided from ~ithin an 
individual union, whether to contract with outside 
organisations to provide these services, or whether to 
expect a union federation to provide such services to all 
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its affiliates. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
various options will not be discussed here, but it is worth 
highlighting the obvious disadvantage of the model chosen by 
the NUTW, namely, that in appointing a professional. the 
union took on a specific set of skills and intellectual 
resources which could not easily be reproduced within the 
union. There are many aspects of health and safety that 
unions can and do deal with, but there are also technical 
and medical components which require specialised medical or 
para-medical expertise. When White left the NUTW in 1984, 
most of the union's health and safety activities went into 
rapid decline and the Brown Lung Campaign did .no~ progress 
any further except for certain compensation claims still 
being pursued. White was, in fact, replaced by another 
medical doctor, Mark Colvin, but, due to various internal 
tensions, the latter's stay with the union did not last more 
than about 6 months.ea 
Even although White was replaced, a question does arise 
regarding the permanence of the job of Medical Officer in 
the NUTW, given that 'campaigns' do not usually run 
indefinitely. In fact, the title, Brown Lung Campaign, is 
something of a misnomer. as it does not adequately capture 
the way in which the union conceptualised its health and 
safety activity at the time. Although various persons 
within the NU1W may initially have conceived of a specific 
campaign, with specific aims to be achieved within a limited 
time period, by 1983 it was apparent that the union had a 
quite different conception of what was to happen around 
health and safety. It was in mid-1983 that White was 
employed as Medical Officer and the job was established on a 
long-term basis, as a position from which the union's health 
and safety prograQJPe was to be co-ordinated.!53 For 
example, towards the end of 1983, discussions were taking 
place about possible campaigns regarding chemicals, 
dyestuffs and noise within the textile industry and Colvin 
later started to obtain lists of dyes and chemicals used in 
52. Interview: Mark Colvin, Industrial Health Unit, Univ. o~ 
Natal (~ormer Medical O~~icer, NUTW>: 27 January 1989 
53. Interview: John Copelyn; Minutes o~ NUTW National 
Executive Committee, 9-12 July 1983 
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various textile mills. So, although the NUTW started with a 
specific campaign to tackle exposure to cotton dust, improve 
working conditions for its members in the dustiest 
departments of textile mills and to obtain compensation for 
byssinotics, its thrust had soon moved further afield to 
other aspects of health and safety. In discussing the 
campaign, John Copelyn, then General Secretary of the union, 
explained as follows: 
"It (the Brown Lung Campaign) has got all the 
campaign elements to it, it has the capacity to 
mobilise people vigorously around health and safety, 
it's got the prospect of improving co~ditions in the 
plants, mainly by taking employers by surprise and 
vigorously campaigning. So, for example, in our 
industry it is a practice to blow-clean machines and 
all the dust goes back in the air and everyone can 
breathe it in to their hearts content, as long as 
the machines are alright. Those are things that 
need to be highlighted, they need to be campaigned 
against, they need to be challenged and you have to 
have a whole propaganda dimension to it, but the 
question that comes out of all the campaigning is: 
What do you intend to sustain? What we had in mind 
to sustain was developing an· education progranme 
amongst the stewards, developing positions around 
the safety committees (provided for by MOSA) in the 
factories and broadening b~yond the brown lung issue 
into other health and safety areas." 154 
The above conceptualisation was unique amongst the unions at 
the time and constitutes a significant aspect of what is 
usually referred to as the Brown Lung Campaign. 
Unfortunately, it was the inability of the union to sustain 
activity around health and safety, particularly its failure 
to define a role for workers at the shop floor level with 
regard to such issues, that was the major shortcoming of the 
Brown Lung Campaign. Moreover, the union's programne ended 
at a crucial time, just when the state's new model for 
54. Interview: John Copelyn 
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regulation of workplace health and safety had been 
legislated in the form of MOSA. Despite the fact that the 
NU1W had begun to formulate a position on the safety 
representative and safety committee system contained in the 
Act, it was not able to formulate any alternative in 
practice and the level of participation by union members in 
the campaign was not carried forward into more lasting forms 
of involvement in other aspects of health and safety.ee 
In addition, the union was not able to monitor the gains 
made as a result of the campaign on a longer term basis. 
Despite the short duration of the NU1W's campaign, it 
resulted in a number of tangible improvements in working 
conditions, work practices and medical practices in a number 
of textile mills. As a direct result of the campaign: 
* dust levels have been reported to have been reduced and 
are being monitored on a continous basis; 
* blow cleaning is no longer practised in the plants; 
* workers who suffer reduced lung function are transferred 
to other jobs; 
* regular lung function screenings are carried out; 
I 
* a number of workers found to be suffering from byssinosis 
have received some compensation. 
The fact that companies in which surveys were conducted 
found themselves so totally "outclassed" on the issues that 
were being raised in negotiations around the reports, may 
have contributed to their apparent willingness to improve 
working conditions. Provided with such strong evidence of 
the existence of a cotton dust hazard in their factories and 
made aware of the existence of byssinosis in their 
workforce, facts of which the industry had been largely 
ignorant, there was little else they could do, but agree to 
improve conditions and to regulate the major health problem 
facing their employees. 
55. NUTW: Internal memorandum dealing with the policy 
question: What is our attitude to certain provisions o~ 
the new Machinery and Occupational Sa~ety Act? N/d 
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The fact that practices such as those mentioned above have 
been institutionalised in the industry has much to do with 
the response of managements. As discussed in chapter l, 
managerial responses to workplace health and safety matters 
are, however, by no means homogeneous, or simply 
characterised in terms of cost benefit analysis and are 
frequently shaped by a variety of other factors. As 
illustrated by the David Whitehead case, some managements 
have appeared quite willing to introduce changes which are 
perceived to be in the interests of employees and are also 
open to the participation of union members in the area of 
health and safety, on terms that may be negotiable. Other 
companies, such as the Frame Group, despite an initial 
defensiveness and lack of co-operation with the union's 
campaign, have also introduced the relevant changes. The 
response by Frame was, however, clearly complicated by its 
broader relationship with the Ntrl'W, one characterised by 
strong resistance to unionisation, and it could be argued 
that the introduction of changes had more to do with a 
desire to maintain control of an area seen to fall within 
the ambit of managerial prerogatives. Such a response is 
not uncommon in the area of occupational health and safety, 
where the institution of the company doctor reigns supreme 
and any challenges to existing or potential company medical 
practices are strongly resisted by management, as well as by 
health professionals. 
In the case of the Brown Lung Campaign, a significant 
proportion of the textile industry did, however, accede to 
the demands of the NU1W and the fact that they did introduce 
changes must be ascribed primarily to the pressure that was 
brought to bear by the union. But, regardless of the 
reasons behind the company responses, which varied between 
companies, the overall effect waa that management re-
established control at the technical level of the labour 
process. Furthermore, with the introduction of changes at 
the plant level, the introduction of a research programme by 
the TF and with the assistance of MOSA, management put 
itself in a strong position to regain the industrial 
\ 
relations highground in the area of health and safety. 
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The outcome at the level of state regulation remains 
unsatisfactory. As already mentioned there has been little 
effort to promulgate any legal regulation governing cotton 
dust exposure and there are no indications that such 
regulation may be forthcoming in the near future. The only 
direct intervention by the Department of Manpower took the 
form of visits by factory inspectors to all mills from which 
compensation claims arose and investigations of those mills. 
The findings of the inspectors were "kept secret from the 
Union, in spite of the fact that the Union had initiated 
these claims.""e While it was made apparent to the major 
textile corporations that measures are required to prevent 
byssinosis, "it cannot be expected that all will follow suit 
until effective legislation is promulgated.""7 In this 
regard, the US Cotton Dust Standard could serve as a model 
for a regulation promulgated in terms of MOSA, one that sets 
standards for dust levels, for medical surveillance and for 
comprehensive surveillance of the workplace. Responsibility 
for the implementation of such a regulation should not be 
left entirely to employers, however, but should be monitored 
by the Department of Manpower and by trade unions. 
Summary. 
The NUTW's Brown Lung Campaign started in 1982 with the 
first textile mil ls being surveyed i.n that year. Less than 
two years later, the campaign and the emergent 'health and 
safety programme of the union came to a standstill, due in 
part to the disappearance of the portfolio of medical 
officer, but also as a result of the union's failure to 
define and sustain a role for itself around health and 
safety issues in the textile mills. 
Despite the problems experienced by the union. it had, in a 
relatively short period, succeeded in raising the awareness 
· of both its own members and their employers with regard to 
the hazard of cotton dust and byssinosis, the disease that 
56. White: In Zwi & Duncan Saunders (eds): op cit, 1985 
57. White: op cit, 1989, p.442 
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exposed workers were contracting in the mills. The survey 
co-ordinated by White, as medical officer in the union, was 
able to confirm "a definite. although modest, prevalence of 
byssinosis in the South African cotton textile industry. 
Additional confirmation has come from the awarding of 
Workmen's Compensation disability pensions for byssinosis to 
38 workers between 1982 and 1986."88 During the course of 
the campaign. the union was able to engage a number of the 
major employers in the textile industry on conditions in the 
plants and was successful in demanding improvements. 
The employer association for the industry, the Textile 
Federation, co-ordinated a response to the campaign and 
established a research programme to ascertain dust levels 
and the prevalence of byssinosis among its member companies. 
Partly through the intervention of the .TF. but also through 
the responses of individual companies to demands by the 
NUTW. management was able to assert its own control over the 
major health issue in the industry. The move to control the 
detection and surveillance of the cotton dust problem was 
reinforced by the legal requirement on companies, through 
MOSA, to establish an organisational system to deal with 
' health and safety on an ongoing basis. In the textile 
companies. however. the system is run by management and the 
union has not encouraged participation. 
The Brown Lung Campaign was thus able to achieve real 
improvements for textile workers in their working conditions 
and aided a number of workers suffering from byssinosis in 
gaining compensation. In the absence of continued 
monitoring by organised workers. however. it remains to be 
seen whether improvements in the companies where the union 
is active. will be lasting and whether further claims for 
compensation will be efficiently dealt with. Furthermore. 
such gains as were made by the NUTW have been confined to 
the companies where it was organised. There may have been a 
ripple effect to other companies. where the NUTW was not 
active. through the role of the TF. But. in the absence of 
legislative regulation and the effective implementation of 
58. i bi d ~ p • 441 
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_such regulation by state, management and labour throughout 
the textile industry. brown lung may still constitute a 
health hazard to certain workers. 
The following chapter will focus on the fibre-cement 
industry and the process through which regulation of 
asbestos dust has come about in the major company in this 
industry. 
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Chapter 5: Unions. management and health in the asbestos-
cement indu§try 
Introduction 
Asbestos has historically been an important product in the 
South African economy. The country has for some time been 
the world's third largest producer of raw asbestos and 
internal consumption, particularly for use in building 
products, is high. The largest internal market for asbestos 
lies in the asbestos-cement, or fibre-cement industry, which 
produces a variety of low-cost building products. Within 
the industry, one company has been dominant for over 45 . 
years, namely Everite, the local subsidiary of the Swiss-
based multinational, Eternit. The following case stu4y will 
focus on the development of regulatory practices at Everite. 
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Unlike the Brown Lung Campaign, where regulatory practices 
were initiated as a result of a union campaign, regulation 
at Everite was initiated by management, although there were 
important effects on various practices once the company 
recognised an independent union in the mid-1980s. The state. 
has also played a more direct role in regulating the use of 
asbestos through the promulgation of an Asbestos Regulation 
in 1987, which introduced a dust standard and various forms 
of control over the use of the substance. In respect of the 
role of the company management and the state. therefore. the 
Everite case study differs markedly from the previous case. 
The high profile and controversial history of asbestos as a 
health hazard. as well as the severity of its effects on 
health, also make the case study rather atypical. On the 
other hand, the way in which health has become an industrial 
relations issue at Everite has features in conmon with many 
other industrial situations. For instance, there are 
similarities between the case studies with regard to the. 
difficulties encountered by unions when attempting to engage 
in workplace regulation and with regard to the disjuncture 
between formal and informal regulation. 
A pivotal factor in the Everite case is the raw material 
which has been the focus of regulation, namely, asbestos. 
Asbestos has been known for its fire-resistant properties 
since antiquity, although it has been used commercially for 
less than a hundred years. 1 During the time of its 
commercial usage, asbestos has become a highly controversial 
substance, about which a substantial body of literature 
exists, with extensive documentation of its effects on 
health. Asbestos is a fibrous mineral silicate with four 
main types in use. Chrysotile, or white asbestos, is 
obtained from serpentine ore. Crocidolite (blue) asbestos, 
amosite (brown) asbestos and anthophyllite are all types of 
amphibole asbestos. There are two main groups of diseases 
associated with exposure to asbestos: those affecting the 
lung and pleura and the asbestos-related cancers. The 
former include asbestosis, which may develop during exposure 
to asbestos, whereas the latter may involve latency periods 
of between 15 and 50 years and often occur after empl~yment 
has ceased. 2 Collectively the diseases are referred to as 
- asbestos-related diseases, commonly abbreviated as ARDs. 
There has been much debate regarding the effects of asbestos 
on health, particularly concerning the question of a dose-
response relationship: whether there is a safe level of 
exposure, the nature of the dose-latency relationship and 
the effects of other factors, such as smoking, on the 
development of cancer in exposed persons. These debates 
will not .receive much attention here. But, while further 
scientific evidence may certainly bring to light new 
findings regarding the aetiology of the disease and its 
pathology, the bottom line remains that asbestos is a proven 
carcinogen and that people exposed to various types of 
asbestos fibre have been shown to suffer an excessive rate 
of cancer, as well as the other asbestos-related diseases. 
In the circumstances, the "case against asbestos usage from 




a health point of view has already been concluded." 3 The 
real issues in the present period concern the various ways 
of controlling asbestos exposure in different social and 
economic settings and the move to substitute .asbestos with 
other cost-effective materials. Myers has provided a 
succinct statement of the problem from a South African 
perspective: 
"The main problem today is cancer and the main 
problem out of the cancers is lung cancer. 
secondarily mesothelioma. Furthermore. asbestos is 
particularly hazardous in Third World countries 
where people receive poor education. where products 
are sold in a way in which they ultimately get to 
people who do not know about the hazards associated 
with a particular product. where public housing is 
constructed with a lot of asbestos-cement materials 
and often in a way that leads to exposure. both 
during the construction process and later through 
environmental exposure. In this situation. I 
actually think that asbestos should be fully 
substituted and I think that there are cost-
effective substitutes for almost all of its 
usages. "4 · 
The following chapter will begin by discussing the record of 
Everite in controlling exposure to asbestos and the 
legislative regulations that have been promulgated to 
control asbestos use. The major focus will. however. be on 
the changes that have taken place in the company's plants 
during the 1980s. the period in which Everite workers joined 
a trade union and involved themselves. through their union. 
in issues to do with asbestos and health. 
3. Myet"s J, At"on J: Asbestos and asbestos related disease 
in South A~rica: An update. SALDRU, Working Paper No.71, 
1987, p. 5 
4. Intet"view: Jonathon Myers, Dept o~ Community Health, UCT 
(~ormet"ly consultant to the union while a membet" o~ the 
IHRG): 20 March 1989 
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The origins of self-regulation at Everite 
The Everite company first started production of asbestos-
cement- building products in 1942 at a plant at Kliprivier, 
south of Johannesburg. As the company grew, plants were 
established in other centres and, by the 1970s, there were 
manufacturing plants at Brackenfell, near Cape Town, in East 
London and in Port Elizabeth. The Port Elizabeth factory 
was closed in the early 1980s and thereafter only a small 
distribution depot was retained in Port Elizabeth. In 1987, 
the company engaged in a major rationalisation following its 
acquisition of the asbestos-cement division of Turner & 
Newall, a British multinational. The result was the 
closures of the Turnall (Cape) plant at Blackheath, as well 
as a plant at Ga-Rankuwa near Pretoria, and the 
incorporation of Turnall's Durban plant into Everite's 
asbestos-cement division. Following the re-alignment, ·the 
company employed some 2500 persons, employed mainly in 
factories at Kliprivier, Brackenfell, Durban and East 
London. Since then, the number will have dropped by a few 
hundred following the closure of the East London plant in 
April 1989. 
In the early period of the company's operations there was no 
attempt at controlling exposure to asbestos dust, nor was 
there any medical or industrial hygiene monitoring 
programme. It is therefore difficult to know what 
conditions were like at the Everite plants, although what 
evidence there is, suggests that there were high dust levels 
and that work practices were not greatly influenced by 
health considerations. According to Everite's Technical 
Manager: "During the 1940s dust removal was carried out in 
the interests of good housekeeping rather than because of 
health reasons. Our milling process was dry and asbestos 
was blown through ducting into huge silos into which workers 
went from time to time. There is no doubt that many of our 
workers in those days were exposed to very high 
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concentrations of asbestos dust By the mid-fifties, 
a wet milling process had been introduced, which probably 
had the effect of decreasing dust levels, but it was only 
from the _1960s that conscious attempts were made to monitor 
dust levels. The factors that prompted the changed attitude 
by the company are not easily identifiable, but it would 
appear that the most important influence was the 
international focus that was developing regarding the 
effects of asbestos on health. 
From the 1930s onwards, reports had appeared in the 
scientific literature linking asbestos exposure to lung 
cancer and mesothelioma. A particularly influential early 
report, although it did not appear in the scientific 
literature, was the 1947 report of the Chief Factory 
Insp~ctor in the United Kingdom. The report produced 
cumulative statistics and analysis for all known cases of 
asbestosis in the UK for the period 1924 to 1946 and found 
an incidence of lung cancers of 13,2% (31 cases out of 235). 
The chances of such a high incidence of lung cancers 
occurring, given a real likelihood the same as that of the 
general population (1%). were extremely remote and pointed 
unmistakably to an occupational origin of the cancers. 6 
Closer to home. a'report appeared of 33 cases of the rare 
pleural cancer linked to asbestos, namely. mesothelioma, 
found in miners in the the north western Cape. The Everite 
company. in fact, had a large share of asbestos production 
in the area at that time. 7 The study by Wagner. Sleggs and 
Marchand, published in 1960 in the British Journal of 
Industrial Medicine, served to focus "worldwide attention on 
mesothelioma as an asbestos cancer. In 32 of the cases, an 
occupational or environmental history of exposure to 
5. Guettinger H: Engineering and technical control of dust. 
In: .Asbestos and health and alternative ~ibre programme • 
. Ever i te, 1986 
6. Castleman B: Asbestos: Medical and legal aspects. New 
York: Law and Business Inc/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1984, pp.53-54 
7. Myers J: The social context of occupational disease: 
Asbestos and South Africa. International Journal a~ 
Health Services, i981, 11(2), p.228 
asbestos was obtained. In the latter, the exposures 
clustered around the crocidolite mines of the North West 
Cape Province." 8 The first of the cases had, in fact, been 
reported by Wagner earlier to the Pneumoconiosis Conference 
at the University of Witwatersrand in 1959, a prestigious 
international conference focussing on respiratory diseases 
caused by the inhalation of fibrogenic dust. 
The report of Wagner et al was followed in 1964 by a study 
by Selikoff and Churg of asbestos insulation workers, an 
epidemiological study "that would ultimately compel 
unanimity of opinion." 9 The latter study followed up 
workers more than 20 years after the onset of exposure and 
demonstrated grossly excessive mortality from lung cancer, , 
mesothelioma, and gastrointestinal cancer, in addition to 
asbestosis. The above are only a few examples of the 
growing academic focus that was developing, both nationally 
and internationally, regarding the hazards of asbestos. The 
academic focus contributed to public awareness of the 
asbestos and health issue and the Wagner and Selikoff 
studies, in particular, were key contributions to the 
process. 10 
In the 1 ight of the above, . it is perhaps surprising that 
Everite started taking action only at a relatively late 
stage and that, when it did, it appears to have been geared 
initially only to monitoring dust levels and not to 
implementing comprehensive controls. At first, starting in 
1961, dust levels were measured on an infrequent basis by 
company staff. Following the increasing spate of adverse 
information regarding asbestos, "Everite was obliged to pay 
increasing attention to dust control measures" 11 and, in 
1969, the then Pneumoconiosis Research Unit carried out the 
first independent and detailed measurements at the 
Kliprivier plant. Later, in the early 1970s, dust surveys 
8. Castleman: op cit, p.92 
9. ibid, p. 97 
10. Interview: B Gibson, Public Affairs Consultant to 
Everite Ltd; and P du Preez and K Sorsa of Everite Ltd: 
31 January 1989 
11. Guettinget·~ op cit, 1986, p.17 
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at the Kliprivier and Brackenfell plants were conducted by 
the Nation~! Research Institute for Occupational Diseases 
(NRIOD - later the National Centre for Occupational Health 
or NCOH). From the early 1970s onwards. a clearer trend 
emerged of moves towards the establishment of a programmatic 
and comprehensive approach by the management of Everite to 
the asbestos and health issue. Supplementing earlier 
attempts at monitoring dust levels. investigations were done 
to identify sources of dust. for instance. from bags broken 
before or during transport to the plants. As the Technical 
Manager. Hans Guettinger saw these efforts. "not all sources 
of dust emission could be tackled simultaneously. and where 
conditions were sufficiently bad to place workers at risk. 
dust masks were issued. 11 12 
A significant development took place in 1971 when Everite 
and other interested manufacturers met with the government's 
Chief Air-Pollution Control Officer and agreed to red~ce 
dust levels to the United Kingdom standard of 2 fibres per 
· millilitre Cf/ml) by 1974. The UK standard had been 
promulgated in 1969. although. in line with international 
trends as regards airborne asbestos dust levels. standards 
were steadily revised downwards during the 1970s and 1980s 
as scientific evidence continued to demonstrate the risk of 
contracting AROs at ever lower levels of exposure. At 
present. "the crucial low end of the dose-response curve 
remains a matter of scientific dispute. with a wide range of 
uncertainty." 13 At Everite the initial target of 2 f/ml by 
the end of 1974 "was found to be too optimistic and 2 f/ml 
was only reached by the end of 1978 in 99% of sampled 
areas." 14 
Alongside of efforts to reduce dust levels. other important 
changes took place at Everite during the 1970s. These were 
. that: 
12. ibid, p.19 
13. Castleman: op cit, 1984, p.247 
14. Guetting~r: op cit, 1986, p.19 
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* A group medical consultant was appointed, leading to the 
establishment of a structured programme of medical 
surveillance in 1977. The programme formed the basis for 
the medical· surveillance that continues at Everite today 
and which consists of regular X-rays, lung function tests 
and clinical examinations. The frequency of the tests 
depends on the employee's length of service and increases 
after 10 years of service. 
* In 1976 the company, recognising the importance of 
including an educational component in its attempts to 
control asbestos exposure, included information on 
asbestos in an induction programme for employees. "Since 
1976 all employees were subsequently exposed to an 
education programme informing them of the dangers of 
exposure to dust and how they could help in the dust 
suppression programme. 11 us 
* Another aspect of the education programme was the 
introduction of labelling of all products with labels 
displaying warnings that asbestos is dangerous to health. 
Perhaps co-incidentally, ~he introduction of labelling 
occurred about the time of a visit to South Africa in 1983 
by a well-known American critic o~ the asbestos industry, 
Barry Castieman. 
* A final development, but arguably the most important, was 
the beginnings of a research programme into alternative 
fibre technology. Research had been initiated in 1976 
within Eternit, the Swiss parent company, but Everite 
locally started its own research in 1979. 
By the late 1970s, Everite had thus made a start at 
establishing particular forms of self-regulation aimed 
primarily at monitoring the working environment and the 
health of employees and introducing some education and 
direct controls. The trend towards control continued during 
the 1980s, but regulation also became more complex after the 
recognition by the company of a representative union. 
15. i bi d, p • 20 
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Before analysing the impact of unionisation on the asbestos 
and health issue, however, it would be useful to examine 
briefly the trajectory of the company's self-regulation 
during the 1980s and the extent to which it either continued 
or departed from the pattern established up to that period. 
Management and state regulation of asbestos in the 1980s 
A point of departure seems to have been the establishment in 
1982 of what was then called the Asbestos and Health Task 
Force (which changed its name to the Law, Science and 
Environment Team (LSET) in 1985), consisting of management 
personnel from the various departments in the company. A 
consultant with the title, Public Affairs Consultant, was 
contracted to co-ordinate the activities of the task force, 
whose role it was to manage Everite's health and safety 
prograrmne. This it did by dividing the prograrmne into ·four 
discrete components and initiating new developments within 
each of the components, which were as follows: 
* Inf..QI:mgtion __ and_ education: During the 1980s a far more 
active and assertive public relations exercise was 
undertaken by the company. A position paper was compiled, 
in which, inter alia, the company acknowledged the 
"consequences of excessive occupational exposure to 
asbestos ... and, for the first time, a public admission 
that an alternative fibre research prograrmne had been 
initiated." 16 The position paper was widely distributed, 
particularly to the media. The induction prograrmne for 
workers was also revised and updated and a Safety Manual 
was compiled. based on the ILO's Code of Practice 
regarding the use of asbestos. 17 Everite also began to 
attem~t to inform contractors and end-users of asbestos 
products about safe working practices and about the 
asbestos and health issue generally. The latter 
information was partly disseminated via the South African 
16. Gibson B, van Zyl P: The asbestos and health debate: 
Grasping the nettle. Community health in South A-frica, 
1 988, 3 ( 2) , p • 1 7 
17. !LO: Code o-f practice: Safety in the use of asbestos. 
International Labour O~~ice, Gen~va, 1984 
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Fibre Cement Manufacturers Association (SAFCMA), an 
umbrella body for the industry established during the 
1960s (now called the Fibre Cement ~ssociation), within 
which Everite plays the role of -senior partner'. 
* Dust control and dust monitoring: Prior to the 1980s the 
company had already invested fairly substantial amounts of 
money in dust control equipment, but the expenditure curve 
climbed sharply after 1982 (see Figure 4). An explanation 
put forward by the company for the pattern of expenditure 
is that: "ironically it proved a lot less expensive to 
reduce dust counts from say 10 f/ml down to 5 f/ml than to 
reduce dust counts from say 1 f/ml down to 0,5 f/ml. In 
recent years increasing technical sophistication has been 
necessary to control dust." 18 A large part of the costs 
appears to have been due to the upgrading of extraction 
systems and the installation of high capacity dust 
filters. Heavy duty vacuum cleaners were also introduced, 
along with "a number of automatic feeding and handling 
systems to eliminate, or at least reduce, the manual 
handling of raw asbestos or waste." 19 Other aspects of 
dust control addressed by Everite are the use of 
extraction systems and slow-running machines for use in 
machining and working asbestos-cement products, together 
with improved methods for recycling waste and waste 
management in general. As regards dust levels in the 
plants, Everite spokespersons recently claimed that there 
were no counts above the 1 f/ml legal limit and that the 
vast majority (more than 90%) "are routinely below 0,5 
f/ml". 20 
\ 
* Health ~urveillance: A crucial component of the Asbestos 
and Health progranune is health surveillance, which was put 
in place in 1976 and which has since then undergone 
refinements rather than major changes. The area of health 
surveillance is one in which unionisation has had an 
important impact. 
18. Guettinger: op cit, 1986, p.20 
19. ibid, p.22 
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Source: Presentation on Asbestos and Health and Alternative 
Fibre Programme, Everite Limited, February 1986. 
* Alternative fibre research programme: Everite has 
continued with its research programme into alternative 
fibres for building materials. By 1988, it had launched 
non-asbestos fibre-cement in the flat sheet range of 
products and had undertaken a verbal commitment to phase 
out asbestos fibre from all products, except pipes, by the 
early 1990s. The search for alternative fibres would 
suggest that the company has de facto recognised the 
dangers of working with asbestos. Everite's official 
position, however, continues to be that the material can 
be used safely under strictly controlled conditions.a1 
Concurrent with the above developments, which were mainly 
concerned with the labour process at Everite and the 
company's public profile, the 1980s saw an unusual 
development regarding legislative regulation of asbestos. 
What occurred was that the Fibre Cement Association 
approached the Department of Manpower towards the end of 
1984, suggesting that an asbestos regulation be promulgated 
under the new Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. The 
reasons for doing so, from Everite's point of view, were 
twofold. Firstly, legislative regulation was seen as a 
means whereby an outside audit could be exercised over the 
industry's attempts at self-regulation. The context was 
that "a great many aspersions had been cast on the integrity 
and credibility of the industry by any number of critics"aa 
and, in the absence of independent audits, the effectivity 
of the company's own control mechanisms was not convincing 
to outsiders. Secondly, parallel to the strategic need for 
an independent source of regulation and auditing function, 
was "a very real belief on the part of the industry that 
outside of the members of the Association. a great many 
other asbestos users were perhaps 50 years behind the time 
and. yes. there was a kind of moral element to that concern, 
but there was also a more selfish element. That is, the 
industry could get its house in order as much as it liked 
but if everyone else was making a mess on the asbestos issue 
then it wouldn't help as the broad public would continue to 
21'. ibid, p.16 
22. Interview: Gibson et al 
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have a very negative attitude to asbestos use." 23 Thus the 
Fibre Cement Association believed that legislation could be 
beneficial, since it was thought that it would be 
accompanied by policing and credibility. 
The Occupational Safety Division of the Department of 
Manpower responded very promptly to the suggestion of the 
Association and an advisory committee was established, 
consisting of representatives of the asbestos-cement 
industry, the motor industry and the Department.·. Roughly 
three years later, an Asbestos Regulation was passed in 
terms of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. 24 
Interestingly enough, there appears to have been little 
conflict on the advisory colD!Dittee over the standard to be 
set: from the outset, the asbestos-cement industry 
recommended a standard of 1 f/ml, the standard that, in 
fact, became the official legal limit. The only areas of 
debate on the committee were over the wording of aspects of 
the regulation and on the frequency of measurements at the 
workplace. 2 ~ The final regulation is thus one wh1ch_has 
been strongly influenced by the industry and which, by and 
large, conforms to practices that have been carried out for 
some time in companies such as Everite. 
Although the Asbestos Regulations place many important and 
long overdue duties on employers to control and prevent 
exposure to asbestos dust, they exhibit a number of 
problems: 
* There is a lack of any differentiation between fibre 
types. 
* Employers who use asbestos "occasionally and incidental to 
their main activity", are exempted. 
23. Interview: Gibson et al 
24. Asbestos Regulations. GG No.10700~ 10 April 1987 
25. IMterview: Gibson et al 
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* Worker participation in monitoring functions is not 
included and the safety representative and safety 
committee system is neglected. In fact, the regulations 
only once refer to the health and safety structures 
outlined in.MOSA, "which completely contradicts the spirit 
of the act in terms of which these regulations have been 
promulgated."26 
* By setting a standard for asbestos, or an exposure limit, 
the regulations imply that, at low levels of exposure, the 
risk of contracting one of the ARDs is small enough to be 
acceptable. This is a position that remains 
controversial.2? 
The major source of regulation as between the state ·and the 
company thus continued at Everite to be management self-
regulation. Legislative regulation in the asbestos case 
must, however, be seen in the broader context within wnich 
the Asbestos Regulations exist, namely MOSA and its 
·principle of self-regulation. In terms of the latter 
principle, the industry's desire for an independent_ audit of 
certain of its practices, such as dust monitoring, cannot 
easily be met by the state, as the legislative framework 
limits the state's role in regulation and, if anything, 
attempts to reinforce the practice of self-regulation. 
Despite some discrepancy between the industry's expectations 
and the state's role in the regulatory process, certain 
advantages of legislative regulation were, however, still 
available to Everite. Gibson summed up the feelings of the 
company and the industry about the regulations as follows: 
"The fact that there are regulations has satisfied 
the Fibre Cement Association's objectives in a 
sense. There is greater credibility now for 
industry's efforts and, of course, there is the 
26. IHRG: Regulating asbestos: Too little, too late? South· 
A-frican Labour Bullet.in, 1987, 12(8), p. 78 
27. ibid, pp.78-79; and Castleman B, Ziem G: Corporate 
in-fluence on thr-eshold limit values. American Journal o-f 
Industrial Medicine, 1988, 13<5>, p.556 
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comfort that despite the shortage of manpower, the 
Inspecto.rs are able to concentrate on, perhaps the 
small number of asbestos users who traditionally 
have paid absolutely no attention, knowing, perhaps, 
that they could rely on companies like Everite, 
Rocla and the bigger users to comply as best they 
can." 28 
Seen from Everite's position, state legislative regulation 
could thus be said to have at least as much to do with 
politics and economics within the industry and the use of a 
contentious substance in production, as it has to do with 
actual control of the working environment. 
Politics of a very different sort entered the scene with 
unionisation of the company from 1982 onwards and it was 
) 
from that source that a far more strident monitoring of 
health and safety practices was to emerge. 
Unionisation at Everite 
The first contact between Everite workers and a trade union 
occurred in Port Elizabeth in 1982, when what was then 
called the General Workers Union (GWU) began to recruit 
members from amongst the workforce. Shortly afterwards, in 
March 1983, the Port Elizabeth plant was closed down and 74 
workers were retrenched. Some of the workers alleged that 
they were told that they had a "touch of asbestos" and that 
they should see their own doctors about it. 39 In this 
regard, the GWU approached a health and safety service 
organisation, the Industrial Health Research Group (IHRG), 
which had been established in 1980 and which was based at 
the University of Cape Town. The IHRG included a medical 
doctor on its staff and members of the group travelled to 
Port Elizabeth to trace t.he retrenched workers and to 
examine them. Only 25 workers were traced and they had lung 
function tests performed on them and were X-rayed.. Of the 
28. Interview: Gibson et al 
29. IHRG: Report on activities +or the period 1 January to 
10 May 1983, p.3 
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25, four had claims for compensation submitted to the 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner later in 1983. 
A more sustained attempt at unionisation followed at the 
Brackenfell plant from 1983 onwards. Here there was strong 
resistance by management to unionisation and a number of 
obstacles were placed in the way of union organisers, such 
as denying them access to the hostel where most of the 
workers were resident, effectively "amounting to a bar on 
workers having contact with the union, even in their own 
time. 1130 Eventually, after a turbulent period at the plant, 
a recognition agreement was entered into between the union 
and Everite in late 1984. Although the workers appear to 
have been aware of the dangers of asbestos - "intensely 
aware of the health hazards of working with asbestos" in the 
words of one union organiser31 it was only after the 
union had gained recognition, that health and safety issues 
could be addressed directly. 
The union's engagement with the asbestos and health issue 
may be categorised into three broad areas of activity, which 
overlap in certain respects. These have been: 
* improving and monitoring company medical services 
* campaigning for the improvement of compensation for ARDs 
* introducing an alternative, worker-orientated health and 
safety system in the company. 
Before outlining the above areas of activity in more d~tail. 
it is worth noting that, throughout its involvement with the 
asbestos and health issue, the union drew fairly extensively 
on the services of the IHRG. In contrast to the model 
adopted by the NUTW in its Brown Lung Campaign, in the 
Everite case, specialist skills were called on as required 
by the workers at the company, or when suggested by union 
organisers, but in a way that also involved the joint 
formulation of goals and strategies. The form that the 
30. General Workers Union: Workers' hostels: an issue o~ 
control. South A-frican Labour Bulletin, 1986, 11(8), 
p.67 
31. Text o~ a talk by Ray Lazarus, T&GWU, to the UCT Medical 
St~dents Con~erence, 30 July 1986, p.3 
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specialist assistance has taken is, therefore, one in which 
"the IHRG acted to support workers in taking up their 
demands in line with their priorities."32 What then were 
those demands and priorities? 
Shortly after the union gained recognition at the 
Brackenfell plant, two fairly large retrenchments took place 
within the space of a few weeks. Workers had previously 
expressed real unhappiness about the quality of the 
company's medical service. When it came to workers having 
to leave the company and return to the Transkei and Ciskei, 
the shop stewards committee decided that, in the case of all 
retrenched workers, an independent medical opinion should be 
sought by way of a post-employment medical check, with 
particular reference to signs of any of the ARDs. To obtain 
a second opinion was no simple matter, however, as it 
entailed obtaining access to the medical records of the 
workers who were to be retrenched, records that were kept by 
the company's medical personnel. The company initially 
refused access to the existing records and it was only in 
response to threatened legal action that the medical records 
were released and the X-rays of retrenchees could be read by 
a union-nominated doctor. Negotiations aimed at 
establishing a standard practice, whereby workers could 
obtain a second opinion by a doctor of their choice, were to 
take roughly a year - almost as long as the negotiation over 
recognition. Once the other Everite plants had become 
unionised, the same procedure was extended to cover the 
company on a national basis. 
The importance of the union-initiated monitoring of the 
company's medical service and, particularly, the practice of 
the company doctor is related to the complexity of 
diagnosing asbestosis. High quality X-rays are critically 
important for the early detection of asbestosis and 
experience in reading X-rays for the disease plays an 
important role, as, in its early stages, it is particularly 
difficult to detect. An independent monitoring system was 
thus able to check on quite specific issues to do with 
32. ibid, p. 2 
1.43 
diagnosis and, therefore. also the practice regarding the 
submission of cases for compensation purposes. The effects 
were to reveal a more accurate picture of the prevalence of 
ARDs in the company's plants and to establish clearer 
guidelines for the submission of cases for compensation. It 
is interesting to note that there was a notable increase in 
the rate of claims for compensation submitted by the company 
on behalf of workers with suspected asbestosis and a similar 
increase in successful claims after the union and members of 
the IHRG began providing an independent medical opinion and 
effective audit of company medical practices. 33 According 
to an organiser of the union, "in the 2 year period 
following the union gaining a majority at the factory, 
almost as many cases of ARD were detected as in the 30 years 
prior to unionisation." 3 4 
A related initiative by the union was that of conducting a 
worker self-survey. aimed primarily at gathering reliable 
information on the workforce at the Brackenfell plant and 
checking the accuracy of company data. The survey was 
started in 1985 and involved the shop stewards at the 
Brackenfell plant administering short questionnaires to all 
I 
union members. gathering information about age. length of 
service and occupational history. Besides generating 
reliable information, however, the committee also felt "that 
it was important to spread interest and information about 
the health problems at Everite more broadly. and involve all 
workers in the issue, and that the survey was an important 
first step in this process."38 The issue of ensuring 
informed participation has. indeed, been a constant theme of 
the union's involvement at Everite. From 1984 onwards. a 
number of seminars were conducted with shop stewards. 
expanding the knowledge which they had gained from the 
company's induction programme. One shop steward went so far 
"":!'~ ._,._ .. 
34. 
":"'C" ._ .. ._,. 
Myers J, Aron J, Macun I: Asbestos and asbestos-related 
disease: the South A~rican case. International Journal 
o~ Health Services, 1987, 17(4), p.660 
Lazarus: op cit, 1986, p.4 
IHRG: Report on activities ~or the period 1 January to 
31 March 1985, p.5 
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as to argue that "the shop stewards were the teachers of the 
supervisors on the problems of asbestos in the factory."36 
The second area of activity which reflected a vital concern 
of workers was that of compensation. Indeed, compensation 
was seen as such a central issue to many workers. that 
Robert Moni, an employee at Everite from 1975 to 1986 and a 
shop steward following unionisation, stated that "the way we 
fought the asbestos issue was through compensation."37 The 
union played a role in two major areas. The first was that 
relating to the medical surveillance programme. particularly 
the periodic and post-employment medical screenings and the 
results of X-ray readings. Here shop stewards learned 
relatively quickly how to ensure proper channels of 
communication between company medical personnel and workers 
who had claims submitted on their behalf for compensation, 
but who were often unclear about the implications. Where 
workers were unsure or worried about the results of their X-
rays. shop stewards were also able to ensure that medical 
release forms were completed and that the relevant medical 
records were referred to the IHRG for a second opinion. 
The second area involved attempts to counter'changes in the 
system of compensation for occupational diseases and to 
improve on the company's own compensation scheme. In early 
1984, the company had announced a progressive compensation 
scheme. whereby workers who were certified by the Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner as suffering from any of the ARDs, 
were given the option of early retirement with full 
benefits. In terms of the option. workers disabled by ARDs 
were entitled to receive a company pension. which 
supplemented their workmen's compensation pension up to the 
level of their last basic wage before retirement on grounds 
of ill-health. The supplementary pension was payable (with 
annual increments) until pensionable age. Thereafter, an 
old-age pension, based on continous service with the company 
to retirement age, was payable. In 1985 the Workmen's 
36. Interview: Robert Moni, ~ormer shop steward, Everite, 
Bracken~ell: 6 May 1989 
37. Interview: Robert Moni 
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Compensation Conunissioner changed the rules determining 
compensation of occupational lung disease in a way that, 
inter alia, created a new category of disablement entitled 
to only a small lump sum payment - the 20% disability 
category. 38 By that time, given the improved rate of 
submission by the company referred to above, the majority of 
cases being submitted .were, in fact, of early asbestosis, 
hence, under the new system classified as 20% ~isabled. 
Everite's response to the change was to argue that its 
compensation scheme was tied to the WCC pension and that 
workers classified as 20% disabled, who only received a lump 
sum, were, therefore, not eligible for early retirement and 
the company's compensation package. Many workers were 
decidedly unhappy about the prospect of receiving very 
little compensation for an occupational disease, 
particularly one that is progressive. Thus the changes 
placed the system of compensation very firmly on the union's 
agenda . 
. The union's response to the changes was to address 
particular demands to both the WCC and Everite. With regard 
to the former, the company initiated a meeting with the wee, 
attended by worker and company representatives and a member 
of the IHRG. This was followed by a meeting with an 
associated body, the Medical Bureau for Occupation Diseases 
(MBOD). Although not successful in altering t~e postion of 
the wee, "the meetings were probably the first time that the 
wee had come face to face with the workers they are supposed 
to serve!" 39 Attempts were also made by the union to 
negotiate improvements to the company's compensation package 
and here the company concede-ct that if a worker certified 20% 
was retrenched or dismissed and later deteriorated, he/she. 
would then be eligible for full compensation. Those 
classified as being 20% disabled who resign, remain 
excluded. 40 Despite the .latter small improvements, the. 
38. See IHRG: Work~en's compensation: Changing the rules. 
South A~rican Labour Bulletin, 1985, 11<2>, pp.15-16 
39. Interview: Ray Lazarus, ~armer T&GWU and CAWU organiser: 
29 June 1989 
40. Text o~ a talk by Ray Lazarus to UCT Sociology students, 
August 1988 
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compensation issue remains an issue for the union at 
Everite. 
Dual models for organising safety and health, or one model 
for all? 
The focus on compensation could be seen essentially as a 
defensive approach to the asbestos and health issue, which 
prevents disease in an indirect way only, by increasing the 
costs of disease to the company. A more assertive approach 
was evident when the union tabled a draft health and safety 
agreement in September 1986. The union had had prior 
experience of health and safety agreements, as it had signed 
what was probably the first ~uch agreement in South Africa, 
in March 1986 with another asbestos cement manufacturer, 
namely, Turnall (Cape). 41 Ironically, the agreement fell 
away when Turnall was taken over by Everite a year later and 
before the Everite agreement had been finalised. 
147 
The draft agreement tabled at Everite was extensive, but 
essentially made provision for the involvement of workers, 
through safety representatives and shop stewards, in 
improving health and safety at Everite. It included clauses· 
on regular monitoring, adherence to certain standards and 
the provision of information on hazards and changes in 
working practices. Along with the aim of increasing the 
direct involvement of workers in monitoring health and 
safety, the agreement was seen as a way of codifying certain 
rights which had already been established in practice, such 
as the right of the union to negotiate over aspects of the 
asbestos and health issue and the right of access to medical 
records. Finally, the agreement presented the union's 
alternative to the organisational model contained in MOSA, 
the latter model having been implemented at the various 
Everite plants already in 1984. The key aspects of the 
union model were an acceptance of the concept of safety 
representatives as embodied in MOSA, although they would be. 
41. IHRG: Health and safety agreement at Turnall - a first 
in South A-frica. South A-frican Labour Bulletin, 1986, 
11( 7 > , p. 42 
elected positions, with greater powers than provided for in 
the Act, and the establishment of a two-tier committee 
system. One safety committee, or set of committees. would 
consist of the safety representatives elected from pre-
determined areas of the plant, together with some shop 
stewards~ and the other would be a management safety 
committee with the power to effect changes in conditions 
requested by the worker safety committee. Within this dual 
system, the shop stewards committee retained the right to 
negotiate on all health and safety issues and working 
conditions. 
Negotiations on an agreement started in January 1987 and the 
first round was followed by further meetings in May and July 
1987. By that stage the union was negotiating with the 
company on a national, centralised basis, which meant that 
meetings were more difficult to co-ordinate and·, when they 
were convened, the agendas were often very lengthy. ~fter 
July 1987 a number of other important issues were given 
priority over the health and safety agreement, such as the 
transfer of the Turnall workers to Everite and then wage 
negotiations. 
An important factor contributing to the delay in 
negotiations on the health and safety agreement arose as a 
result of an issue having nothing to do with Everite as 
such. The issue was a series of mergers, first involving 
the GWU as a whole and later affecting its members at 
Everite. The GWU had decided at its 1984 National 
Conference, in the interests of devel'oping trade union 
unity, to limit the industrial areas in which members would 
be recruited; the building products sector, however, 
remained within its scope. The union had also decided to 
"continue with the moves to form a new federation with other 
·progressive unions."42 Unity talks between a number of 
unions, including the GWU, eventually resulted in the 
formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
42. Maree J: The General Workers" Union, 1973-1986. In: 
James W, Simons M: The angry divide - Social and 
economic history of the Western Cape. Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1989, p.140 
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(COSATU) in November 1985. An ambitious policy objective of 
the new federation was to establish one, national union in 
each major industrial sector within six months of the 
formation of COSATU. In line with that policy, the GWU had 
already started talks with the Transport & General Workers 
Union (T&GWU) prior to the formation of COSATU, but the 
talks became more concrete in early 1986 and the merger 
finally took place in May of that year. 43 
Shortly after after the merger of GWU and T&GWU, the new 
T&GWU began the process of transferring all its members in 
the building products sector, including Everite, to a new 
union, the Construction & Allied Workers Union (CAWU). The 
effect of COSATU's policy of rationalising unions within 
specific industrial sectors was particularly problematic in 
the construction sector, where there was little evidence of 
effective worker organisation prior to the formation of 
CAWU. The three unions involved in the merger to form CAWU 
were SAAWU, GAWU and T&GWU; all had expanded in different 
regions, within different companies in both the construction 
and the building products sectors. The only well 
established worker organisation within national companies, 
however, appears to have been that in the Corobrik and 
Everite companies, organised by the T&GWU. The uneven 
features, along with the differing political traditions of 
the three unions, presented very real difficulties in the 
way of establishing a financially viable and well co-
ordinated national organisation in a sector historically 
characterised by poor working conditions and very little 
democratic or independent unionisation. Despite the 
problems, the merger went ahead, but the process itself 
placed numerous demands on the time and resources of the 
memberships and staff of the respective unions, detracting 
from tasks such as dealing with health and safety issues. 
Added to this was the fact that leading shop stewards at 
Everite were elected office bearers in the new Executive of 
CAWU, thereby preoccupying them with the affairs of the 
CAWU. 
43. ibid p. 141 
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There were thus a number of objective obstacles in the way 
of concluding negotiations around the agreement and, at the 
time of writing, it was still not back on the negotiating 
table - almost three years after it had first been presented 
for discussion. Before the delay, agreement had been 
reached on a number of issues, however, one key item being 
the decision to retain a unitary safety committee system, 
based very much on MOSA. The position of the management was 
very firmly in favour of retaining the existing system, 
established after MOSA was introduced in 1984 and consisting 
of a departmentally based committee system with appointed 
safety representatives and representatives of management; 
Everite management were prepared to integrate additional 
features into the existing system, such as providing for the 
election of safety representatives. Despite some 
reservations, the majority of union delegates who attended 
the negotiations felt "that it was worth trying the system 
to see how it worked. If there were problems, the un~on 
could propose amendments at a later stage - or withdraw from 
the agreement."44 
Perhaps the most important problem with regard to the 
agreement, at least from the side of the union, related to 
the lack of progress in dealing with specific problems of 
health and safety at factory and national level during the 
time that the agreement was under negotiation. The 
organiser previously responsible for the Everite company, 
put it this way: 
"When specific health and safety issues have come 
up, more often than not, management has referred 
these to the national negotiations on health and 
safety. For example, a clause in the retrenchment 
procedure, dealing with screening of workers about 
to be retrenched, was referred to the health and 
safety negotiations. At the same time, shop 
stewards have tended to focus their energies as 
regards health and safety on the agreement. It is 
possible that in so doing, smaller (but important) 
44. Interview: Ray Lazarus 
health and safety issues have not been given the 
attention that they would otherwise have 
received."4!5 
In the process of attempting to establish an alternative 
framework, union-initiated activities in the area of health 
and safety have thus largely come to a standstill. What 
continues is the independent audit of X-ray reading and WCA 
submissions, carried out by the IHRG. The continued, but 
largely ad hoc, monitoring function by union-contracted 
specialists can be contrasted with the Brown Lung Campaign 
of the NUTW. In the case of the latter, the union did not 
succeed in establishing an ongoing monitoring system for the 
technical controls and medical surveillance introduced by 
management, due largely to the withdrawal of available 
specialist skills from the union and the subsequent decline 
of activity in the area of health and safety. At Everite 
some independent monitoring continues over the medical 
surveillance programme, but with little role being played by 
workers around health and safety on the shop floor. 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a commitment by both 
I 
the management and the union members to finalising the 
agreement and implementing it. 46 It would seem quite 
possible that some form of negotiated involvement of workers 
in the pre-existing system of safety organisation will 
eventuate. On the other hand, the drawn out strike that is 
taking place in Everite nationally at the time of writing 
may have the effect of further delaying the reappearance of 
the health and safety agreement on the negotiating table. 
Assessment 
Of the three parties to the regulatory process at Everite, 
there is no .doubt that the management has played the 
dominant role in controlling exposure to asbestos dust. 
Self-regulation. brought about by certain forms of public 
45. Interview: Ray Lazarus 
46. Interviews: Gibson et al; Shop stewards committee~ 
Everite~ Kliprivier: 30 January 1989 
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pressure, the potential threat of consumer pressure and the 
costs (present and potential) of compensation, has been the 
primary force behind the company's adopting a programmatic 
approach to the asbestos and health issue. The programme 
has included a search for alternative fibres and the 
substitution for asbestos in many of the company's products. 
Perhaps the major issues raised by the above form of 
regulation have to do with the way in which company 
practices are audited and the nature of the system for 
continous and effective monitoring of all aspects of the 
asbestos and health issue at the plant level. The two 
issues may be interrelated, but they are not identical. 
With regard to auditing company practices. it could be 
argued that such auditing is primarily the role o.f the 
relevant government department, guided by the legislative 
framework established through the Asbestos Regulations.. As 
indicated above. however. the framework was very heavily 
· influenced by Everite itself. As a result the company 
should have no problems complying with the regulations - in 
fact. Everite is generally in a position to remain ahead of 
compliance with legislative standards. The ability to stay 
ahead of legislative regulation thus leaves the role of the 
state undefined with regard to enforcing and auditing 
regulatory measures in a company like Everite. On the other 
hand, the problems in the Asbestos Regulations discussed 
above. may weaken their effectivity in relation to other 
corporate users of raw asbestos or asbestos containing 
products. 47 
Additional forms of auditing health and safety activities at 
Everite have been initiated by the company management. 
Since the early 1970s, the company has subscribed to the 
safety rating system provided by the National Occupational_ 
Safety Association (NOSA) and. by 1988. all the Everite 
plants had received a five-star rating. the highest provided 
by NOSA. The NOSA system is. however, mainly focussed on 
good housekeeping, which Everite management itself sees "as 
47. IHRG: op cit, 1987 
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only one element in safety management." 48 A recent 
initiative by Everite, which marks a significant step 
towards the possibility of effective and independent 
auditing of its activities, is that of the Safety Audit 
Committee (SAC), established in mid-1989. The SAC is 
modelled on a similar committee set up by Eternit's Latin-
American subsidiary and consists of a committee of academic 
and scientific investigators, some of whom have considerable 
expertise in the area of occupational health and the 
asbestos issue and whose role will be to monitor all aspects 
of the company's health and safety programme. 49 
To date, however, the most effective check on company 
practices has been that brought about by the involvement of 
the union. Once the union had established the right of 
access and the right to negotiate health and safety issues, 
it was in a position to begin monitoring various company 
activities, principally the activities of the medical 
service. As a result, there was a definite move on the part 
of management "from the paternalistic type of approach to a 
more consultative and a more participative approach." 150 
The union's role could thus be characterised'as being 
largely concerned with monitoring existing practices and 
policies on the part of management and through such 
involvement, ensuring important improvements. In the 
process of doing so, the union, with the assistance of the 
IHRG, was able to deepen the workers' understanding of 
various aspects of the asbestos and health issue. 
Through the engagement with the problems of compensation for 
asbestosis, the union was responding to direct needs on the 
part of its members and ensuring proper communication on 
what is a complex medical and legal set of questions. The 
focus on compensation has, however, tended, at times, to 
overshadow other aspects of the asbestos and health issue. 
48. Interview: B Gibson et al 
49. Personal communication ~rem Brian Gibson, Public A~~airs 
Consultant to Everite and Secretary o~ the SAC, 13 March 
1989 
50. Interview: B Gibson et al 
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As was the case in the Brown Lung Campaign, the emphasis on 
compensation has detracted from activities oriented more 
towards questions of prevention of exposure and controls 
over the use and handling of asbestos in the production 
process. 
The real problem area for the union and for plant level 
regulation as a whole, however, relates to the 
organisational system for health and safety. A number of 
functions are already being carried out by the company, some 
of which are required in terms of MOSA. The form in which 
they have been implemented, in particular with regard to 
inspections, training and the health and safety structures, 
has been determined by an interpretation of the law that is 
conmon to many companies. Standards for dust levels. 
environmental monitoring and health examinations are also in 
place, but with regard to the latter, MOSA provides little 
more than a baseline. Although workers may not be sat.isfied 
with all the existing practices .. the fact that they already 
· exist, implies very different levels of experience in 
dealing with health and safety issues between workers and 
management. As a result, it will undoubtedly be difficult 
' for the union to establish entirely new practices and 
structures. Instead the union will be faced with the 
challenge of ensuring the most favourable terms on which 
workers enter the pre-existing health and safety structure. 
one which is. moreover. orientated to a bureaucratic form of 
control over health and safety. 
On the basis of the company's record to date, it could be 
argued that management has primarily been concerned to 
establish audits of its health and safety progranme by 
external agencies and has tended to bypass the essential 
role of workers in plant level regulation. The reasons 
appear twofold. Firstly, there is the extent to which 
health and safety is bound up with the overall industrial 
relations situation in the company - one in which a 
unionised workforce adopts a negotiating approach to all 
plant level matters concerning its members, whereas 
management tends towards maintaining its own prerogative on 
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a number of issues, particularly where costs are concerned. 
Furthermore, the underlying approach of management to health 
and safety differs from that of the union in that management 
sees the area as one characterised by co-operative relations 
and a mutuality of interest. The latter view may be shared 
to some extent by the workers, but perceptions of their 
relationship to management in the area of health and safety 
are shaped by management-worker relations on a number of 
other issues, both past and present - resulting in 
perceptions that change over time and in relation to 
specific issues. 
A second reason contributing to the tendency of Everite 
management to bypass the union with regard to plant level 
regulation must 1 ie in the extent to whi.ch the company 
management has become sensitised to all issues related to 
safety and health, because of the controversies surrounding 
asbestos. Such sensitivity has lead to a situation whereby 
it is felt that "anybody who has the slightest 
dissatisfaction with safety and health matters, I think, 
must realise that they will get a very prompt and positive 
response from management ... its just the way Everite is 
built right now." 151 It could be argued that'the latter 
attitude has been necessary to counter any detrimental 
effect on the company's sales arising from adverse publicity 
concerning its product. 
It could be argued that the actions of the company 
management in dealing with safety and health, as described 
earlier, require or depend upon a relatively tight form of 
control over the area. The ability of a union to contest 
such a managerial style, through participation in the 
organisation of health and safety on its own terms, could 
clearly jeopardise the ability of management to continue to 
exercise such a form of control. 
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Turning to a comparison with the previous case study, unlike_ 
the textile industry, regulation at Everite has thus been 
set in motion primarily through the management of the 
51. Interview: B Gibson et al 
company. The extent of regulation has evolved from early 
attempts at simply ascertaining dust levels, to the adoption 
of a far more comprehensive safety management programme, 
including surveillance of both environmental and medical 
factors. But, due to the controversial nature of asbestos 
internationally and the sensitivity generated at the 
management level of the company over its use of the 
substance, the form of regulation has largely been 
characterised by the use of the existing company hierarchy 
to enforce regulation. Along with the employment of 
specialist skills in the engineering, medical and public 
relations spheres, management has thus tended_towards 
overall dominance of all aspects of the asbestos and health 
issue. With regard to the form ·of regulation, Everite thus 
exhibits characteristics similar to the response of the 
textile companies to the Brown Lung Campaign. Both cases 
also demonstrate a relative weakness of organised labour vis 
a vis management, in terms of a failure to establish a 
structured role in the day-to-day monitoring of hea-lth and 
safety at the plant level. 
Summary 
The Everite case study has attempted to outline the way in 
which the company gradually developed a r_esponse to the 
hazards associated with asbestos. Due initially to the 
international and local focus on the substance, the company 
established a health and safety programme, characterised by 
voluntary compliance with standards chosen by the company: 
The standards used were in line with certain international 
developments in the regulation of asbestos, but stopped 
short of the more stringent regulatory practices adopted in 
some countries. A significant feature of the evolving self-
regulation in Everite was the establishment of an 
alternative fibre research programme in the late 1970s. 
During the 1980s. state legislative regulation, formulated 
in terms of MOSA, was initiated and influenced by the Fibre 
Cement Association, in which Everite played an important 
role. 
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In the 1980s, unionisation of the company led to the 
workforce, with the assistance of union consultants, 
beginning to assert a role in the area of health and safety 
through the collective bargaining process. The role was 
largely focussed on monitoring company practices in medical 
surveillance and taking up various issues concerning 
workmen's compensation. TI;le only real engagement with the 
regulatory process as such came with the attempt' to 
negotiate a health and safety agreement. The agreement was 
/ 
aimed at codifying certain rights and practices that had 
already been established in the company, but also at 
providing a framework through which workers would be able to 
participate in monitoring all aspects of health and safety. 
As a result of various obstacles, the latter attempt by the 
union has not reached any conclusion. Instead, what exists 
in Everite is a framework for managing safety that is, by 
and large, shaped by MOSA and which bypasses the union. In 
addition, there are management initiatives, in the form of a 
system for co-ordinating Everite's health and safety 
programme, and, more recently, the creation of a committee, 
aimed at providing an independent audit of the company's 
self-regulation. 
Like the Brown Lung Campaign, the Everite case, therefore, 
demonstrates a form of regulation in which the rules have 
largely been established by one party, namely, management. 
Responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the 
rules also rests with the management. Although an 
alternative source of regulation exists in both cases, in 
the form of a representative union, the goals set by the 
unions have in both cases been primarily short-term. The 
result has been significant improvements for workers, but 
has not led to workers playing a longer-term role in the 
area of health and safety. As long as the unions at both 
Everite and in the textile companies continue to maintain a 
presence, however, the potential exists for them to 
intervene in the regulatory process through the organised 
strength of their members on the shop floor. 
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This thesis set out. rather ambitiously. to examine a number 
of hypotheses in the South African context. In addition. it 
had the objectives of conceptualising regulation, examining 
_contemporary organisational aspects of workplace health and 
safety and. finally, examining the capacity of unions to 
effect changes to working conditions. In concluding. it 
would be appropriate to return briefly to the hypotheses and 
to discuss the objectives in t_he 1 ight of the materia 1 that 
has been presented in the thesis. 
All three hypotheses had a conunon theme, namely. that there 
are certain factors which tend to contribute to a failure of 
regulatory activity in the manufacturing sector. One 
significant factor is the nature of health and safety 
itself, which. it was proposed. should be seen as a 
' particularly complex issue. one that embodies both 
organisational and technical aspects. It is, moreover. 
through the failure of management and labour to take. 
adequate account of the various dimensions to the issue. 
that regulation may be weakened. 
That occupational health and safety is a complex issue 
should be uncontroversial. The detection of dangers at 
work. industrial hygiene monitoring and medical surveillance 
bring together medical and physical sciences and the high 
level skills required for their practice. Moreover. there 
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are large areas of disputation in these fields and the 
outcome of particular activities. such as assessing the X-
ray of a worker exposed to asbestos. or determining the lungr 
function of a worker with symptoms of byssinosis. may be 
·influenced by a variety of factors, many of which have to do 
with socio-political and socio-economic factors. 
As the case studies presented in the thesis have tried to 
show. such complexities pose problems for trade unions. in 
that they often have to rely on specialist skills. Such 
reliance is not necessarily problematic in itself, but may 
become so. if the technicalities of- dealing with health and 
safety matters are not complemented by an organisational 
approach that provides a clear role for workers in the area. 
Such an imbalance was. to some extent. present in both the 
Everite case and in the Brown Lung Campaign. As regards the 
approach of management to health and safety issues. the way 
in which MOSA has been implemented. suggests that the 
technical skills required to monitor health and safety have 
l~rgely been ignored. The fact that the functions of safety 
representatives are very limited is. however. largely 
determined by the failure of the Act to specify a need for 
safety representatives to receive adequate training. 
particularly in the area of industrial hygiene. 
Conceptually. it could be argued that to separate workplace 
health and safety into technical and organisational 
components ignores the way in which production is 
simultaneously a technical and social process. in which 
'technical' matters are constrained and indeed defined by 
the social relations of which they are a part. The 
discussion in the preceding chapters has. if anything. 
confirmed the validity of such an approach and thereby 
highlighted an over-simplification in the original 
hypothesis .. However. in terms of the skills'and resources 
• required of both management and unions to effectively 
regulate production. the distinction retains some 
usefulness. 
With regard to the second hypothesis. namely that trade. 
union pressure is commonly orientated towards short-term 
goals. which may of limited preventive ·efficacy. it could be 
concluded that the material presented in the thesis bears 
out the hypothesis; In the case studies, compensation 
played a major role and, in neither situation, has the union 
been able to engage systematically with monitoring health 
and safety on a longer term basis. nor been able to monitor 
the success of the preventive measures introduced as a 
result of their demands. That is not to say that the unions 
which fall within the democratic tradition of unionism in. 
South Africa, are incapable of effecting changes and 
improvements to the working environment. On the contrary, 
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the thesis has tried to demonstrate the,substantial gains 
made by certain unions through the collective bargaining 
process. So long as trade unions have to rely on dealing 
with regulati~n of health and safety through a collective 
bargaining process that is dominated by a host of other 
priorities, however, their ability to formulate longer-term . 
policy and preventive strategy around health and safety will 
be limited. 
The f i'nal hypothesis, concerning the apparent disjuncture 
between formal and informal regulation and between the roles 
assigned to state, employers and workers and their actual 
practices, was aimed at guiding the analysis of legislative 
regulation and regulation through the collective bargaining 
process. Through the analysis of the contemporary 
legislative framework and the implementation of MOSA, as 
well as the case studies, an attempt was made to demonstrate 
different sources of regulation and the way they may 
interact. Perhaps the most significant feature of the South 
African situation is the existence of a duality in the 
regulatory process, with regulation being effected by trade 
unions through collective bargaining, alongside a 
legislative framework aimed at ensuring plant level 
regulation through the combined efforts of management and 
labour. Given the dualism, it could be argued that a 
disjuncture does exist between the different sources of 
regulation, insofar as trade unions have not been 
incorporated into the formal legislative framework for the 
regulation of workplace health and safety. On the other 
hand, the roles of the different parties to the regulatory 
process and their practices are determined by a complex set 
of factors, which are independent of whether they engage 
with the regulatory process through a formal legal 
obligation, or through collective bargaining. To come to 
grips with some of the above factors, the thesis had as one 
of its objectives the conceptualisation of regulation. 
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From a range of radical writing on workplace health and 
safety, a dominant approach identified was one which views 
the control of dangers in production within the context of 
antagonistic relations between workers and employers. 
Moreover, the literature is based on the assumption that 
managerial strategies of control over the labour process are 
a constant factor in industrial relations and that 
iQterventions by organised labour to effect changes also 
have to do with the question of control. 
In contrast, the present thesis has tried to suggest that 
the nature of control, as it applies to health and safety; 
amounts to regulation, .or control, by means of rules and 
procedures. The concept of regu'lation has been used to 
specify particular forms of control over production, which 
are aimed at technical and behavioural aspects and which, 
more importantly, may be in the interest of both employers 
and workers. Thus there is an important interdependence 
between employers and workers in the labour process~ with 
regard to health and safety, despite the fact that the 
particular interests of the parties in the regulation of 
production may differ. Their· interdependence is, inter 
alia, based on the fact that improvements in'working 
conditions may require the fulfillment of a responsibility 
by the employer, while the implementation of certain 
procedures, aimed at ensuring safe working practices, 
requires the co-operation and participation of workers. 
The existence of an objective interdependence between 
employers and workers and a mutual interest in reducing the 
degree of risk associated with production does not, however, 
necess~rily lead to co-operative relationships. The South 
African situation provides evidence of industrial relations 
which are characterised by high levels of conflict and a 
collective bargaining system that tends towards antagonistic 
co-operation. 
In both case studies examined in Chapters 4 and 5, changes 
to the production process and the monitoring of hazards and 
their effects were introduced in the context of management-
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union relations that exhibited a relatively high degree of 
conflict. For instance, in the case of the Brown Lung 
Campaign, there was a strike at David Whitehead just prior 
to the campaign, as well as the protracted struggle by the 
NUTW for recognition at the Frame group of companies. The 
process leading up to the recognition of the GWU at Everite 
and the union's attempt to gain access to the medical 
records of its members was also a very conflictual process. 
But in both cases, there were co-operative elements as well. 
The NUTW gained access for the purposes of the survey at 
David Whitehead and other plants, and the managements of a 
number of companies agreed to a number of the unions demands 
quite readily. At Everite, co-operation did eventuate with 
regard to the union's role in the medical surveillance 
programme. 
It could be argued however, that the co-existence of co-
operative and conflictual relations is a feature of most 
issues that .are subjec·t to collective bargaining. What is 
more specific to the area of health and safety is the way in 
which regulation comes about and what it achieves, both in 
terms of technical controls over production and in terms of 
its impact on industrial relations. 
In the textile companies in which the NUTW campaigned for 
improvements, there were few pre-existing forms of control 
by management over factors affecting health and safety. It 
took roughly two years before the various companies, guided 
by and co-ordinated in their actions by the Textile 
Federation, moved to implement a comprehensive research and 
medical monitoring programme. Their response could arguably 
be seen as an attempt by management in the industry to gain 
the initiative, presumably, to enable management to 
formulate responses unilaterally, rather than through t~e 
collective bargaining process. In the case of Everite, it 
· has been argued that the management are concerned to 
mairitain a particular system for dealing with health and 
safety matters, a system that enables them to exercise a 
particular form of control, given the sensitivities 
surrounding the use of asbestos in production. The form of 
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control adopted in the Everite case could be described -as 
bureaucratic control, as conceptually developed.by Edwards. 1 
In both cases, however, the development of a certain form of 
control and its application to the area of health and safety 
does not appear to be directly connected with the concern by 
management to organise the appropriation of surplus. 
Rather, it could be argued, on the basis of the Everite and 
the Brown Lung Campaign studies, that control related to 
health and safety is concerned with the effects of 
production and is therefore precisely related to regulation 
over work and the way in which work is carried out. Thus, 
regulation implies a social process, from which both sides 
to -the labour relation stand to gain and in which. it is 
possible for control over an 'external environment' to be 
shared between actors. In both the asbestos-cement and the 
textile industries, for example, unionisation has led to a 
situation whereby the collective bargaining process provides 
a vehicle for informal regulation and a means whereby an 
organised workforce is able to exercise some influence oyer 
the regulatory process. The studies have also, however, 
illustrated the difficulties that unions may experience with 
regard to engaging with both the technical and industrial . 
relations aspects of health and safety matters, particularly 
as regards the definition and maintenance of a clear role 
for workers at the plant level. 
To conceive of regulation as a process of control over the 
working environment, via the establishment of rules and 
procedures, does not necessarily contradict the existence of 
fundamental antagonisms between capital and labour and the 
fact that within the capitalist labour process the existence 
of conflict becomes the 'normal' state of affairs. In'the 
latter re.gard, it is perhaps the absence cf conflict, or the 
way in which an absence of conflict is achieved, that 
requires more urgent analysis, particularly in the field of 
health and safety. What this thesis suggests is that 
-------------
1. Edwaxds F:: Contested terrain: The trans-formation o-f the 
workplace in the twentieth century. London: Heineman~ 
1979 
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control may operate at different levels: at the level of the 
working environment and the actions of individuals within 
that environment, at the. level of work organisation and at 
the level of organising the appropriation of surplus. The 
concept of regulation suggested in the thesis requires 
further research, however, particularly in the light of 
critical comments on the idea of 'levels of control' 
advanced by writers such as Ramsay.2 
The regulation of production also crucially involves the 
state, as a source of legislation aimed at establishing the 
minimum standards necessary for production to proceed, 
having regard to the health and safety of workers. In South 
Africa, the state has historically played a limited role, 
bpth in that legislative regulation has been minimal and in 
that there has been weak enforcement of legislation. With 
the introduction of MOSA and the concept of self-regulation 
contained in the Act, the state could be seen to be 
addressing the historical limitation on its own role, but it 
·has done so by withdrawing further from direct, formal 
regulation and by establishing a system whereby 
responsibility for regulation rests primarily with the 
employer and~ to a limited extent, with work~rs. 
Through MOSA and its regulations, the state has placed new 
limits on freedom of action of management in the workplace 
and its freedom to ignore the effects of production on the 
health and safety of workers. But, at the same time as 
introducing such limitations, MOSA provides a relatively 
weak and ambiguous system for monitoring the extent to which 
management complies with its responsibilities.· Everite's 
search for alternative auditing systems is evidence of the 
failure of the legislative framework to provide effective 
checks on regulatory activities. More importantly, the way 
in which the Act is being implemented, especially with 
regard to the safety representative and safety committee 
2. Ramsay H: What is participation ~or? A critical 
evaluation o~ •1abour processi analyses o~ job re~orm. 
In: Knights D, Wilmott H, Collinson D (eds): Job 
redesign: Critical perspectives on the labour process. 
UK & USA: Gower, 1985, p.61-62 
system, undermines the role of labour in the regulation 
process and thereby cripples the potential·for effective 
self-regulation, a form of regulation in which management 
and labour 'share' control over the working environment. In 
other countries, particularly the Scandinavian countries, 
the state has intervened in such a way as to contribute 
significantly to the growth .of workplace organisation around 
health and safety and to the erosion of manageri~l authority 
with regard to such issues. The right of safety 
representatives in Sweden to stop work is a clear example. 
It is only through the state's interve_ning in such ways.that 
self-regulation at the enterprise level can be meaningful. 
In the case of MOSA, it could be argued that the Act does 
provide significant rights and powers for the safety 
represenatives a~d for organised labour to use in the 
interests of its members. Moreover, were trade unions to 
engage with the system set in place by MOSA, it is quite 
possible that they would be able to acquire further powers 
within the area of health and safety. Such a scenario would 
be analogous to the protection that unions have gained in 
the area of unfair dismissals through the various rulings of 
the Industrial Court. But research on the implementation of 
MOSA and the two case studies demonstrate that trade unions 
have, by and large, not engaged with the legislative 
framework, nor have they been successful in establishing any 
alternative to the system provided for by the Act. As a 
result of the absence of any structured role for workers, a 
disjuncture has developed in the regulatory process. The 
disjuncture can be seen in that management complies with its 
legal responsibilities, insofar as it. is necessary to do so; 
a management-dominated and bureaucratically controlled 
safety system monitors safety at the enterprise level; and 
the state polices a system that is unlikely, in many cases, 
to accurately reveal the state of health and safety in a 
particular plant. 
An important contributory factor in the decision of unions 
not to use or participate in the safety system provided for 
by MOSA, is the particular shop-floor tradition of the 
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democratic trade unions in this country. As demonstrated in 
the thesis, that tradition has enabled unions to deal 
effectively with a range of health and safety issues through 
the collective bargaining process and through the role of 
shop steward structures. Given that tradition, MOSA was 
perhaps doomed to failure as regards the self-regulation 
philosophy, in that it imported a model that did not take 
into account some crucial realities of the South African· 
industrial relations system. 
There are, however, also some important limitations to the 
shop-floor bargaining tradition of many trade unions, when 
applied to issues in the area of health and safety. 
Firstly, to rely on shop-floor bargaining when management is 
legally obliged to implement a safety system, which can all 
too easily reflect its particular interests, is to risk 
weakening the role of workers in continued monitoring of 
productiori. Secondly, dealing with health and safety issues 
through the collective bargaining process, on an ad.hoc 
basis, runs the risk of ignoring the need for workers and 
unions to develop the particular skills required to deal 
with complex technical and industrial relations aspects of 
the dangers of work. Finally, the shop-floor tradition of 
dealing with health and safety is unable to engage with the 
regulatory process as it applies to manufacturing industry 
as a whole. For instance, in both the Everite case and in 
the case of the Brown Lung Campaign, the respective unions 
were able to achieve significant gains in the particular 
plants in which they were organised, but they were unable to 
have any impact on the way that other, possibly unorganised, 
plants in the industry were to be regulated. For unions to 
be able to play a role in regulation on an industry-wide 
basis would, however, require that they re-evaluate their 
interaction with the relevant government departments. Such 
a role would also require concrete advantages for the 
unions. 
The potential role for a tripartite relationship in the 
regulation of industrial sectors, is an ·area that would 
require further research. Equally, in the context of the 
complexities of workplace health and safety that the thesis 
has tried to demonstrate, the problematic legislative model 
for regulation established during the 1980s ~nd the 
particularities of industrial relations in this country, 
f~rther research on effective and lasting alternatives would 
be appropriate. If the thesis has begun to lay the ground 
for such research, it will have fulfilled an important, 
albeit unstated, objective. 
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APPENDIX 1: IMPLEMENTATION OF TiiE MACHINERY AND OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY ACT - COMPANY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Co•pany Questionnaire. 
Section A: Caapany Data 
1. Date of interview 
2. Naae of interviewee(sl 
l. Na•e of Company 
4. Product nanufactured/co•pany activity 
5. Does your Coapany have more than one plant in Cape Town? 
yes(1> no(2) 
If yes, specify: 











8. Do you keep statistical reports of accidents? 
all ainor accidents <1> 
all Major accidents <21 
all accid•nts <l> 
na statfstics kept (4) 
oth•r - sp•cify <5> 
• 
[f statistics are kept 1 could these be made available 
Section 9: MOSA 
9. Are you familiar with the Machinery and Occupational Saf~'t 
Act and have you had any experience of its workings? 




1. Safety Representatives (SR'sl 
10. Do you have Safety Representatives in your plant(sl? 
yes ( 1 l no (2) 
11. If yes, how many? 
plant number 
12. If no, far what reasons? 
13. Since what date have you had SR's? 
14. What process led ta SR's being designated? 
SR's: appointed by management 
elected by employees 
elected but subject to management approval 
ie.veta by management 
appointed, but consultation with union/employees 
volunteered 
i;o- opted 
other - specify 
2 
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15. i!Jhat oosition 
comoanv? 
a. top management 
b. middle management 
c. supervisory staff 
d. skilled worker 
do the Safety Representatives occupy 




e. semi-skilled worker 
f. unskilled worker 
g. other - specify 
in the 
2 
---------------- ·------------------------ .--------------------------· 
3 
16. Are any of the following qualifying criteria usually employed in the 
designation of SR's? 
1 i teracy 
healt~ and safety training 
level of skill eg.skilled,unskilled, managerial 
other - specify 
171 
none 
17. What functions are being fulfilled by the SR's and how often? 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 
/daily/ weekly/ monthly/ other/ ad hoc emergencies 
Inspections: (1) 
Accident Reports: (2) 
other - specify: (3) 
18. To whom are Safety Representatives accountable? 
Safety Committee (1) 
Chief Engineer (2) 
Safety Officer <3> 
. management (4) 
shop stewards com~ittee (5) 
other - specify (6) 
19. How are SR's trained: 
NOSA courses (1> 
company courses (2) 
as part of induction programmes (3) 
union courses (4) 
other - specify (5) 
20. Who determines the content of training courses? 
NOSA <1> 
co11pany <2> 
uni on < 3 l 
other (4) 




22. [s training carried out during working hours ie. oaid time 
off for training? 
'feS (l) no ( 2 l 
23. Does your company run a general induction programme' 
yes (1) no ( 2) 
24. If yes, does this programme include a safety component? 
yes (1) no < 2) 
25. Does your safety training affect your accident rate and 
health & safety record? 
yes < 1) no (2l 
If yes, please specify 
2. S•fety Co•aittee 
26. Is there a Safety Committee in the plant? 
yes ( 1) no (2) 
.--, 
I I 
27. [f there is more than one committee, how many committees are there? 
----------------------------------------------------------------' 
28. What is the structure of the SC(s) ? 
No. of members: 






uni on 111emb er s 
safety representatives 
29. If there is more than one committee, hoN do the safety committees 
relate to each other? 
---------------------------------·------------------------------
30. ·when Nas the committee(s} established? 
Section C: E•ployee Representation and Health• Safety 
31. Are there any trade unions operating in your company? 
yes < l > no (21 name(s} of union(si 
32. If yes, 
unions? 
do you have recognition agreements Nith any of the 
yes < l I no <21 
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33. Does your company have a Health and,Safety agreement(s) with 
;iny Trade Union':, 
yes ( 1) no ( 2) if yes, with which union? 
I 
34. If you do not have a Health and Safety agreement, do you h~ve 
Health and Safety clauses in a General Agreement' 
yes ( 1) no ( 2i 
35. Do you negotiate issues relating to health and safety as part 
of the proceedings of the Industrial Council ? 
yes < t) no (2) 
no company participation in IC. (3) 
36. Besides the Safety Committee, are there any other co••ittees 
in the plant(s), for instance, a union shop stewards committee? 
yes ( 1> no (2) 
If yes, specify type of committee 
37. If there is a shop stewards committee, does it involve itself 
in health and safety issues? 
yes < 1 l no (2l don't know (3) 
38. If yes, what is the relationship of this committee to the Saf~ty 
Committee? 
Section D. NOSA ~ Gener~l , Opinion 
39. Describe the mechanism by which health and safety has been dealt 
with in the workplace (both before and after MOSA) Before After 
I .--, 
I I I 
raised on in individual basis ( 1 ) 
7 
17S 
on ad hoc basis in course of regular discussions 121 
with union representatives 
in negotiations between a shop stewards committee (3) 
,.nd management 
by a Safety Committee ( 4) 
by the Chief Engineer ( 5) 
by the Safety Officer ( 6) 
via the SR's and SC (7) 
other - specify <a> 
40. Have there been any changes in the use of Personal·Protective 
Equipment after the implementation of MOSA? 
no change Cl) 
increased use of PPE (2) 
not applicable (3) 
other - specify (4) 
41. Was the use of PPE enforced before MOSA? 
yes C 1) no < 2) 
42. Are employees penalised for not using PPE? 
yes C 1) no (2) other (3) 
43. Who currently has primary responsibility for ensuring that 
the workplace is safe and healthy? 
Rank in order of importance 
management ( 1 ) 
eeployees (21 
company doctors/ nurses <3> 
engineers (41 





other - specify (6) 
44. Who has primary responsibility for seeing that health and 
safety precautions are observed ? 
Rank in order of importance 
management ( 1i 
employees ( 2) 
trade unions (3) 
company doctors/nurses (4) 
engineers (5) 
other~ specify (bl 
I 
. I 
45. If you feel that the responsibility for health and safety rests with 
management, why should this be the case? 
---------~-- -------------------- -----------------------------------
46. Do you see health and safety as: 
an area of mutual interest for management and employees (ll 
an area involving a conflict of interest (21 
other - specify (3) 
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47. Are you hapoy with the way the Safety Representative system works? 




48. Are you happy with the way the Safety Committee syst•m works? 
yes ( 1 l no (2) 
Please co1111ent 
49. Do you think that SR's should have more e~tensive powers than 
those set out in MOSA? 
yes (ll no ( 21 
Please give reasons 
50. Do you think that Safety Representatives should have the 
following rights: 
the right to be elected by employees yes ( 1 l no(2) 
the right to refuse to do dangerous work yes< 1 l no(2) 
th• right to the following information: 
•laws,r•gulations & exemptions yes< 1 l no(2l 
I ,\ 
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*substances used yes ( 1) no•'. 2) 
tmachinery used yes< 1 l no(2) 
•new processes yes(ll no(2) 
•results of safety tests yes ( 1) no(2i 
•results of tests of safety equipment yes ( 1 l no ( 2) 
•gfoup results of medical tests yes(ll no(2l 
(that don't identify.personal information) 
•medical records <with employee permission) yes(ll no< 21 
•accident and sickness records yes< 1 l no ( 2) 
Hactory .inspector's activities yes ( 1 l no(2l 
tne right to negotiate health and safety issues through the shop 
stewards committee yes(ll no(2) 
51. Do your health & safety structures adequately cover shift and night 
workers? 
yes < 1) no ( 2 l other (3) 
---------· -----------------------------------------------------------
Section E: Gener•l 
52a. What ure the main factors affecting the accident r~te in your firm? 
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52b. What are the main factors affecting health & safety generally in the 
fit" in? 
53. What is your attitude to employees bringing medical or 
engineering experts into the plant to advise them 
generally acceptable (1) 
generally unacceptable (2) 
depending on circumstances (3). 
combination of above - specify (41 
other - specify (5) 
~4. Does your company have a Safety policy? 
yes ( 1 I no (21 
55. If yes, is this pblicy actively subscribed to, or does it set out 
the company's intentions on health and safety? 
subscribed to (1) 
intentions <2> 
other (3) 
56. Are employees bound to this policy, or are they made to sign any 
document binding them to any other company policy or practice? 
bound to company policy ( 1) 
not bound to policy (2) 
not required to sign any documents (3) 
sign for receipt of PPE (4) 
sign other documents (5) 
57. Would your Cdmpany be prepared to form part of a standard sampling 




APPENDIX 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF TiiE MACHINERY AND OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY ACT - TRADE UNION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Trade Union Q~estionnaire. 
Section A: General 
1. Date of interview 
2. Name of interviewee(s) 
3. Name of Union 
4. Branch of union 
5. Branch.Membership: signed up 
paid up 
,-, 
I I ~,-, 
I I 
6. Sectors in which you are organizing in Greater Cape Town· 
,-, 







7. In which firms are you operating/recognised? 
8. In how. many organised firms have your members expressed 
concern about dangerous working conditions causing accidents and 
industrial disease? 
most 







9. In how many firms have your members actually taken up issues 
of dangerous working conditions with management? 
most 








10. Could you mention two of the most important issues raised and 
specify the workplaces involved? 
workplaces issue dates 
---------------------------------------------------·---------------------
11. Do you have hea 1th and safety agreements with any companies/ 
workplaces? 
yes (1) · no ( 2) If yes,list number of 
workplaces covered 
12. Do you have Health and Safety clauses in any of your General 
or Recognition Agreements? 
yes ( 1) no ( 2) 
Section B: MOSA 
13. Are you familiar with the Machinery and Occupational Safety 
Act and have you had any experience of its workings? 




1. Safety Representatives (S~'s) 
( 4) 
14. Are there SR's in the workplaces at which you have members? 










15. Where there are S~'s, have they generally been: 
appointed by management 
elected by workers 
elected but subject to management 
approvai ie. veto by management 
other - specify 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 





16.Are any of the following qualifying criteria usually emplqyed in 
the designation of SR's? 
literacy 
health and safety training 
level of skill eg. skilled,unskilled,managerial 




( 3 ) 
( 4) 
( 5 ) 
17. Do any SR's hold officia1 positions in the union? 
eg. shop stewards 





18. To whom are Safety Representatives accountable? 
Safety Committee (1) 
Safety Officer (2) 
Chief Engineer (3) 
management ( 4) 
shop stewards committee (5) 
other - specify (6) 
19. Does your union provide training for commit tee members, shop 
stewards or others in health and safety issues? 
yes ( 1) no ( 2) 
20. Does training take place during working hours ie. paid time 
off for training? 
most training during working hours ( 1 ) 
some " " " " ( 2) 
very little training during working hours ( 3 ) 






2. Safety Committee 
21. Are there SC's in any of the workplaces in which you have 
members? 
yes ( 1 ) no ( 2) don't know (3) 
-----------------------------------~ --------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------- --------
22. In your experience, have SC's generally been established by: 
management ( 1) 
management in consultation with union (2) 
other - specify (3) 
don' t know ( 4 ) 
23. What structure do the SC's usually take? 
membership - mainly management (1) 
mainly management and SR's (2) 
management and union representatives (3) 
other (4) 
3. MOSA - General 
24. Would it be better for shop stewards to have overall 
responsibility for health and safety issues, rather than the 








25. What is the re la tionsh ip be tween the Shop Stewards commit tee, 




- --- - -·----- - - - - - - ------- -- - - -- - ' ----------- ----- --- - - - - ----- - - - - - - - --- - -
Section C: General and Opinions on Health and Safety 
26. Describe the mechanism by which health and safety has been dealt 
with in the workplace (both before and after MOSA) Before After 
raised on an individual basis 
on ad hoc basis in course of regular discussions 
with union representatives 
( l ) 
( 2) 
in negotiations between a shop stewards committee(3) 
and management 
by a safety committee ( 4) 
by the Chief Engineer ( 5 ) 
by the Safety Officer ( 6) 
via the SR's and SC ( 7) 





27. Who currently has primary responsibility for ensuring that the 
workplace is safe and healthy? 
Rank in order importance 
management ( l ) 1-1 1-1 ,-1 
I I I I I I 
employees ( 2) 
trade unions ( 3) 
compaPy doctors/nurses ( 4) 
engineers ( 5) 




28. Who has primary responsibility for seeing that health and 
safety precautions are observed? 
Rank in order importance 
.management ( 1) ,-, 
I I 
employees ( 2) 
trade unions ( 3 ) 
company doctors/nurses ( 4) 
engineers ( 5 ) 
shop stewards ( 6) 
safety representatives ( 7) 
other - specify (8) 
19,7 
,-, , -
I I I 
·------------------------------------------------------------------------
·-------------------------------------.---·------------------------------
29. If you feel that the responsibility for health and safaty rests with 
management, why should this be the case? 
------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
,. 
30. Do you see health and safety as: 
an area of mutual interest for management and employees (1) ,-
an area involving a conflict of interest 






31. Are you happy with the way the Safety Representative system works? ,-






32. Are you happy with the way the Safety Committee system works? 
yes ( 1) no ( 2) 
Please comment 
33. Do you think that SR's should have more extensive powers than 
those set out in MOSA? 
yes ( 1) no ( 2) 
34~ Do you think that Safety Representatives should have the 
following rights: 
the right to be elected by employees yes(l) 
the right to refuse to do dangerous work yes(!) 
the right to negotiate health and safety issues through 
stewards committee or the safety committee yes(l) 
the right to the following information: 




*results of safety tests 
*results of tests of safety equipment 
*group results of medical tests 
*medical records(with employees permission) 
*accident and sickness records 





yes ( 1 ) 
yes(l) 
yes ( 1) 





































35. Are shift and night workers adequately covered by the health and 
safety structures that exist in the workplaces in which you have members 
yes ( l ) no ( 2) other (3) 
,-, 
I I 
36. Have there been any changes in the use of Personal Protective 
Equipment after the implementation of MOSA? 
no change 
increased use of PPE 
not applicable 
other - specify 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
(4) 
37. Was the use of PPE enforced before MOSA? 





38. Have your members generally been penalised for not using PPE? 
yes ( 1 ) no ( 2) 
Section D: General 
. some ( 3) don't know (4) 
,-, 
I I 
39. Has awareness of, and action on health and safety issues increased in 
your organisation in the last few years? 





40. What has been the general policy of your union towards the 
implementation of MOSA, particularly with respect to Safety 





41. General Comments 
42. would your organisation be interested in receiving literature on MOSA 
43. Would your organization be prepared to be part of a standard sampling 




APPENDIX 3: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 
MOSA __ and __ its im_2lementation 
State 
I Mulder, Chief Director and P Haupt, Director, Directorate 
of Occupational Safety, Department of Manpower: 15 March 
1989 
Unions -·····---· 
Building Workers Union: General Secretary 
Food & Allied Workers Union (FAWU): Cape Town Asst Branch 
Secretary 
Jewellers & Goldsmiths Union: General Secretary 
LiquQr & Catering Trades Employees Union: General Secretary 
Media Workers Association of SA (MWASA): Cape Town Branch 
Secretary · 
Motor Industries Combined Workers Union (MICWU): Secretary, 
Cape Town division 
National Union of Leatherworkers: Cape Town Branch Secretary 
SA Woodworkers Union: General Secretary 
South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU): Cape Town 
Branch Secretary 
South African Typographical Union (SATU): Cape Town Branch 
Secretary 
Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU): National Education 
Officer 
Tramways & Omnibus Workers Union (TOWU): General Secretary 
Transport & General Workers Un~on (T&GWU): Cape Town Branch 
Secretary 
Em_p_l o_yers 
(Numbers in brackets indicate approximate number of 
employees per company) 
Airton Timbers: Manager and Safety Co-ordinator (93) 
Alia Candy Co (Pty) Ltd: Manager (45) 
Apeldoorn Lighthouse Net & Twine (Pty) Ltd: General Manager 
and Chairperson of Safety Connnittee (525) 
Argus Printing & Publishing Co~ Chief Engineer (800) 
Caltex Oil (SA) (Pty) Ltd: Loss Control Co-ordinator (520) 
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Cape & Transvaal Printers (Pty) Ltd: Chief Engineer (972) 
Consol Ltd: Plant Protection Officer (647) 
Continental Hosiery Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd: Manager (165) 
Dairybelle Corp: Manager (1044) 
Derek Butcher: General Manager (140) 
Dorbyl Marine (Pty) Ltd: Manager (145) 
Exactocraft (Pty) Ltd: Works Mana~er (100) 
res Foods: Admin Manager (308) 
Industrial Hard Chrome (Pty) Ltd: Works Manager (29) 
Kohler General Packaging: General Manager and Safety Officer 
(432) 
Macralls: Manager (77) 
MB Blow Moulders: Manager (100) 
Meritex (Pty) Ltd: Admin Manager, Engineering Manager and 
Safety Officer (1600) 
Metal Box SA Ltd: Plant Manager (780) 
Mondi Board Mills: Safety Officer (279) 
Multimech: Works Manager and Safety Committee Chairp~rson 
Nampak Corrugated Containers WP: Chief Engineer (537) 
Nampak Paper Ltd: Training Officer (358) 
Nasionale Boekdrukkery: General Manager and Safety Officer 
(460) 
Nasionale Tydskrifte: Chief Engineer (735) 
Nova Knits (Pty) Ltd: General Manager (65)* 
Optima-Hydraulics (Pty) Ltd: Manager (35) 
Orbit Motors (Pty) Ltd: General Manager (300) 
Panther Shoe Co Ltd: Production Manager (331) 
Press Spinning & Stamping Co (Pty) Ltd: Manager (55) 
Ready Mixed Concrete (.Cape) (Pty) Ltd: Personnel Manager 
(234) 
SA Nylon Spinners (Pty) Ltd: Safety Officer (1614) 
SASKO: IR Manager (123) 
193 
Sewrite Clothing Manufacturers: General Manager (205) 
Svenmill: Generai Manager and Safety Officer (480) 
Swartklip Products (Pty) Ltd: IR Manager (950) 
Tory Fashions (Pty) Ltd: Manager (775) 
Case Study_; The. Brown. Lung Cam...Pai_gn 
Un._:t_.9n 
Elias Banda, Organiser, ACTWUSA (formerly shop steward at 
David Whitehead & Sons): 26 January 1989 
John Copelyn, General Secretary, ACTWUSA (formerly General 
Secretary, NUTW): 7 February 1989 
Neil White, Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town (formerly with 
NUTW) :. 11 January 1989 
Mark Colvin, Industrial Health Unit, University of Natal 
(formerly with NUTW): 27 January 1989 
EmplQY..~rs 
David Stacey, Personnel Manager, David Whitehead & Sons: 
10 March 1989 
Brian Brink, Deputy-Director, Textile Federation: 15 March 
1989 
.Case Study: The Asbestos Cement. __ :I_ndus.J;,n 
!Inion 
Shop stewards committee, Everite, Kliprivier: 30 January 
1989 
Robert Moni, former shop steward, Everite, Brackenfell: 
6 May 1989 
Ray Lazarus, former T&GWU and CAWU organiser: 29 June 1989 
Jonathan Myers, Dept of Community Health, UCT (formerly 
consultant to the union as a member of the Industrial Health 
Research Group): 20 March 1989 
-Employer 
B Gibson, Issue Management Consultant to Everite Ltd; and P 
du Preez and K Sorsa of Everite Ltd: 31 January 1989 
194 
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